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ARTICLES
VELVET ROPE DISCRIMINATION
Shaun Ossei-Owusu*
Public accommodations are private and public facilities that are held
out to and used by the public. Public accommodations were significant
battlegrounds for the Civil Rights Movement as protesters and
litigators fought for equal access to swimming pools, movie theaters,
and lunch counters. These sites were also important for the Women’s
Rights Movement, which challenged sexist norms that prohibited their
service in bars and restaurants if they were unaccompanied by men.
Tragically, public accommodations receive less attention within the
civil rights race and gender agenda today. This inattention exists
despite media accounts, case law, and empirical data that demonstrate
that discrimination based on race and sex thrives in these spaces. This
Article focuses on two normalized practices that violate federal and
state anti-discrimination laws yet have been undertheorized in the
public accommodations context: dress codes and gender-based pricing
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in bars, restaurants, and nightclubs. It deploys legal history to illustrate
how assumptions about race and sex have determined access to these
public accommodations for more than a century. Statutory
developments—mostly notably Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and similar state analogs—helped cabin racial and gender
discrimination in public accommodations. Yet throughout the late
1960s, “velvet rope discrimination” evolved, which refers to the use of
legally protected categories by public accommodations in their
determinations of who is granted entry and in their provision of service.
This Article examines public accommodations law through the lens of
velvet rope discrimination and argues for the legal prohibition of dress
codes and gender-based pricing. These policies traffic dangerous
stereotypes about racial minorities, women, and the LGBTQ
community and preclude their equal enjoyment of these facilities. By
offering the first comprehensive account of two overlooked practices,
this Article presents a new way of thinking about anti-discrimination
law and democratic inclusion.
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INTRODUCTION
The legal trouble for Gaslamp, a beleaguered Houston-based nightclub,
began in 2015. In May of that year, some women of color attempted to
gain access into the club but were refused entry. A sympathetic white
woman, clearly miffed by the refusal, attempted to intervene to no avail.
By chance, someone happened to be recording the incident. “That is so
racist,” the white woman exclaimed.1 Commenting on what appeared to
be textbook discrimination, she added, “I’m white, and I got in for free.
They were right behind me, and they charged them 20 bucks. They’re
[B]lack.”2 One African-American woman added, “He didn’t even look at
us. He didn't even look at our IDs . . . He just said, ‘$20.’”3 The club’s
gatekeepers made matters worse. After some laughs, waves, and blown
kisses toward the camera, one of the doormen taunted, “How ‘bout this,
Yelp it.”4 Another teased, “Have a good night in the ‘hood’ . . . Tell
Tyrone I said hi.”5 In a world where legal remedies for civil rights
violations are limited,6 the incident would seemingly fade away.
In another encounter, three Black men sought entry into Gaslamp but
were presented with a $20 entry fee that they declined to pay.7 When
walking by a few minutes later, they saw white men entering Gaslamp
1
Joey Guerra, Video: Gaslamp Employee Says ‘Have a Good Night in the ‘Hood,’ Hous.
Chron. (Sept. 28, 2016, 6:16 PM), https://www.chron.com/entertainment/restaurantsbars/article/Video-Gaslamp-employee-says-have-a-good-night-6522262.php
[https://perma.cc/VP5K-9FSM].
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
See, e.g., Nancy Leong & Aaron Belzer, The New Public Accommodations: Race
Discrimination in the Platform Economy, 105 Geo. L.J. 1271, 1275–76 (2017) (discussing the
inadequacies of public accommodations anti-discrimination laws in the platform economy
business model); Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Rights and Retrenchment: The
Counterrevolution Against Federal Litigation 3 (2017) (recounting a successful movement
beginning in the 1980s to undermine the possibility of the enforcement of individual rights
through private litigation); Kate Sablosky Elengold, Consumer Remedies for Civil Rights, 99
B.U. L. Rev. 587, 598–99 (2019) (describing the difficulties in applying anti-discrimination
statutes).
7
Phaedra Cook, Midtown Nightclub Accused of Discriminatory Practices, Hous. Press
(Sept. 14, 2015, 6:00 AM), https://www.houstonpress.com/restaurants/midtown-nightclubaccused-of-discriminatory-practices-7762250 [https://perma.cc/3KCW-X9AX]; Grizzard,
Houston Bar Discriminates Against Blacks, Lawyer Tim Sutherland Lies, Says Federal Law
Doesn't Apply, Daily Kos (Sept. 18, 2015, 1:38 PM), https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2015/9/18/1422605/-Houston-Bar-Discriminates-Against-Blacks-Lawyer-TimSutherland-Lies-Says-Federal-Law-Doesn-t-Apply [https://perma.cc/VL3C-JN3K].
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without paying the entry fee, while African Americans, Asian Americans,
and Latinx people were being asked to pay the entry fee.8 Again,
suspicions of racial discrimination grew. Interracial corroboration was
noteworthy here too. After observing how the club implemented its cover
fee, a white ally revealed, “They were letting all white guys in for free
and charging minority men a cover fee . . . It never had anything to do
with dress code . . . If a minority male showed up with a bunch of women,
sometime [sic] they’d let them in.”9
After these allegations went public, Gaslamp’s lawyer explained that
the cover charge was not about race, but about gender and sexuality. “Our
club doesn’t allow multiple males with no females, so our policy is to
charge a cover for that group,” he explained.10 He admitted that women’s
payment of the cover charge was a discretionary decision made by
bouncers and noted that “[s]ometimes the door guy thinks you’re a
smokin’ hot babe, and you get in free.”11 The attorney also acknowledged
that there was no predetermined ideal ratio of men to women, and
recommended, “[Y]ou’d want at least one [woman] for a group of three
[men] and a one-to-one ratio is better.”12 One of the bouncers who worked
the door the night the men were excluded was less diplomatic. He
described the three men in a subsequently deleted Facebook post as, “3
old, out of shape, with no girls dorks lol.”13 Those three men happened to
be lawyers.14 They filed a lawsuit in federal court under Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,15 which prohibits racial discrimination in public
accommodations.16 President Obama’s Department of Justice intervened
in 2016 and the agency settled with the club two years later under the
Trump Administration.17
8

Grizzard, supra note 7.
Cook, supra note 7.
10
Id.
11
Grizzard, supra note 7.
12
Cook, supra note 7.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Cara Smith, Houston Lawyers Sue Popular Midtown Bar, Support HERO, Hous. Bus. J.
(Nov. 2, 2015, 9:28 AM), https://www.bizjournals.com/houston/morning_call/2015/11/
houston-lawyers-sue-popular-midtown-bar-support.html [https://perma.cc/YBD7-YX22].
16
42 U.S.C. § 2000a.
17
Settlement Agreement, United States v. Ayman Jarrah, No. 4:16-cv-02906 (S.D. Tex.
Feb.
1,
2018),
https://www.justice.gov/crt/case-document/file/1031751/download
[https://perma.cc/L8DG-QET7] (requiring the defendant to cease discriminating, engage in
training on the substantive provisions of Title II, publicize a non-discrimination policy in its
entrance, and develop a program to monitor compliance with Title II).
9
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At the heart of the Gaslamp fiasco is a constellation of normalized
social and legal practices that I refer to as “velvet rope discrimination.” I
borrow and adapt this term from sociologist Reuben Buford May, who
developed the term “velvet rope racism” to focus specifically on racial
discrimination in nightlife.18 The analysis here, which focuses specifically
on bars, restaurants, and nightclubs expands the concept to focus on race
as well as gender and sexuality. The practices that constitute velvet rope
discrimination have gone relatively unnoticed by legal scholars despite
ample litigation,19 as well as varying treatments in social sciences,
humanities, and journalism.20 Far from an isolated set of incidents, the
exclusion faced by the men and women at Gaslamp is part of a larger,
jagged evolution of anti-discrimination law. Racial, gender, and sexual
considerations thrive in public accommodations despite running afoul of
a host of federal, state, and local anti-discrimination laws.21
18

See Reuben A. Buford May, Velvet Rope Racism, Racial Paranoia, and Cultural Scripts:
Alleged Dress Code Discrimination in Urban Nightlife, 2000–2014, 17 City & Cmty. 44, 45,
51–52 (2018).
19
See, e.g., supra note 15; infra notes 295–99, 301–02.
20
See, e.g., Reuben A. Buford May, Urban Nightlife: Entertaining Race, Class, and Culture
in Public Space 8–9 (2014); Philip R. Kavanaugh & Tammy L. Anderson, Managing Physical
and Sexual Assault Risk in Urban Nightlife: Individual- and Environmental-Level Influences,
30 Deviant Behav. 680, 706 (2009); James G. Fox & James J. Sobol, Drinking Patterns, Social
Interaction, and Barroom Behavior: A Routine Activities Approach, 21 Deviant Behav. 429,
440–41 (2000); Emily Heil, A Baltimore Restaurant Group Apologizes to a Black Woman
and Son for Unequally Enforcing Its Dress Code, Wash. Post (June 23, 2020, 7:00 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/voraciously/wp/2020/06/23/a-baltimore-restaurantgroup-apologizes-to-a-black-woman-and-son-for-unequally-enforcing-its-dress-code/
[https://perma.cc/F7UC-K8EF]; Emily Suzanne Lever, Man Suing NYC Bar for $50K
Claiming They Discriminated Against Men by Hosting Ladies Night (Oct. 15, 2019, 3:41
PM), https://gothamist.com/news/man-sues-bar-ladies-night-discrimination [https://perma.
cc/H4KR-BXLB].
21
See Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.215 (2020) (“It shall be an unfair practice for any
person . . . to commit an act which directly or indirectly results in
any . . . discrimination . . . or the refusing or withholding from any person the admission,
patronage, custom, presence, frequenting, dwelling, staying, or lodging in any place of public
resort, accommodation, assemblage, or amusement . . . .”) (emphasis added); Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 659A.403 (2020) (“[A]ll persons within the jurisdiction of this state are entitled to the full
and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any place
of public accommodation, without any distinction, discrimination or restriction on account of
race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, national origin, marital status or age . . . .”)
(emphasis added); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-64 (2017) (“It shall be a discriminatory
practice . . . [t]o deny any person within the jurisdiction of this state full and equal
accommodations in any place of public accommodation, resort or amusement because of race,
creed, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, gender identity or expression, marital status, age,
lawful source of income, intellectual disability, mental disability, physical disability,
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Notwithstanding Richard Epstein’s assertation a quarter century ago that
“the law of public accommodations could be described as ‘ancient
history,’”22 available descriptive and empirical accounts indicate that race
and sex discrimination flourish in restaurants and nightlife.23
This Article fills a gaping hole in statutory anti-discrimination law
scholarship. With the exception of Joseph Singer’s work and an important
article by Elizabeth Sepper and Deborah Dinner, anti-discrimination law
is heavily centered on the veritable problems of housing and employment,
with less attention given to public accommodations.24 Alternatively,
including, but not limited to, blindness or deafness, or status as a veteran, of the
applicant . . . .”) (emphasis added).
22
Richard A. Epstein, Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against Employment Discrimination
Laws 128 (1995).
23
Lauren A. Rivera, Status Distinctions in Interaction: Social Selection and Exclusion at an
Elite Nightclub, 33 Qualitative Socio. 229, 239 (2010); Reuben A. Buford May & Kenneth
Sean Chaplin, Cracking the Code: Race, Class, and Access to Nightclubs in Urban America,
31 Qualitative Socio. 57, 58, 60 (2007) (examining racial discrimination in Athens, Georgia
through participant observation); David Grazian, Urban Nightlife, Social Capital, and the
Public Life of Cities, 24 Socio. F. 908, 915–16 (2009) (offering empirical data about racial
and class barriers, the normalization of gender differences, and the lack of inclusiveness in
nightlife to argue that nightlife can serve as a bonding mechanism).
24
Most generally, Joseph Singer has shaped recent legal thinking on race and public
accommodations, whereas Elizabeth Sepper and Deborah Dinner have recently written about
sex discrimination in public accommodations. See Joseph William Singer, We Don’t Serve
Your Kind Here: Public Accommodations and the Mark of Sodom, 95 B.U. L. Rev. 929, 930,
950 (2015); Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private
Property, 90 Nw. L. Rev. 1283, 1286, 1296 (1996); Elizabeth Sepper & Deborah Dinner, Sex
in Public, 129 Yale L.J. 78, 83 (2019). This Article is indebted to their work and extends their
analyses. There are also some helpful but dated accounts of discrimination in bars and
nightclubs in a few student notes. These various insights are all helpful but fail to capture the
robustness of contemporary public accommodations discrimination. See, e.g., Lisa Gabrielle
Lerman & Annette K. Sanderson, Project, Discrimination in Access to Public Places: A
Survey of State and Federal Public Accommodations Laws, 7 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change
215, 250 (1978); Alan J. Hoff, Note, A Proposed Analysis for Gender-Based Practices and
State Public Accommodations Laws, 16 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 135, 137 (1982) (arguing that
gender-preferential practices are acceptable when applied reasonably); Joyce L. McClements
& Cheryl J. Thomas, Comment, Public Accommodations Statutes: Is Ladies’ Night Out?, 37
Mercer L. Rev. 1605, 1605 (1986) (discussing the use of public accommodations laws by men
for sex discrimination claims in the 1980s); Heidi C. Paulson, Note, Ladies’ Night Discounts:
Should We Bar Them or Promote Them?, 32 B.C. L. Rev. 487, 489 (1991) (exploring “ladies
night” events and gender-based pricing in relation to public accommodations laws and sex
discrimination between the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s); Jessica E. Rank, Comment,
Is Ladies’ Night Really Sex Discrimination?: Public Accommodation Laws, De Minimis
Exceptions, and Stigmatic Injury, 36 Seton Hall L. Rev. 223, 225–28 (2005) (describing the
variety of approaches to the issue of “ladies night” sex discrimination around the country).
Some particularly instructive insights have been offered by scholars who have addressed these
issues in a few pages of what are larger, book-length projects on anti-discrimination law. See
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attention is given to public spaces, but primarily through the lens of
disability law or the longstanding public accommodations clash between
religion and sexuality.25 This Article deploys the gifts of legal history to
supplement these lines of inquiry and make the case that discrimination

Nancy Levit, The Gender Line: Men, Women, and the Law 102–04 (1998) (providing
examples of “ladies night” discrimination and examining various state sex discrimination
laws); Richard Thompson Ford, Rights Gone Wrong: How Law Corrupts the Struggle for
Equality 85–92 (2011) (discussing specific cases of gender discrimination and distinguishing
between harmless and harmful gender distinctions); Joanna L. Grossman, Nine to Five: How
Gender, Sex, and Sexuality Continue to Define the American Workplace 2–3 (2016)
(analyzing a “ladies night” case in New Jersey in an exploration of sex discrimination). For
helpful takes on housing discrimination, see Lee Anne Fennell, Searching for Fair Housing,
97 B.U. L. Rev. 349, 351–52 (2017) (exploring the underlying racial biases of home seekers
as they relate to housing discrimination); Rachel D. Godsil, The Gentrification Trigger:
Autonomy, Mobility, and Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 78 Brook. L. Rev. 319, 324
(2013) (conducting a historical analysis of gentrification and offering alternative legal
mechanisms for in-place residents facing gentrification); Olatunde Johnson, The Last Plank:
Rethinking Public and Private Power to Advance Fair Housing, 13 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1191,
1193, 1195–96 (2011) (examining the Fair Housing Act’s enforcement regime and its mandate
to affirmatively further fair housing). For instructive treatments of employment
discrimination, see Tristin K. Green, Racial Emotion in the Workplace, 86 S. Cal. L. Rev. 959,
969 (2013) (arguing that racial emotion is a source of discrimination in the workplace in order
to advocate for more comprehensive laws that will better recognize and address this form of
discrimination); Serena Mayeri, Intersectionality and Title VII: A Brief (Pre-)History, 95 B.U.
L. Rev. 713, 715 (2015) (providing an analysis of the role of intersectionality in the
development and execution of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Brian Soucek,
Perceived Homosexuals: Looking Gay Enough for Title VII, 63 Am. U. L. Rev. 715, 718
(2014) (analyzing cases on gender stereotyping and sexual orientation claims in the
workplace).
25
For recent examinations of the interface of religion and sexual orientation in these sites,
see Pamela S. Karlan, Just Desserts?: Public Accommodations, Religious Accommodations,
Racial Equality, and Gay Rights, 2018 Sup. Ct. Rev. 145, 146; Melissa Murray, Inverting
Animus: Masterpiece Cakeshop and the New Minorities, 2018 Sup. Ct. Rev. 257, 257–58
(2018); Elizabeth Sepper, The Role of Religion in State Public Accommodations Laws, 60 St.
Louis U. L.J. 631, 636–37 (2016) (tracking religious exemptions in public accommodations
law). The Americans with Disabilities Act goes further than Title II in that it requires an
affirmative duty to remove physical barriers to access to ensure that people are not
discriminated against on the basis of disability See 42 U.S.C. § 12181. Some of the most
helpful takes on disability and public accommodations include: Samuel R. Bagenstos, The
Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to Public Accommodations Law, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 1205,
1208–09 (2014); Elizabeth F. Emens, Integrating Accommodation, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 839,
843 (2008) (identifying certain benefits created for third parties by the Americans with
Disabilities Act); Colin Crawford, Cyberplace: Defining A Right to Internet Access Through
Public Accommodation Law, 76 Temp. L. Rev. 225, 227–28 (2003) (exploring whether to
impose a public accommodations law framework onto cyberspace); Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr.,
“Equal Members of the Community”: The Public Accommodations Provisions of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 64 Temp. L. Rev. 551, 554 (1991).
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in public accommodations matters in the context of racial, gender, and
LGBTQ justice. Two intellectual moves are central to this endeavor.
First, the Article sketches out the terrain of velvet rope discrimination,
which I define as the use of legally protected categories by public
accommodations in their determinations of who is granted entry and in
their provision of service. The legal categories I focus on are race and sex,
and the public accommodations of interest in this Article are bars,
restaurants, and nightclubs. I pay particular attention to gender-based
pricing schemes, the use of dress codes as proxies for race, and the
trafficking of stereotypes that come with these forms of vetting. This
descriptive endeavor shows how law, in some ways, is well-suited to
regulate velvet rope discrimination but in other ways is ill-equipped to
satisfy the goal of equal access to public accommodations. Entry into
these spaces is often granted or denied based on stereotypes that could be
considered socially objectionable and legally impermissible if actually
uttered. In ways that hark back to the 1970s critiques of romantic
paternalism,26 women are considered ideal customers because their
presence ostensibly increases alcohol purchases by men (as gifts,
courtship, and/or status displays).27 Dress codes attempt to curate
audiences by prohibiting styles associated with racial minorities or
maintaining requirements that exclude gender non-conforming
individuals. Most generally, the discretionary aspect of admission—
which is lightly regulated as a legal matter28—is rife with potential
discrimination along a host of categories (e.g., race, gender, sexual
orientation, color, national origin).
The second move is normative and unsettles taken-for-granted
assumptions about law, public accommodations, and leisure. Here, I
argue that in the context of public accommodations, the use of dress codes
26

Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (“Traditionally, [sex] discrimination
was rationalized by an attitude of ‘romantic paternalism’ which, in practical effect, put
women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage.”).
27
Rivera, supra note 23, at 239.
28
Robert Bork foresaw the enforcement problems with Title II before it was passed.
Of what value is a law which compels service to Negroes without close surveillance to
make sure the service is on the same terms given to whites? It is not difficult to imagine
many ways in which barbers, landlords, lunch counter operators, and the like can
nominally comply with the law but effectively discourage Negro patrons. Must federal
law enforcement agencies become in effect public utility commissions charged with the
supervision of the nation’s business establishments or will the law become an
unenforceable symbol of hypocritical righteousness?
Robert Bork, Civil Rights – A Challenge, New Republic, Aug. 31, 1963, at 23.
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and gender-based pricing—core features of velvet rope discrimination—
should be prohibited. This prescriptive position is rooted in a close
analysis of public accommodations jurisprudence and growing statutory
developments. Unlike Title VII, which covers employment
discrimination and contains a business necessity clause that allows
employers to discriminate based on legally protected categories,29 Title II
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not contain a business necessity
defense30 and courts have routinely rejected such arguments in the public
accommodations context.31 Moreover, jurisdictions are slowly adopting
anti-discrimination provisions designed to combat velvet rope
discrimination.32 The combination of settled jurisprudence and a budding
statutory shift suggests that the Article’s normative position, which may
seem initially jarring, actually has bases in settled law.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I outlines the development of
federal and state statutes that prohibit discrimination in public
accommodations. These laws surfaced after the Civil War and became
most notable when Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1875,33 which
the Court struck down in the 1883 Civil Rights Cases.34 That decision,
along with Plessy v. Ferguson,35 led more states to pass public
accommodations statutes. None of these laws prohibited sex-based
segregation. Such discrimination was normalized as a reasonable feature
of human relations.36 Nevertheless, in the first half of the twentieth
century, when there was no federally recognized right to equal access to
public accommodations, minority leisure-seekers used state laws to
contest their exclusion from this realm of social life.37 These cases
provided fodder for challenges to recreational segregation after the Court
invalidated Jim Crow in Brown v. Board of Education38 and presaged the
passage of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits
discrimination in public accommodations based on race, color, religion,
29

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).
42 U.S.C. § 2000a.
31
See sources cited infra notes 372–73 (discussing cases).
32
See sources cited infra notes 351, 360–63, 366 (discussing recent legislation designed to
curtail velvet rope discrimination).
33
Pub. L. No. 43-114, 18 Stat. 335–37, invalidated by Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
34
109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883).
35
163 U.S. 537, 550–51 (1896).
36
See Barbara Y. Welke, When All the Women Were White, and All the Blacks Were Men:
Gender, Class, Race, and the Road to Plessy, 1855–1914, 13 L. & Hist. Rev. 261, 271 (1995).
37
See e.g., infra notes 83, 103, 111, 118.
38
347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
30
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or national origin. Gender again would be left out of public
accommodations laws’ purview. It would take approximately a decade for
a majority of states to include sex in their anti-discrimination statutes.39
This federal and state framework buoyed existing local agencies that
developed their own municipal prohibitions on public accommodations
discrimination.40
The accretion of laws prohibiting public accommodations
discrimination should, in theory, regulate discrimination against protected
groups in bars, restaurants, and nightclubs. However, Part II suggests
otherwise and sketches the contours of velvet rope discrimination. I begin
this Part by describing the myriad ways restaurants, bars, and nightclubs
promote practices that, at first glance, contravene anti-discrimination laws
and, in some instances, actually violate such laws based on determinations
by courts and agencies. In the 1960s, some of these entities responded to
the new civil rights landscape by mimicking other integration-resistant
public accommodations. Some claimed private status or mandated the
display of selectively furnished “membership cards.”41 Other public
accommodations rigorously enforced real and unstated dress codes; this
emerged as the more economically and socially defensible practice. Dress
codes—which were tied to sartorial practices that preceded antidiscrimination law42—became a salient screening mechanism for
innocent profit-seekers and bigots alike. Sex integration in public
accommodations was also contested as women fought for access to
exclusionary bars and restaurants.43 But the socio-legal landscape evolved
differently due to patriarchy’s simultaneous degradation and valorization
of women. Sex-based anti-discrimination laws surfaced at the closing of
the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, when the notion of wageearning women normalized, ideas about adult consensual sex liberalized,
and women publicly asserted their independence.44 Owners of public
39

Sepper & Dinner, supra note 24, at 104, 111.
See Charles S. Rhyne & Brice W. Rhyne, Civil Rights Ordinances 71–89 (1963); Joseph
Parker Witherspoon, Administrative Implementation of Civil Rights 531–38 (1968).
41
See, e.g., United States v. Jordan, 302 F. Supp. 370, 374 (E.D. La. 1969); United States
v. Nw. La. Rest. Club, 256 F. Supp. 151, 153 (W.D. La. 1966).
42
Ruthann Robson, Dressing Constitutionally: Hierarchy, Sexuality, and Democracy from
Our Hairstyles to Our Shoes, 8–27 (2013) (describing the historical development of laws
regulating dress).
43
See sources cited infra notes 204–11 (discussing early instances of discrimination in bars
and restaurants in the mid-twentieth century).
44
Sepper & Dinner, supra note 24 at 83; see also Julia Kirk Blackwelder, Now Hiring: The
Feminization of Work in the United States, 1900–1995, 176–204 (1997); Susan Frelich
40
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accommodations soon offered gender-based discounts that were in accord
with this independence, but these deals would be challenged by men in
the 1980s. At this point, state courts had a limited lexicon for gender
discrimination and took different approaches to these schemes. Some
states upheld gender-based pricing in public accommodations under the
problematic logic that these arrangements were innocuous, while some
courts invalidated these schemes in ways that troublingly validated men’s
weaponization of civil rights laws against women.45 Ultimately, Part II
describes how the 1970s and 1980s produced a public accommodations
regime that was poorly equipped to regulate velvet rope discrimination.
Part III conceptually maps out the contemporary operation of velvet
rope discrimination by detailing specific examples. It also explicates
public accommodations owners’ business justifications of gender-based
pricing and dress codes. The most common explanations for gender-based
pricing are profitability, establishments’ desire to attract women to entice
men, and chivalry.46 In public accommodations law, courts have rejected
business necessity-like arguments that use profit motives to justify
discrimination. In addition to resting on heteronormative assumptions,
chivalry-based defenses understand discrimination through the traditional
and narrow lens of “hostile” sexism, yet ignore the “benevolent” versions
of sexism that legal scholars, feminists, and social scientists have long
described.47 Meanwhile, dress codes are instituted because of owners’
desire to attract a particular clientele, keep out troublemakers, and/or
create a certain ambiance. These are undeniably legitimate business goals,
but the noteworthy cases involving alleged discrimination by way of dress
codes lead to reasonable inferences that these policies are crafted
specifically to exclude minorities. Although men of color attract much of
the attention in the discourse on discriminatory dress codes, overly vague
Appleton, The Forgotten Family Law of Eisenstadt v. Baird, 28 Yale J.L. & Feminism 3
(2017) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s 1972 declaration that laws criminalizing
contraceptives are unconstitutional made family law “more inclusive, liberatory, sex-positive,
and feminist”); Elana Levine, Wallowing in Sex: The New Sexual Culture of 1970s American
Television 3 (2007) (explaining how television reflected shifting sexual mores in the 1970s);
Daphne Spain, Constructive Feminism, Women’s Spaces and Women’s Rights in the
American City 2 (2016) (describing the ways feminists challenged sex segregation in public
institutions and thus changed the use of urban space).
45
See Bethany M. Coston & Michael Kimmel, White Men as the New Victims: Reverse
Discrimination Cases and the Men’s Rights Movement, 13 Nev. L.J. 368, 373–74 (2013).
46
See infra notes 368–71 and accompanying text (discussing different views).
47
See sources cited infra notes 238, 376 (describing prominent accounts of “benevolent”
sexism).
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dress codes that prohibit “inappropriate attire” allow bouncers to deploy
rules to exclude women of color and sexual minorities in ways that also
run afoul of various anti-discrimination laws.48 At the same time,
considering the reality of recreational segregation, this Part complicates
the story by pointing to the various intraracial implications of velvet rope
discrimination and discusses the challenges that arise when minorities are
excluded from bars and nightclubs that employ, are owned by, and/or
predominantly service other minorities. Overall, this Part establishes how
the economic and putatively rational logics used to defend dress codes
often crumble upon deeper scrutiny yet thrive due to our inadequate antidiscrimination law regime. In this way, the Article joins a group of
scholars who describe how entities evade anti-discrimination statutes and
offers suggestions about how to think about these laws in the modern
world.49
The Conclusion offers some normative thoughts on velvet rope
discrimination. It does not purport to solve the aforementioned problems
but offers a variety of suggestions that might help reframe public
accommodations law. The prescriptions attempt to offer meaningful ways
in which federal, state, and local governments can honor the underlying
principles of anti-discrimination law.
Two quick points are worth offering before proceeding—one about
why dress codes and gender-based pricing should be analyzed in tandem
and the other about the significance of velvet rope discrimination. At first
blush, gender-based pricing and dress codes may appear to be distinct
practices that merit separate analytical treatment. Since the potential
harms that flow from these practices are qualitatively different, our
normative ideas about regulation might lead to different conclusions. The
perceived differences between the two are not negligible. At the most
basic level, dress codes seem to be animated by keeping out a particular
48
See sources cited infra 328–38 and accompanying text (discussing the operation of dress
codes at bars and nightclubs).
49
See Leong & Belzer, supra note 6, at 1275 (arguing that public accommodations laws
must account for discrimination in the “platform economy”); David Brody & Sean Bickford,
Discriminatory Denial of Service: Applying State Public Accommodations Laws to Online
Commerce 1 (2020) (arguing the same for online commerce); Jonah Gelbach, Jonathan Klick
& Lesley Wexler, Passive Discrimination: When Does It Make Sense To Pay Too Little?, 76
U. Chi. L. Rev. 797, 823–40 (2009); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Volunteer Discrimination, 40
U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1895, 1901 (2007); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in
Residential Communities, 92 Va. L. Rev. 437, 439–40 (2006); Susan Sturm, Second
Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 458,
460–61 (2001).
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group of people—people who do not conform to some ideal style guide—
whereas gender-based pricing is inspired by attracting a specific group of
people—cisgender heterosexual women. This is just one way of looking
at such discretion. One could easily understand both practices as goodfaith attempts to curate a particular ambiance. They could also be
considered crude forms of racial and gender balancing.50 Herein lies one
of the many points of convergence that demonstrate why these practices
should not be understood in silos: both are screening mechanisms that
determine who has access to what are, in theory, public spaces, which
raises weighty legal questions about inclusion.51 These screening
mechanisms are generally absent from other types of public
accommodations (i.e., movie theaters, amusement parks, transportation
services). The average reader would likely bristle at the idea of being
subject to a dress code at a post office or gender-based pricing at a public
park. These screening mechanisms differently promote the kinds of
intimate discrimination that Elizabeth Emens has cautioned against; they
can also limit romantic prospects and the possibility of relationship
formation for socially marginalized groups such as racial minorities,
women, people with disabilities, the LGBTQ community, and people at
the intersections of some of these categories, to name a few.52 Genderbased pricing and dress codes also defy ideas about inclusion and equality
that are at the heart of anti-discrimination law but might get lost if they
are understood in atomistic terms.
In addition to raising questions about inclusion, dress codes and
gender-based pricing contribute to the normalization of ideas about race,
class, gender, sexuality, and the intersections of these categories. This
50
Press Release, N.Y. State Off. Att’y Gen., Settlement with Manhattan Nightclub Ends
Investigation of Discrimination Allegations (June 3, 2003), https://ag.ny.gov/pressrelease/2003/settlement-manhattan-nightclub-ends-investigation-discrimination-allegations
[https://perma.cc/72JE-82K7] (announcing $10,0000 settlement with a club that refused to
admit a group of South Asians, who the doorman told: “It’s my responsibility to blend this
club. There has to be a balance, there has to be.”).
51
See Don Mitchell, The Right to the City: Social Justice and the Fight for Public Space 5
(2003) (outlining the history of inclusion in and exclusion from public space in American
cities).
52
Elizabeth F. Emens, Intimate Discrimination: The State's Role in the Accidents of Sex
and Love, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1307, 1374–75 (2009) (discussing how people with disabilities
have limited opportunities to form intimate relations and how race and gender can “intersect
to create . . . subgroups who are relatively excluded in their intimate prospects”); see also
Jasmine E. Harris, The Aesthetics of Disability, 119 Colum. L. Rev. 895, 941 (2019) (noting
how ideas about aesthetics and appearance can impact access to public accommodations for
people with disabilities).
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normalization can impact the quality of life for marginalized people, as
well as groups traditionally understood as privileged. For example, dress
codes may be facially neutral, but nightclub litigation, along with a
broader literature on fashion, appearance, and employment, demonstrate
that such policies also smuggle pernicious ideas about whiteness that can
be disadvantageous to racial minorities, as well as whites themselves.53
The normalization that flows from dress codes is not just about men of
color, who appear to be the subject of their implementation, but men more
generally. For various reasons, some men do not conform to the standards
that these dress codes demand—and sometimes their nonconformity
manifests itself in disgruntlement or sexual violence.54 Legally
questionable dress codes in these public accommodations may also
pathologize women’s fashion choices by imposing disturbing norms
about how women should dress, act, and behave.55
Similar kinds of reification abound in the context of gender-based
pricing. As Richard Ford observes, gender-based pricing might be
charitably understood as akin to the type of courting practices that have
long defined modern urban romance or could be read less generously as
extensions of a crude heteronormative hunter-gatherer logic that imagines
women as available and present primarily for men’s consumption.56
Either framework positions women—some of whom are disinterested in
romantic pursuits and go to these spaces simply for platonic sociality and
53

See Robson, supra note 42, at 119–20 (describing how proscriptions against saggy pants
and gang-affiliated colors facilitated profiling against young males, despite their broad
popularity in contemporary youth culture); Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Acting White?:
Rethinking Race in “Post-Racial” America 10–15 (2013) (explaining how President Obama
navigated presenting his Black identity so as not to alienate white people uncomfortable with
confronting racism and stereotyping); Deborah L. Rhode, The Beauty Bias: The Injustice of
Appearance in Life and Law 6–7 (2010) (noting how a preference for white-European features
has prompted exponential increases in spending on nonessential cosmetic procedures as well
as psychological disorders in the United States).
54
See Michael Kimmel, Angry White Men: American Masculinity at the End of an Era 25–
26 (2013) (noting how perceptions of disenfranchisement have led white men to associate with
misogynistic and white supremacist movements and militias).
55
Sahar F. Aziz, Coercing Assimilation: The Case of Muslim Women of Color, 18 J. Gender
Race & Just. 389, 398 (2016); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Another Hair Piece: Exploring New
Strands of Analysis Under Title VII, 98 Geo. L.J. 1079, 1106–08 (2010); Jennifer L. Levi,
Misapplying Equality Theories: Dress Codes at Work, 19 Yale J.L. & Feminism 353, 364–65
(2008); Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and
Gender, 1991 Duke L.J. 365, 390–93 (1991).
56
See Ford, supra note 24, at 85. For an instructive examination on the evolution of courting
see Elizabeth Alice Clement, Love for Sale: Courting, Treating, and Prostitution in New York
City, 1900–1945, at 22–43 (2006).
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leisure—as sexually available. These assumptions and the larger project
of patriarchy provide some explanatory power for the sexual violence that
emanates from these spaces.57 But men are straight-jacketed by genderbased pricing too, as this custom can make them unnecessarily
competitive and compel them to perform crass versions of masculinity.58
Ultimately, assumptions about race, gender, and sexuality become more
visible by examining dress codes and gender-based pricing together.
Finally, dress codes and gender-based pricing highlight critical gaps
and live controversies within anti-discrimination law. Some of these
issues, like dress codes, have been deeply interrogated by scholars of
gender and employment and have relevance for public accommodations.59
Most basically, dress codes and gender-based pricing coincide with the
kinds of appearance discrimination that are technically not covered by
anti-discrimination law but often reliant on ideas about protected
57

See sources cited infra notes 384–87 and accompanying text (noting how gender-based
pricing in bars and clubs perpetuates stereotypical versions of femininity while facilitating
increased levels of sexual violence against their female patrons).
58
See sources cited infra notes 389–92 and accompanying text.
59
See Mary Anne Case, Legal Protections for the “Personal Best” of Each Employee: Title
VII’s Prohibition on Sex Discrimination, the Legacy of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, and the
Prospect of ENDA, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 1333, 1354–60 (2014) (exploring how federal courts have
struggled to interpret different workplace grooming standards between men and women as a
violation of Title VII’s sex stereotyping protections); William R. Corbett, Hotness
Discrimination: Appearance Discrimination as a Mirror for Reflecting on the Body of
Employment-Discrimination Law, 60 Cath. U. L. Rev. 615, 624–28 (2011) (explaining the
inherent difficulty in establishing a legally viable appearance-based employment
discrimination claim despite the pervasiveness of this discrimination in the United States);
Deborah L. Rhode, The Injustice of Appearance, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 1033, 1067–69 (2009)
(noting the popular pragmatic arguments against expanding Title VII protections to include
appearance-based discrimination); Ann C. McGinley, Babes and Beefcake: Exclusive Hiring
Arrangements and Sexy Dress Codes, 14 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol'y 257, 263 (2007)
(exploring gendered hiring and expectations for cocktail servers in casinos); Gowri
Ramachandran, Freedom of Dress: State and Private Regulation of Clothing, Hairstyle,
Jewelry, Makeup, Tattoos, and Piercing, 66 Md. L. Rev. 11, 55–58 (2006) (arguing that the
government should interfere to protect freedom of dress in private workplaces in order to take
the power from employers, but remain hands-off in other private settings); David B. Cruz,
Making Up Women: Casinos, Cosmetics, and Title VII, 5 Nev. L.J. 240, 243–48 (2004)
(analyzing how courts have interpreted Title VII’s BFOQ provision to uphold sexdiscriminatory dress and appearance requirements); Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear
Barrettes: Dress and Appearance Standards, Community Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92
Mich. L. Rev. 2541, 2556–59 (1994) (arguing that courts upholding gendered dress and
appearance restrictions reinforces unexamined gender stereotypes and prejudices); Karl E.
Klare, Power/Dressing: Regulation of Employee Appearance, 26 New Eng. L. Rev. 1395,
1418–21 (1992) (exploring permissible uses of gender discrimination in the context of
gendered dress codes addressing hair length and pants).
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categories such as disability, race, gender, and sexual orientation. More
specifically, these screening mechanisms highlight bias against
transgender individuals.60 This issue is connected to the themes discussed
herein and appears where relevant but warrants more in-depth treatment
than this Article can offer. Gender-based pricing and dress codes generate
the kinds of “administrative violence” Dean Spade has thoroughly
detailed.61 As Heath Fogg Davis similarly explains, “[S]ex-classification
policies are unjust because they prompt and authorize administrative
agents to use their own subjective gender judgments to target, inspect, and
exclude transgender-appearing people from the public accommodations
under their watch.”62 But the sparsity of anti-discrimination laws
protecting transgender individuals, along with law’s inability to grasp the
velvet rope discrimination in this Article, render their treatment in these
public accommodations invisible. Accordingly, this Article uses dress
codes and gender-based pricing to provide alternative ways of thinking
about enduring and new challenges in the anti-discrimination subfield of
public accommodations law.
The political and social significance of discrimination is also worth
emphasizing before proceeding. In a country where there is deep concern
about the future of democracy, police violence toward unpopular groups,
tenacious wage disparities, and a host of other maladies (including a
pandemic), it is tempting to dismiss velvet rope discrimination as
inconsequential. Put another way, it is easy to consider the issues
described in this Article as a distraction from more dire issues facing
marginalized groups. But this trivialization faces three problems.
As a sociological issue, this kind of diminishment ignores how
discrimination in public accommodations can normalize ideas about race,
gender, and sexuality for people who actively discriminate, as well as the
individuals who are subject to unequal treatment. Throughout history,
inequality has been able to thrive due to norms that are legally or socially
sanctioned.63 The velvet rope discrimination described in this Article is
part of a doxa that, in many ways, endorses odious social distinctions.
60
Heath Fogg Davis, Sex-Classification Policies as Transgender Discrimination: An
Intersectional Critique, 12 Persps. on Pol. 45, 45 (2014).
61
Dean Spade, Normal Life: Administrative Violence, Critical Trans Politics, and the Limits
of Law 9–10 (2015).
62
Davis, supra note 60.
63
Kate Manne, Down Girl: The Logic of Misogyny 13 (2017) (“Misogyny . . . visit[s]
hostile or adverse social consequences on a certain (more or less circumscribed) class of girls
or women to enforce and police social norms that are gendered either in theory (i.e., content)
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Relatedly, derision toward this form of discrimination loosely
resembles historical criticisms—from the left and the right—of midtwentieth-century civil rights litigants who sought equal access to water
fountains, pools, lunch counters, theaters, gyms, and recreational parks.64
The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP), which litigated many of the public accommodations disputes
that went to the Supreme Court, managed these cases amidst a similar set
of concerns around democracy, employment discrimination, police
violence, criminal justice inequality, and a host of other issues.65 The
National Organization for Women (NOW) challenged men’s-only bars
amidst concerns about reproductive rights, wage gaps, and sexual
violence.66 Trivialization of velvet rope discrimination implies that these
organizations mismanaged their priorities in the past or suggests that the
concerns these organizations had about public accommodations
discrimination are relics of the past. The benefits of historical hindsight
suggest that these were not worthless endeavors, but important steps
toward attempting to extirpate bias in American society that still exists.67
or in practice (i.e., norm enforcement mechanisms).”); Ruth Thompson-Miller, Joe R. Feagin
& Leslie H. Picca, Jim Crow’s Legacy: The Lasting Impact of Segregation 157, 179 (2015)
(noting how “[t]he racial norms of Jim Crow were firmly grounded in African Americans’
knowing ‘their place’ at the bottom of the racial hierarchy” and suggesting that the fragility of
racial hierarchy “depends upon everyday individual acts to collectively uphold it”); Roberto
Lovato, Juan Crow in Georgia, The Nation (May 8, 2008), https://www.thenation.com/
article/juan-crow-georgia/ [https://perma.cc/38PH-Y3P9] (describing Juan Crow as “the
matrix of laws, social customs, economic institutions and symbolic systems enabling the
physical and psychic isolation needed to control and exploit undocumented immigrants”).
64
Dismissals of the fight for public accommodations desegregation came from outside and
inside of the Black community. Strom Thurmond famously claimed, “[T]here’s not enough
troops in the [A]rmy to force the [S]outhern people to break down segregation and admit the
Negro race into our theaters, into our swimming pools, into our homes, and into our churches.”
Nadine Cohodas, Strom Thurmond and the Politics of Southern Change 177 (1993). See also
Malcolm X Speaks: Selected Speeches and Statements 9 (George Breitman ed., 1965) (“The
only revolution in which the goal is loving your enemy is the Negro revolution. It's the only
revolution in which the goal is a desegregated lunch counter, a desegregated theater, a
desegregated park, and a desegregated public toilet; you can sit down next to white folks—on
the toilet. That’s no revolution.”).
65
See generally Christopher W. Schmidt, The Sit-Ins: Protest and Legal Change in the Civil
Rights Era 57–59 (2018) (describing the role of the NAACP in the sit-in movement).
66
See Sepper & Dinner, supra note 24, at 111–14; Georgina Hickey, Barred from the
Barroom: Second Wave Feminists and Public Accommodations in U.S. Cities, 34 Feminist
Stud. 382, 385–88 (2008).
67
Ella J. Baker, Bigger than a Hamburger, S. Patriot, May 1960, at 4 (“The Student
Leadership Conference made it crystal clear that current sit-ins and other demonstrations are
concerned with something much bigger than a hamburger or even a giant-sized coke . . . [they]
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Finally, as a legal and political issue, such dismissals fail to appreciate
the democratic and dignity concerns at the heart of anti-discrimination
law.68 In his comments to Congress on proposed civil rights legislation,
President Kennedy insisted that “no action is more contrary to the spirit
of our democracy and Constitution—or more rightfully resented by a
Negro citizen who seeks only equal treatment—than the barring of that
citizen from restaurants, hotels, theatres, recreational areas and other
public accommodations and facilities.”69 When the Senate Commerce
Committee discussed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it noted that
“[d]iscrimination is not simply dollars and cents, hamburgers and movies;
it is the humiliation, frustration, and embarrassment that a person must
surely feel when he is told that he is unacceptable as a member of the
public.”70 Echoing and building on Professor Regina Austin’s unheeded
clarion call two decades ago for scholars to pay closer attention to leisure
and the law as a civil rights matter,71 this Article calls attention to the
ways discrimination in public accommodations speaks to questions of
democratic membership and inclusion.
I. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
This Part does a few things. First, it sifts through some of the
definitional issues states wrestled with in their implementation of new
public accommodations statutes. Initially, it was not clear whether bars,
restaurants, and dance halls fell within these statutes’ purview. This
uncertainty led to a host of battles between legal actors tasked with
defining and interpreting the reach of these statutes. This included but was
not limited to: intrastate disputes between intermediate courts and courts
of last resort; battles between courts and legislatures; and different
jurisdictional approaches between states that codified these laws. The
are seeking to rid America of the scourge of racial segregation and discrimination—not only
at lunch counters, but in every aspect of life.”); Jack Williams, Lady Lawyer Fights for
Women’s Rights, Ithaca J., Feb. 5, 1969, at 4 (“I don’t particularly care if I ever go into a
bar—not that I don’t drink—but the issue is one of being treated the same way as a first-class
citizen.”).
68
3 Bruce Ackerman, We the People: The Civil Rights Revolution 127–53 (2014)
(describing the anti-humiliation principle that has figured into constitutional law).
69
Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 306 (1969) (quoting Special Message to the Congress on
Civil Rights and Job Opportunities, 248 Pub. Papers 483, 485 (June 19, 1963)).
70
S. Rep. No. 88-872, at 16 (1964).
71
Regina Austin, “Not Just for the Fun of It!”: Governmental Restraints on Black Leisure,
Social Inequality, and the Privatization of Public Space, 71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 667, 711–12 (1998).
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second goal of this Part is to impose some coherence on an area marred
by difference and contestation. I illustrate how, in the absence of public
accommodations statutes, parties challenged sex discrimination through
other constitutional registers. These indeterminacies in sex and race
discrimination helped set the stage for the public accommodations
revolution of the 1960s that concludes this Part.
A month after the gunfire ceased and the Civil War ended,
Massachusetts became the first state to pass a public accommodations law
that prohibited discrimination based on race or color in 1865.72 Other
states followed,73 as did Congress when it passed the Civil Rights Act of
1875.74 The Act called for the “full and equal enjoyment of the
accommodations” and included a variety of punishments that were
considered heavy-handed after its enactment.75 Violators and their
abettors could spend anywhere from 30 days to a year in jail and pay a
sum of $500 to the aggrieved party.76 The Act would have a short shelf
life, as the Court would strike it down eight years later in the Civil Rights
Cases.77 In a consolidated decision involving African Americans seeking
equal access to theaters and public transportation, the Court ruled that
Congress was not empowered to regulate private discrimination under the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.78 Thirteen years later, the Court
72

Act of May 16, 1865, ch. 277, § 1, 1865 Mass. Acts 650, reprinted in Milton R. Konvitz,
A Century of Civil Rights 156 (1961); Wallace F. Caldwell, State Public Accommodations
Laws, Fundamental Liberties and Enforcement Programs, 40 Wash. L. Rev. 841, 843 (1965);
Kazuteru Omori, Race-Neutral Individualism and Resurgence of the Color Line:
Massachusetts Civil Rights Legislation, 1855–1895, 22 J. Am. Ethnic Hist. 32, 37 (2002).
73
See Act of Feb. 25, 1873, No. 12, § 3, 1873 Ark. Acts 15, 15–19 (prohibiting
discrimination in public accommodations, dating back to 1873); Act of Feb. 27, 1874, ch. 49,
§ 1, 1874 Kan. Sess. Laws 82, 82–83, noted in Konvitz, supra note 72, at 156; Act of Apr. 9,
1873, ch. 186, § 1, 1873 N.Y. Laws 583–84 (1873), noted in Konvitz, supra note 72, at 156.
For more on the history of state public accommodations statutes, see Lerman & Sanderson,
supra note 24, at 238–40 (1978).
74
Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
75
Id. See also Sauvinet v. Walker, 27 La. Ann. 14, 15 (1875), aff'd, 92 U.S. 90, 90–93
(1876) (describing a $1000 judgment against defendant as a “penalty wholly disproportionate
to the offense”).
76
Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
77
109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883). The Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment
provided for equal protection under the law and supplied a basis for public accommodations
claims, but nonenforcement and obstruction set the stage for the stronger legislative
intervention that came with the 1875 Act. See A.K. Sandoval-Strausz, Travelers, Strangers,
and Jim Crow: Law, Public Accommodations, and Civil Rights in America, 23 Law & Hist.
Rev. 53, 58–59 (2005).
78
109 U.S. 3, 4, 25 (1883).
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upheld the constitutionality of segregation in its infamous Plessy v.
Ferguson decision.79 The Court’s ruling defined federal regulation of
public accommodations for almost a half century and validated
recreational segregation.80
In response to the creation and invalidation of the Civil Rights Act of
1875, as well as the Plessy decision, many states continued passing their
own public accommodations statutes.81 These laws mirrored the 1875
Act. Considering this Article’s interest in bars, nightclubs, and
restaurants, it is important to note that, with few exceptions,82 restaurants
were typically included in public accommodations statutes whereas
places that served alcohol—like saloons and taverns—were not, which
presented a variety of statutory interpretation challenges. Accordingly,
between the enactment of the 1875 Act and the Court’s decision in Brown,
public accommodations cases involving bars, nightclubs, and restaurants
might be carved into three categories: cases that wrestled with definitional
issues (i.e., what constitutes a public accommodation); rulings that
involved favorable decisions for patrons seeking equal access to public
accommodations; and cases where courts either rejected equal access or
undermined the anti-discrimination norms more generally.
A. Courts and Definitional Issues
Some of the definitional cases came early and typically included aboutfaces on whether bars, restaurants, and dance clubs are public
accommodations. New York provides a perfect example. In Lewis v.
Hitchcock, the only federal decision litigated before the Civil Rights
Cases that falls within this Article’s purview, the district court wrestled
with whether a restaurant-inn was a public accommodation.83 Since the
Civil Rights Act did not enumerate restaurants as one of the covered
establishments, the plaintiff—who was refused food and refreshments
because of his race—argued that the New York restaurant was an inn. The
court agreed and explained that the word “restaurant” had no “definite
79

163 U.S. 537, 550–51 (1896).
Robert B. McKay, Segregation and Public Recreation, 40 Va. L. Rev. 697, 697–707
(1954).
81
Charles S. Mangum, Jr., The Legal Status of the Negro 28–36 (1940); see Pauli Murray,
States’ Laws on Race and Color 7–9 (1950).
82
See Act of Feb. 27, 1874, ch. 49, § 1, 1874 Kan. Sess. Laws 82, 82–83; Mangum, supra
note 81, at 50–51 (discussing states that did not cover restaurants).
83
10 F. 4, 6 (S.D.N.Y. 1882).
80
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legal meaning.”84 It indicated that the term “restaurant” did not mean
“only, or chiefly, an eating-house” and noted the term’s
interchangeability with other designations, such as taverns and inns.85
After the Supreme Court struck down the 1875 Act, the remaining judicial
engagements with definitional questions were on the state level.
Though the state already had an accommodations law on the books,
New York’s Jewish community succeeded in getting a stronger public
accommodations statute passed in 1913.86 The law prohibited
discriminatory advertising in an attempt to rid the city of bigoted “No
Jews allowed” signs.87 While this campaign was aimed at public
accommodations discrimination outside the scope of this paper—in
housing, hotels, and resorts that routinely discriminated against Jewish
people across the country88—it is important for a few reasons.
First, Jewish legal advocacy attempted to get a better definitional grip
on public accommodations discrimination. Print advertisements were
understood as not sufficiently tied to discrimination. Legislative reform
efforts, led by Jewish attorney and future NAACP director Louis
Marshall, sought to enumerate “by name or title, every conceivable
person, place, or instance covered under the law.”89 B’nai B’rith’s Anti84

Id.
Id. at 6–7.
86
Evan Friss, Blacks, Jews, and Civil Rights Law in New York, 1895–1913, 24 J. Am.
Ethnic Hist. 87, 87 (2005).
87
Friss, supra note 86, at 89–91; see also M. Alison Kibler, Censoring Racial Ridicule: Irish,
Jewish, and African American Struggles over Race and Representation, 1890–1930, at 117–
20 (2015) (describing the relationship between African Americans and Jews, and their views
on the New York public accommodations law).
88
Peter Adams, Politics, Faith, and the Making of American Judaism 5 (2014) (“Jews were
subject to discreet—and not so discreet—discrimination in employment and public
accommodations.”); Friss, supra note 86, at 83 (“But for Jews, more likely to frequent upstate
resorts, advertisements such as ‘No Dogs or Jews Allowed’ and ‘We do not cater to Hebrews
or invalids’ had successfully offended Jewish travelers for years.”); John Higham, Social
Discrimination Against Jews in America, 1830–1930, 47 Publ’ns Am. Jewish Hist. 1, 12–14
(1957) (describing how, beginning in the late nineteenth century, anti-Semitism “was more
acute at resorts than elsewhere, for no other institution combined such indiscriminate social
mingling with such ardent social aspirations,” and how discrimination in those establishments,
along with “clubs and private schools increased during the years before the First World War”);
Chanelle N. Rose, Tourism and the Hispanicization of Race in Jim Crow Miami, 1945–1965,
45 J. Soc. Hist. 735, 745 (2012) (“[D]uring the 1930s and 1940s, racial discrimination was not
solely limited to [B]lacks since a number of Miami Beach hotels read: ‘Gentile Only’ or ‘No
Jews, No Dogs.’”).
89
Jeffrey Gurock, The 1913 New York State Civil Rights Act, 1 Ass’n Jewish Stud. Rev.
93, 95 (1976). The anti-discrimination norms of public accommodations law would remain
elusive:
85
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Defamation League replicated these efforts in other states, defined the
larger context of public accommodations, and in the words of preeminent
historian John Higham, represented “one of the small beginnings of the
twentieth century movement to outlaw discrimination.”90 Second, Jewish
activism cast a broader spotlight on the economic rationales owners of
public accommodations used to justify discrimination. Hotel owners were
particularly prone to anti-Semitism. As one writer explains, these
proprietors succumbed to “the economic pressure exerted upon them by
prejudicial Gentile patrons” because they were “[f]earful of losing their
clientele by being dubbed as ‘Hebrew’ hotels, proprietors expediently
excluded Jews from their establishments.”91 Similar rationales abound
today, with proprietors not wanting their establishments to be understood
as the “[B]lack club.”92 Finally, Jewish organizing is important because it
illustrates how courts narrowly understood who should benefit from
public accommodations discrimination law. Despite efforts to broaden the
understanding of discrimination in bars and restaurants, courts did not
understand Jewish people, and whites more generally, as the beneficiaries
of public accommodations laws.
This interpretation represents an understanding of public
accommodations discrimination that this Article writes against: the idea
that public accommodations statutes protect a specific group rather than
prevent people from being denied access based on noxious racial
considerations.
Notwithstanding the 1913 amendment, New York would struggle with
the who and what of public accommodations discrimination. In 1914, a
New York intermediate court concluded that saloons were public

Enterprising hotelkeepers, capitalizing on the strict-constructionist attitude of the
courts, circumvented the law by inventing several new ‘code words’ for exclusion. Such
terms as ‘restricted clientele,’ ‘churches nearby,’ and ‘buses to church’ were added to
the advertiser’s vocabulary. These euphemisms, which soon became intelligible to Jew
and Gentile alike, stymied public officials and frustrated Jewish leaders in their attempts
to have the law enforced.
Id. at 111.
90
Higham, supra note 88, at 16.
91
Gurock, supra note 89, at 97.
92
Kalyn Oyer, ‘It’s Too Dark in Here’: Black Nightclub DJs in Charleston Speak Up About
Discrimination, Post & Courier (June 17, 2020), https://www.postandcourier.com/
charleston_scene/its-too-dark-in-here-black-nightclub-djs-in-charleston-speak-up-aboutdiscrimination/article_5dfa8cf4-acd8-11ea-a85e-db71746cc171.html
[https://perma.cc/HQN6-T96K] (describing the experience of a DJ who contended that that
club owners attempt to limit the number of Black people in their venues).
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accommodations when a Black defendant was overcharged for a drink
while he was with two white companions.93 New York courts would
uphold the statute thereafter and rule for Black plaintiffs in cases
challenging discrimination on a dancefloor and another barroom.94 But
the New York judiciary, perhaps influenced by the specter of interracial
mingling, would retain a narrow view of who the law would extend to
when it rejected a claim brought by Arthur Cohn, a white plaintiff. He
entered a saloon with three companions—two Black and one white. The
bartender refused to serve the party unless they paid the exorbitant price
of 50 cents for a glass of beer and whiskey despite the regular charges of
5 cents and 15 cents, respectively.95 The court rejected the public
accommodations challenge and ruled that the statute could not be “availed
of by a white man because of discrimination against him that is based
upon his association with colored men.”96 That same year, the same court
declined to extend the law to a Jewish plaintiff who was refused service
in a Harlem restaurant while with his Black companion.97 Ignoring Jewish
people’s interstitial racial status at the time (in which white Jewish people
were often not considered white),98 the court was satisfied by what would
be a common justification for differential treatment in these spaces: that
it was “against the rules of the house to serve a mixed party.”99 As Paul
Chevigny explained in his classic work on legal regulation of popular
culture, concerns about the “social mixing of races” during the Harlem
Renaissance played a role in structuring narrow understandings of these

93
Babb v. Elsinger, 147 N.Y.S. 98, 98–99 (N.Y. App. Div. 1914); Court Holds It Unlawful
to Draw Color Line in Saloons, N.Y. Age, Apr. 23, 1914, at 1.
94
Johnson v. Auburn & Syracuse Elec. R.R. Co., 222 N.Y. 443, 446–47, (N.Y. 1918);
Springer v. McDermott, 173 N.Y.S. 413, 413–14 (N.Y. App. Div. 1919); see also Baer v.
Wash. Heights Café, 168 N.Y.S. 567, 567–68 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1917) (holding that the rear of
a saloon where food and liquor were served was a place of public accommodation).
95
Matthews v. Hotz, 173 N.Y.S. 234, 235 (N.Y. App. Div. 1918).
96
Id.
97
Cohn v. Goldgraben, 170 N.Y.S. 407, 407–08 (N.Y. App. Div. 1918).
98
Ian Haney López, White by Law: The Legal Construction of Race 151 (10th ed. 2006).
See generally, Karen Brodkin, How Jews Became White Folks and What That Says About
Race in America 26–30 (1998) (describing the United States’ history of anti-Semitism at the
turn of the twentieth century); Eric L. Goldstein, The Price of Whiteness: Jews, Race, and
American Identity 1–2 (2006) (explaining the complicated relationship between Jewishness
and whiteness and its development during the twentieth century).
99
Cohn, 170 N.Y.S. at 407.
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public accommodations.100 When New York’s highest court of appeal
ruled that saloons were not contemplated by the statute,101 the legislature
responded by amending the public accommodations law to include
saloons, ending a decade of battles between courts and the legislature
about the law’s reach.102
New York was not the only state with these definitional struggles; it
was just the most conspicuous. Minnesota also wrestled with whether a
saloon was a public accommodation at the turn of the century. A
restrictive state supreme court ruling led to a statutory amendment of
Minnesota’s public accommodations law. In Rhone v. Loomis, the
aggrieved patron was a former slave from Arkansas who was refused a
beer by a saloonkeeper.103 He prevailed at the trial level, but the
saloonkeeper appealed and argued that the absence of the word “saloon”
from the Minnesota public accommodations law made the trial judge’s
interpretation incorrect. The Supreme Court of Minnesota agreed. Amidst
the growing temperance movement, the court feared enshrining a right to
be served alcohol or understanding the legislature as wanting to
criminalize bartenders’ refusal to serve drinks.104 It rejected the argument
that saloons fell into the statute’s language of “other places of public
accommodation, refreshment, resort, or amusement.”105 Instead, it
deployed the statutory rule of ejusdem generis, which limits the reach of
general wording that follows a specific list.106 The court concluded that
the legislature enumerated all the covered places with “specificity” and
even named “soda-water fountain[s]” and “ice-cream parlor[s]” but made
no mention of saloons despite their prevalence.107 For the court, this
omission could not have been a mistake considering the prevalence of
saloons. Going one policy step further, it believed the legislature likely
omitted bars because it knew that “the promiscuous entertainment of
persons of different races in places where intoxicating drinks are sold not
100
Paul Chevigny, Gigs: Jazz and the Cabaret Laws in New York City 33 (1991); see also
Burton W. Peretti, Nightclub City: Politics and Amusement in Manhattan 18 (2007)
(describing anti-Semitic understandings of nightlife in New York City).
101
Gibbs v. Arras Bros., Inc., 222 N.Y. 332, 332 (N.Y. 1918).
102
Equal Rights in Places of Public Accommodation, Resort or Amusement, ch. 14, § 40,
1918 N.Y. Laws 61, 61–62 (adding saloons to Civil Rights Law § 40).
103
74 Minn. 200, 200 (1898); William D. Green, Degrees of Freedom: The Origins of Civil
Rights in Minnesota, 1865–1912, at 244 (2015).
104
Green, supra note 103, at 246–47.
105
Id. at 247.
106
Rhone, 74 Minn. at 204–05.
107
Green, supra note 103, at 223, 246.
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infrequently results in personal conflicts.”108 One local Black newspaper
would complain, “Since this damnable decision a number of saloons are
refusing to serve Afro-Americans that did so before.”109 The legislature
would add saloons to the statute a year later.110 Both Minnesota and New
York demonstrate how some legislatures, despite their silence on saloons’
inclusion in public accommodations law, would respond immediately
when courts attempted to eliminate these establishments from their
purview.
Ohio followed Minnesota’s Supreme Court the next year in 1899 but
would not have the same statutory modification. In a decision that
spotlighted what would become the common practice of overcharging
Blacks who now had access to public accommodations, the court rejected
a discrimination challenge. The defendant was a Black man who was
charged 30 cents rather than the standard 15 cents for a “whiskey
cocktail,” for himself and his “colored companion.”111 The Supreme
Court of Ohio held that the establishment did not fall under the Ohio
statute. Temperance concerns also informed this decision. The state’s tax
on liquor, regulatory licensing scheme, and prohibition on sales to minors
led the court to reason that alcohol consumption was “an evil” that the
legislature sought to “discourage and restrict.”112 Ohio courts were more
flexible in other interpretations of the state’s public accommodations
statute. Years later, a Black brother and sister were denied entry into a
dancing pavilion that maintained separate hours for white and Black
dancers.113 The state’s intermediary court ruled that the establishment fell
within the statute’s coverage even though it was not specifically
enumerated.114 A lower court also imposed liability in a case where the
defendant dance hall owner refused entry to Jewish patrons and told them
to “come some other day.”115 In its recognition of the need for racial
inclusion in these spaces, the court offered a statement that defied the antiSemitic sentiments of the period when it noted that, “The most persistent
race of which recorded history gives any account, has overcome too many
108

Id. at 245.
Id. at 246.
110
Act of Mar. 6, 1899, ch. 41, §1, 1899 Minn. Laws 38, 38–39.
111
Kellar v. Koerber, 61 Ohio St. 388, 389 (1899).
112
Id. at 391.
113
Youngstown Park & Falls St. Ry. Co. v. Tokus, 4 Ohio App. 276, 277 (Ohio Ct. App.
1915).
114
Id. at 276–82.
115
Anderson v. State, 30 Ohio C.C. 510, 511 (Ohio Ct. App. 1918).
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obstacles to be defeated of a right secured to it by statute by any of the
excuses offered by the dancing master in this record.”116
Crucially, these questions about where bars and dance halls fit into
public accommodations laws would reemerge decades later after
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which was similarly silent
on these establishments.117 Besides these exceptions, state courts hearing
discrimination claims in cases involving saloons, restaurants, and the like
were surprisingly solicitous to the spirit of the laws and often ruled in
favor of minority plaintiffs. Yet these successes were also tempered by a
few limitations. First, they only entailed states that had public
accommodations provisions, which were rare outside of the South.
Second, these wins only capture instances that were actually litigated
(which was prohibitive considering the paucity of civil rights lawyering).
Third, they only reflect reported decisions. Still, the instances described
in the next Section speak to the seriousness that courts and litigants
brought to the issue of equality in public accommodations.
B. Early Successes
Some of the early decisions involving bars and restaurants were
surprisingly successful. The most notable challenge emanated out of a
Reconstruction-Era revision to Louisiana’s public accommodations law.
Sauvinet v. Walker involved an 1869 statute prohibiting discrimination in
public accommodations.118 Charles St. Albin Sauvinet was a fair-skinned,
mixed-race civil sheriff in New Orleans. He was refused a drink at the
defendant’s coffeehouse-saloon.119 Using dignity-harm rhetoric of the
day, the Supreme Court of Louisiana indicated that the plaintiff objected
to the “indignity so wantonly offered to him” and noted how “his feelings
have been greatly outraged” because of the “illegal and unwarranted
act.”120 The plaintiff requested an outstanding $10,000 in damages.121 The
lower court rendered a judgment of $1,000, which was upheld by the

116

Id. at 512; see also Leonard Dinnerstein, Antisemitism in America 58 (1994) (“Indeed,
the racial components of antisemitic thought in America, always inherent yet mostly hidden,
became obvious in the period known as the Progressive era.”).
117
See infra Section I.D. (discussing Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
118
27 La. Ann. 14, 14–15 (1875), aff'd, 92 U.S. 90, 90–93 (1876).
119
Justin A. Nystrom, New Orleans After the Civil War: Race, Politics, and a New Birth of
Freedom 96–98 (2010).
120
Sauvinet, 27 La. Ann. at 14.
121
Id.
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Supreme Court of Louisiana and drew the ire of the dissent.122 Judge W.G.
Wyly evoked the principle of equal treatment, the longstanding critique
of anti-discrimination law’s perceived racial preferences, and concern
about the size of the awards all in one dissent. “I think the plaintiff had
the right to be served at the barroom of the defendant,” he wrote, “but I
do not think the refusal ought to entitle him, a colored man, to greater
damages than a white man ought to recover, it being no greater wrong to
refuse a colored man than a white man.”123 Moreover, he reasoned:
I think the penalty wholly disproportionate to the offense. If, instead of
refusing the plaintiff a drink merely, the defendant had seized a chair
and beaten him half to death with it, the damages would probably not
have exceeded $250. Yet, is the right to enjoy the entertainment of a
drinking saloon of greater moment or more sacred than the right of
personal security from violence?
Grave offenders are rarely condemned to pay a larger penalty than
$1000, as the law is now administered; and yet, without any evidence
of the ability of the defendant to pay the penalty, he is condemned to
pay one thousand dollars for merely refusing to sell a drink, not
probably worth more than twenty-five cents, and where no actual
damage has resulted from the refusal.124

In 1875, the same year Congress passed the federal statute, the
Supreme Court upheld the judgment in Walker v. Sauvinet and ruled that
there was no federal question raised in the appeal.125 Although the Civil
Rights Cases mooted the Civil Rights Act of 1875, Sauvinet still stood for
the proposition that states had the prerogative to pass anti-discrimination
laws, which they continued to enact.
In 1887 when a Black plaintiff entered a Detroit establishment that
consisted of a “restaurant side” and a “saloon side,” he was instructed to
go to the saloon side if he wanted to purchase anything.126 The manager’s
instructions were rooted in internal guidelines that, again, would
influence velvet rope discrimination for decades. “[T]he rules of the
house” were that “colored people” could not be served at certain tables.127
122

Id. at 14–15.
Id. at 15 (Wyly, J., dissenting).
124
Id.
125
Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92–93 (1876).
126
Ferguson v. Gies, 46 N.W. 718, 718 (Mich. 1890).
127
Id.
123
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In its ruling for the plaintiff, the court used language that was unfamiliar
for a post-Reconstruction period typically defined as the “nadir” of race
relations.128 The court acknowledged that these laws sought to “modify
and overcome the prejudices . . . of the white race against the colored
race” and “place the latter upon an equal footing with the former.”129
Using remedial language, the court stated: “if to be born [B]lack is a
misfortune, then the law should lessen, rather than increase, the burden of
the [B]lack man’s life.”130
A decade later, in 1897, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin came to a
similar conclusion in a case that points to some of the features of velvet
rope discrimination. The Black plaintiff sought service in “a public eating
house and saloon” in Milwaukee with his white friend.131 They
experienced a version of waiting that can be race-neutral and happen in
busy establishments but is also a feature of public accommodations
discrimination that can be racially inflected. They waited “some 40
minutes for some one [sic] to take their order” to no avail, which caused
them to leave and go elsewhere.132 The defendant-proprietor presented a
series of plausible arguments. He maintained that the place was busy and
that they could not give personal attention to all their guests.133 He pointed
out that the plaintiff and his friend were served breakfast earlier that
day.134 He also argued that after the plaintiff’s initial complaint, he asked
a waiter to serve them, but the waiter refused to do so for racial reasons.135
The court rejected the circumstantial evidence and imposed the
respondeat superior doctrine to find the defendant liable for the waiter’s
act since it occurred during the course of his employment.136 These early
decisions seemed to portend a favorable set of conditions for state litigants
challenging discrimination in public accommodations. However, the
landscape would develop in a more mixed fashion.

128
See Rayford M. Logan, The Negro in American Life and Thought: The Nadir, 1877–
1901, at 52 (1954).
129
Ferguson, 46 N.W. at 719.
130
Id. at 721.
131
Bryan v. Adler, 72 N.W. 368, 368 (Wis. 1897).
132
Id. at 369.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Id. at 369–70.
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C. Public Accommodations Wins and Losses in the Early Twentieth
Century
In the first half of the twentieth century, challenges to race and sex
discrimination in saloons, restaurants, and nightclubs produced mixed
outcomes. Importantly, these cases existed among a larger set of
challenges to discrimination in public transportation, pools, parks,
libraries, beaches, golf courses, department stores, skating rinks, and a
host of other public spaces.137 This Section briefly describes the legal
world of velvet rope discrimination in the first half of the twentieth
century. The varied outcomes during this period set the stage for federal
intervention in the context of race discrimination and new state
articulations of sex discrimination in the 1960s.
1. Race
In many instances, courts worked within anti-discrimination statutes
and outside of them to uphold segregated public accommodations. A 1904
New York court would not provide relief to an African immigrant who
was refused service at a saloon because the public accommodations law
was interpreted as only covering citizens.138 An Illinois court
137

See, e.g., Traci Parker, Department Stores and the Black Freedom Movement: Workers,
Consumers, and Civil Rights from the 1930s to the 1980s, at 57–71 (2019) (discussing the
“Don’t Buy Where You Can’t Work” movement); Wayne A. Wiegand & Shirley A. Wiegand,
The Desegregation of Public Libraries in the Jim Crow South: Civil Rights and Local Activism
8 (2018) (explaining that Brown v. Board of Education “functioned as an open invitation to
southern [B]lacks to serve as plaintiffs in a series of lawsuits to desegregate public facilities
across the South”); David E. Goldberg, The Retreats of Reconstruction: Race, Leisure, and the
Politics of Segregation at the New Jersey Shore, 1865–1920, at 18–21 (2017) (describing how
Black protestors successfully integrated recreational venues at the Jersey shore through
consumer protests); Victoria W. Wolcott, Race, Riots, and Roller Coasters: The Struggle over
Segregated Recreation in America 88–89 (2012) (describing how, after Brown v. Board of
Education, “activists became more emboldened to challenge recreational segregation
nationally”); Jeff Wiltse, Contested Waters: A Social History of Swimming Pools in America
157–59 (2007) (describing efforts to desegregate pools in the North); George B. Kirsch,
Municipal Golf and Civil Rights in the United States, 1910–1965, 92 J. Afr. Am. Hist. 371,
383–86 (2007) (explaining how the Brown v. Board of Education and Dawson v. Mayor &
City Council of Baltimore City “decisions opened the door for a series of federal judicial
rulings that outlawed racial discrimination on municipal golf courses in several southern
cities”).
138
Fuller v. McDermott, 87 N.Y.S. 536, 537 (N.Y. App. Term 1904). But see Hubert v.
Jose, 132 N.Y.S. 811, 812 (N.Y. App. Div. 1912) (asserting in dicta that a showing of
citizenship is not necessary for protection by the civil rights law without addressing its
previous ruling on the issue).
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problematized the state statute’s use of the word “failure.” That word, the
court ruled, was passive, whereas a “denial” was active.139 Rejecting a
claim brought by a Black restaurant-goer alleging discrimination, it
reasoned:
A failure upon the part of a restaurant keeper to serve a guest may be
caused by physical inability, by a strike on the part of the cooks and
waiters, by the demand being made outside of the hours when meals are
prepared, or by some other sufficient reason not within the meaning of
the statute.140

The Supreme Court of Louisiana not only upheld separate bars for white
and Black patrons but ruled in 1909 that they could not be partitioned in
the same building.141 Kansas did not enumerate restaurants in its public
accommodations statute,142 and a 1924 court decision declined to read
such an establishment into the law.143 In 1944, a Utah court rejected the
idea that restaurants could be collapsed into the common law category of
innkeeper.144 This decision precluded plaintiffs from bringing a swath of
public accommodations discrimination suits in the state. In short, not only
was there a lack of uniformity across states, but within specific
jurisdictions, the boundaries of public accommodations laws were
unclear.
At the same time, some courts ruled in favor of people who claimed
that they did not receive equal access to bars, restaurants, and nightclubs.
A 1934 Colorado court found discrimination where the Black plaintiff,
upon entering a Denver restaurant with two white companions, was told,
“It’s no use of you all waiting here. I will serve these people, but you [the
plaintiff] will have to eat in the kitchen if you want to eat here.”145 In
1939, a Connecticut court ruled in favor of the Black male plaintiff, who,
along with his Black female companion, was overcharged for beer.146
Two years later, an Ohio court would similarly strike down racial
overcharging in public accommodations. In McCrary v. Jones, three
Black plaintiffs went to a bar and ordered three beers to which the waiter
139

Grace v. Moseley, 112 Ill. App. 100, 102 (Ill. App. Ct. 1904).
Id.
141
State ex rel. Tax Collector v. Falkenheiner, 49 So. 214, 215 (La. 1909).
142
Kan. Gen. Stat. § 3791 (1915) (repealed 1969).
143
State v. Brown, 212 P. 663, 664 (Kan. 1923).
144
Nance v. Mayflower Tavern, 150 P.2d 773, 774–75 (Utah 1944).
145
Crosswaith v. Bergin, 35 P.2d 848, 848 (Colo. 1934).
146
Ross v. Schade, 7 Conn. Supp. 443, 444–45 (Super. Ct. 1939).
140
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responded, “Well, the place has changed hands and we don’t care to cater
to mixed trade but if you persist in being served, I will serve you, it will
cost you 50 [cents] a glass.”147 The court rejected the defendant’s
reference to the bar’s signage, which indicated that “[p]rices are subject
to change without notice,” and ruled for the plaintiff.148 That same year,
a 1941 California court looked beyond the Black-white binary often found
in these cases and awarded $200 in damages to a Black couple who was
refused service at a Chinese restaurant and bar.149 The 1940s ended with
a high-profile case involving a Washington restaurant’s denial of service
to Black pianist Hazel Scott, who was also the wife of New York
politician Adam Clayton Powell. The incident occurred in a small town
in Washington after her train stopped because of snow.150 It highlighted
some of the interstate public accommodations challenges that minorities
encountered and would be addressed by Title II of the Civil Rights Act.
Scott and Powell filed the case in federal court, and although the tribunal
rejected the Fourteenth Amendment claims for failure to state a cause of
action, it found that the restaurant was a public accommodation.151 The
incident resulted in a $325 judgment for the couple.152
Ultimately, the first half of the twentieth century produced a regulatory
patchwork. Separate but equal dominated the South, whereas the rest of
the country was comprised of differential statutory and judicial
approaches to racial discrimination in public accommodations. The
situation was arguably worse in the context of sex discrimination.
2. Sex and Sexuality
Legal challenges to discrimination based on sex and sexuality were
minimal during the first half of the twentieth century. This is not because
such discrimination did not exist, but because law and social norms made
such challenges nonviable. As a matter of law, statutory protections
against sex discrimination did not emerge until after the passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. As Deborah Dinner and Elizabeth Sepper
147

39 N.E.2d 167, 169 (Ohio Ct. App. 1941).
Id. at 171.
149
Evans v. Fong Poy, 108 P.2d 942, 942–43 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1941); State Appeals
Court Upholds Negro Rights, S.F. Exam’r, Jan. 8, 1941, at B.
150
Suits Ask $80,000 Under Civil Rights, Democrat & Chron. (Rochester), Feb. 18, 1949,
at 12.
151
Powell v. Utz, 87 F. Supp. 811, 812–13, 816 (E.D. Wash. 1949).
152
Suit Defendants Ask Bankruptcy, Spokane Daily Chron., Aug. 9, 1950, at 3.
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helpfully explain, sex-based discrimination in public accommodations
was rooted in a host of social norms. Most notably, these norms included,
amongst a host of other factors, a “separate-spheres ideology” that
assigned women to the home and men to the market; the understanding of
these places as masculine and only open to women to the extent that they
were accompanied by men; and heteronormative ideas about the sexual
vulnerability of white women.153 But that is not to say that ideas about
gender and sexuality did not filter through legal decisions during this
period. The few decisions courts issued provide a window into this aspect
of public accommodations discrimination.
Contemporary gender-based pricing in bars and restaurants is actually
a recent development and stands in sharp contrast to early twentiethcentury practices that often prohibited the sale of alcohol to women and
excluded them from certain public accommodations unless they were in
the company of men. Although such prohibitions received judicial
endorsements as early as 1869,154 the Supreme Court’s 1904 decision in
Cronin v. Adams is illustrative.155 In that case, a Denver ordinance
prohibited “[e]ach and every liquor saloon, dram shop or tippling house
keeper” from allowing women to enter and be supplied with liquor.156 The
Court ruled that the ordinance was a valid exercise of police powers and
in its rejection of the appellee-saloonkeeper claim added, “What cause of
action, then, has plaintiff in error? He is not a female nor delegated to
champion any grievance females may have under the ordinance, if they
have any.”157 Herein laid a key issue in public accommodations law. Since
no states prohibited discrimination based on sex, challenges were often
brought by men and occasionally by women through other constitutional
registers. Women of color lodged their own challenges, but they were
typically through public accommodations laws that prohibited
discrimination based on race.158
153

Sepper & Dinner, supra note 24, at 83.
Ex parte Smith, 38 Cal. 702, 709–12 (1869) (upholding an ordinance prohibiting the
presence of women in public drinking saloons after midnight as constitutional).
155
192 U.S. 108 (1904).
156
Id. at 113.
157
Id. at 114–15.
158
See, e.g., Wilson v. Razzetti, 150 N.Y.S. 145, 145 (N.Y. App. Term 1914) (holding that
restaurant owners who refused to serve a Black woman violated the New York Civil Rights
Law and that the owners’ defense—that the reason they did not serve the plaintiff was that
they were out of food—was “absurd and frivolous”); Amos v. Prom, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 615,
618–19, 630 (N.D. Iowa 1954) (holding that a dance hall, which had refused to admit a Black
woman, was a place of amusement under the Iowa Civil Rights Act); Slack v. Atl. White
154
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There were two outliers to the Supreme Court’s decision in Cronin.
One preceded the decision, and one came immediately after it. Both
rejected ordinances that restricted women’s access to bars. While these
decisions might be considered liberal for the period, they presaged how
post-1960s courts would rely on paternalist logic even when they were
striking down discriminatory practices. In 1900, Kentucky’s highest court
struck down a statute that made it unlawful for women to be in any
establishment that sold alcohol, as well as “loaf or stand” within fifty feet
of such establishments.159 The ordinance punished by misdemeanor the
bar owner as well as women who passed by the establishment. The
purpose of the ordinance was to “regulate and control the sale of liquors”
because “very disreputable, low, and vile women congregate in and about
saloons . . . .”160 This kind of undesired assembly supposedly led to
“affrays, fights, murder, and other crimes.”161 The court ruled that the
ordinance was too sweeping because it captured women who happened to
be walking by along with “well-behaved” women who had a lawful
reason to go into such establishments.162 Idaho’s highest court also struck
down a gender-based ordinance involving saloons. It used a similarly
limiting line of reasoning when it stated, “[T]o say by an ordinance that a
wife or mother may not enter a saloon, without subjecting herself to a
fine . . . is beyond the legal power of the city.”163 These decisions were
exceptions rather than the rule, as courts routinely upheld gender-based
prohibitions in bars.
Judicial support of women’s exclusion is unsurprising considering the
gender norms of the early twentieth century. These decisions are
significant not for shock value, but because of the sharp reversal these
establishments and public accommodations law would undertake in the
second half of the twentieth century. One tribunal insisted that “[t]he
vicious tendency of the mingling of men and women in saloons” was
“harmful to good morals.”164 Another court upheld a city ordinance that
made it unlawful for a woman to drink in a saloon or be present in one for
Tower Sys., Inc., 284 F.2d 746, 746 (4th Cir. 1960) (holding that the Interstate Commerce Act
did not prohibit a privately owned restaurant from refusing to serve a Black woman).
159
Gastenau v. Commonwealth, 56 S.W. 705, 705 (Ky. 1900).
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
Id. at 705–06.
163
State v. Nelson, 79 P. 79, 82 (Idaho 1905) (emphasis added).
164
Laughlin v. Tillamook City, 147 P. 547, 547 (Or. 1915) (quoting State v. Baker, 92 P.
1076, 1078 (Or. 1907)).
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more than five minutes. Violation of the law could lead to a fine or
revocation of license unless it was shown that the woman was of “good
repute,” sober, and had the consent of her husband.165 When considered
along with statutes and cases that prohibited women from being owners
or employees in establishments that sold alcohol,166 these decisions
created an early twentieth-century environment that reinforced the idea
that these public accommodations were inherently male. This kind of
gendered orthodoxy could not be seriously challenged until the 1960s.
Before describing the tectonic shifts inaugurated by Brown v. Board of
Education, an important set of comments about sexuality and its
intersection with race and gender should be offered. In public
accommodations where alcohol was served, long-standing assumptions
about Black licentiousness and civility led courts to be overly gratuitous
in their emphasis on Black plaintiffs’ conduct and respectability. Fears of
sexual impropriety also surfaced. Judicial responses were mixed. In 1916,
then-Judge Cardozo ruled that a restaurant’s liquor license could not be
revoked because “women of loose character” dined or supped in the
establishment.167 But the Supreme Court of Florida upheld the jury verdict
for slander against a defendant who claimed that the plaintiff, a
“respectable” white man, “danced with negro women.”168 Stoumen v.
Reilly was not a challenge to discrimination, but about the suspension of
a San Francisco bar’s liquor license.169 The decision highlights how
concerns about sexuality impacted the legal regulation of these spaces.
The appellant, Sal Stoumen, was “a spunky straight man” who owned a
popular gay bar and refused to pay the typical bribes such owners paid to

165

Commonwealth v. Price, 94 S.W. 32, 33 (Ky. 1906).
Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 465–66 (1948) (validating a state law that only allowed
men to be bartenders and stating, “The fact that women may now have achieved the virtues
that men have long claimed as their prerogatives and now indulge in vices that men have long
practiced, does not preclude the States from drawing a sharp line between the sexes, certainly
in such matters as the regulation of the liquor traffic”); City of De Ridder v. Mangano, 171
So. 826, 827–28 (La. 1936) (upholding law prohibiting women’s employment in bars); State
v. Mayor of Hoboken, 53 A. 693, 693 (N.J. 1902) (upholding a statute that prohibited women’s
employment in saloons and stating, “It is difficult to imagine a course of conducting a liquor
saloon more deserving of reprobation than the permitting the assembling there of women for
the purpose of enticing customers”); Ex parte Felchin, 31 P. 224, 224 (Cal. 1892) (requiring a
higher licensing fee for bars and saloons that employed women).
167
In re Farley, 111 N.E. 479, 481 (N.Y. 1916).
168
Sharp v. Bussey, 187 So. 779, 780 (Fla. 1939).
169
Stoumen v. Reilly, 234 P.2d 969, 970 (Cal. 1951).
166
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local police.170 Stoumen utilized a more inclusive understanding of
business owners’ prerogatives and “fought police and liquor control
inspectors for 18 years for the right to serve anyone he chose to in his
establishment.”171 A local agency suspended the bar’s license and found
that he kept “a disorderly house” and that “persons of known homosexual
tendencies patronized said premises and used said premises as a meeting
place.”172 The court reversed the suspension of the license. It used public
accommodations rationales to conclude that “[m]embers of the public of
lawful age have a right to patronize a public restaurant and bar” and ruled
that patrons could only be ejected for good cause.173 A few years later, a
District of Columbia court rejected the public accommodations challenge
brought by an interracial couple consisting of a white woman and a Black
man who entered a dance hall and were ordered to stop because “mixed
dancing” was prohibited.174 As the Civil Rights Movement took shape,
activists and the federal government offered a more unified vision of
public accommodations. The ensuing Women’s Rights Movement helped
produce independent and intersectional ideas about how sex, sexuality,
gender, and race shaped state-level public accommodations laws.
D. Title II and the New Public Accommodations Landscape
Brown v. Board of Education overturned an almost six-decade-long
judicial endorsement of “separate but equal” ideology and represented a
watershed moment in American legal history.175 Outside the worlds of
constitutional law and anti-discrimination law, it is easy to both
understate and overstate the magnitude of the opinion. The decision’s
focus on public education can overshadow the pervasive role of
segregation across different areas of social life including but not limited
to “movie theaters, dance halls, parks, swimming pools, beaches, barber
shops and beauty parlors, drugstores, bowling alleys, restaurants, and

170

Tom Murray, Preachers, Faggots, Perverts & Palaces, S.F. Sentinel, Mar. 6, 1987, at 4.
See generally Nan Alamilla Boyd, Wide-Open Town: A History of Queer San Francisco to
1965 (2003) (discussing the hostile policing of bars and taverns, including harassment and
intimidation by local police).
171
Murray, supra note 170.
172
Stoumen, 234 P.2d at 970.
173
Id. at 971.
174
Tynes v. Gogos, 144 A.2d 412, 413–15 (D.C. 1958).
175
347 U.S. 483, 488, 495 (1954).
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cemeteries.”176 Randall Kennedy adds, “[B]lack people were consigned
to the back of the bus, directed to use distinct drinking fountains and
telephone booths, excluded altogether from white schools and hospitals,
permitted to visit zoos and museums only on certain days, confined to
designated areas in courtrooms, and sworn in as witnesses using racially
differentiated Bibles.”177 But Brown was limited by a state action doctrine
that focused on discrimination by public officials and did not necessarily
extend to public accommodations.178 This became one of the areas of
struggle in the decade following Brown. The famous sit-ins, along with
various boycotts and protests, drew attention to the issue. To be sure, this
kind of direct action came much earlier, when a group of Black women
in Washington, D.C., led in part by legal pioneer Pauli Murray, conducted
sit-ins at a Washington D.C restaurant in 1943 and 1944.179 Civil rights
leader and NAACP charter member Mary Church Terrell followed with
a successful public accommodations suit brought under a District statute
in 1953.180 But the sit-ins of the 1960s were particularly effective because
they produced a dizzying array of Supreme Court decisions in a short
amount of time.181 As Christopher Schmidt powerfully argues, sit-ins
“exerted pressure on the cultural assumptions regarding the line between
private and public action, expectations of government responsibility, and
basic conceptions of social justice.”182 The appalling images of young
Birmingham students getting mauled by dogs and sprayed with
firehouses—all because of a desire for equal access to public facilities—
inspired an until-then reluctant President Kennedy into action.183 He
176
Cybelle Fox & Thomas A. Guglielmo, Defining America’s Racial Boundaries: Blacks,
Mexicans, and European Immigrants, 1890–1945, 118 Am. J. Socio. 327, 358 (2012).
177
Randall Kennedy, The Civil Rights Act’s Unsung Victory and How It Changed the
South, Harper’s Mag. (June 2014), https://harpers.org/archive/2014/06/the-civil-rights-actsunsung-victory/ [https://perma.cc/M6EV-HM48].
178
Id.
179
Lynne Olson, Freedom's Daughters: The Unsung Heroines of the Civil Rights Movement
from 1830 to 1970, at 19–20 (2001); Flora Bryant Brown, NAACP Sponsored Sit-ins by
Howard University Students in Washington, D.C., 1943–1944, 85 J. Negro Hist. 274, 278
(2000).
180
Olson, supra note 179, at 78–79.
181
See, e.g., Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964); Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146
(1964), Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964); Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347
(1964).
182
Christopher W. Schmidt, The Sit-Ins: Protest and Legal Change in the Civil Rights Era
182 (2018).
183
Glenn T. Eskew, But for Birmingham: The Local and National Movements in the Civil
Rights Struggle 312 (1997).
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would go on to support a strong federal public accommodations law that
became a signature feature of Lyndon Johnson’s presidency: Title II of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.184
Title II would prohibit discrimination on the grounds of race, color,
religion, or national origin in the “goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, and accommodations of any place of public
accommodation.”185 Sex was not included in this Title.186 In addition to
Title II’s requirement that establishments offer full and equal access, three
other aspects of the Title are relevant for this Article’s discussion. First,
Title II enumerated a list of establishments that were considered public
accommodations. The Act specifically named “restaurant[s]” but did not
mention clubs, bars, or taverns; the closest applicable language in the
provision referred to establishments “principally engaged in selling food
for consumption on the premises,” any “concert hall” or “place . . . of
entertainment.”187 The applicability of this language would be a subject
of dispute immediately after Title II passed.188 Second and relatedly, the
Act was specific about covering establishments that affected interstate
commerce. This was the constitutional hook that allowed Congress to
evade the problem posed by the 1883 Civil Rights Cases.189 The interstate
commerce provision ultimately sustained the law when the Court rejected
challenges brought by southern public accommodations owners the same
year Title II was passed.190 The operative language, particularly given the
absence of language around bars and nightclubs, was the statute’s
coverage of establishments that “serve[] or offer[] to serve interstate
travelers,” accommodations where “a substantial portion of the food
which i[s] serve[d] . . . moved in commerce,” and entities that provide
“sources of entertainment” that “move in commerce.”191 This commerce
component was also a heavily litigated issue in the 1960s and 1970s as

184

42 U.S.C. § 2000a.
Id. § 2000a(a).
186
See id. § 2000a; discussion infra Section II.A. (describing the work of activists in
response to the non-coverage of sex discrimination in the Act).
187
42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b).
188
See sources cited infra note 195 (detailing the various cases in which the categorization
of various bars, taverns, and establishments was disputed).
189
Harry T. Quick, Note, Public Accommodations: A Justification of Title II of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 16 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 660, 683 (1965).
190
42 U.S.C. § 2000a(c); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 298, 305 (1964); Heart of
Atl. Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 243, 247–48, 261–62 (1964).
191
42 U.S.C. § 2000a(c).
185
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courts revisited the issue of what constituted a public accommodation.192
Finally, Title II excluded private clubs and establishments that are “not in
fact open to the public,” which is language some public accommodations
owners attempted to find shelter in when they excluded minorities from
their businesses.193
It was unclear whether Title II would extend to bars and nightclubs due
to the provision’s reliance on the Commerce Clause and equivocal
legislative history.194 In a few instances, owners of bars and lounges
seized on this ambiguity when accused of violating Title II. In a case that
was denied certiorari, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
ruled that a tavern that sold beer, but not food, was not covered.195 Like
tribunals before them, courts used the statutory interpretation rule of
ejusdem generis—in this instance Title II’s indefinite term of “places of
entertainment”—to exclude bars from coverage. 196 Ultimately, these
decisions would become outliers as the subsequent cases in federal courts
rejected this view,197 and the Supreme Court would subsequently call for
192

See sources cited infra note 197 (discussing which establishments were deemed to be a
place of public accommodation by various courts).
193
42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e).
194
Senator Magnuson, a key shepherd of the bill, noted:
As a general rule, establishments of this kind will not come within the scope of the title.
But a bar or nightclub physically located in a covered hotel will be covered, if it is open
to patrons of the hotel. A nightclub might also be covered . . . if it customarily offers
entertainment which moves in interstate commerce.
110 Cong. Rec. 7,407 (1964).
195
Cuevas v. Sdrales 344 F.2d 1019, 1020, 1023 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
1014 (1966); see also Robertson v. Johnston, 249 F. Supp. 618, 620–21 (E.D. La. 1966)
(holding that a bar or nightclub that served only drinks was not a “restaurant, cafeteria,
lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, or other facility principally engaged in selling food
for consumption on the premises” within the public accommodations provisions of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964), rev’d on other grounds, 376 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1967); Selden v. Topaz 12-3 Lounge, Inc., 447 F.2d 165, 165 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that a lounge that did not serve
food or offer entertainment did not fall under the Civil Rights Act of 1964). But see United
States v. DeRosier, 473 F.2d 749, 750–52 (5th Cir. 1973) (ruling that a neighborhood bartavern that derived a small portion of its total business from mechanical amusement devices
that had moved in interstate commerce was a “place of entertainment” within the meaning of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
196
See discussion supra Section I.A (discussing the conflicting approaches and disputes
regarding interpretation between different courts and jurisdictions).
197
DeRosier, 473 F.2d at 750–52; United States v. Vizena, 342 F. Supp. 553, 554 (W.D. La.
1972) (holding that a bar that provided a juke box and pool table for amusement of its patrons
was a “place of entertainment” within the Civil Rights Act); United States v. Deetjen, 356
F. Supp. 688, 689–90 (S.D. Fla. 1973) (finding that a Florida bar was a public accommodation
under Title II because the alcoholic beverages, television, piano, and juke box were
manufactured out of state and affected commerce); United States v. Purkey, 347 F. Supp.
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a robust understanding of Title II’s place-of-entertainment provision.198
The end of the 1960s provided more clarity about what constituted public
accommodations discrimination, and the only outstanding issues seemed
to be implementation and enforcement. Compliance—at least in the
context of bars, restaurants, and nightclubs—would not come as easy.
Meanwhile, an intrepid group of women activists would come to
challenge gender politics as usual and fight to widen what was still a
narrow understanding of public accommodations discrimination.
II. THE FLOWERING OF VELVET ROPE DISCRIMINATION
The century between the Civil War and the Civil Rights Movement
gradually produced the public accommodations landscape we have today.
This area evolved from the common law’s allowance of business owners’
right to refuse service (with some exceptions) to a regime where
governments designated race, color, sex, religion, national origin as
categories that could not be used to deny equal access to and enjoyment
of public space. This Part describes how new and modified prohibitions
on race and sex discrimination in bars, restaurants, and nightclubs were
developed, interpreted, and enforced. It begins by discussing how
feminist legal advocacy spurred state-level prohibitions of sex
discrimination in public accommodations due to Title II’s non-coverage
of the category. It also describes different ways states responded to these
new laws. Integral to this discussion is how courts’ varied treatment of
gender-based pricing produced a status quo that allowed velvet rope
discrimination to thrive. The second Section describes how resistance to
Title II and state-based analogs similarly produced an environment where
dress codes would emerge as a central feature of velvet rope
discrimination.

1286, 1287 (E.D. Tenn. 1971) (concluding that the Civil Rights Act extended to a
neighborhood tavern that practiced racial discrimination and contained a “juke box, records,
pinball machine and bowling machine which were manufactured out-of-state”); Nanez v.
Ritger, 304 F. Supp. 354, 356 (E.D. Wis. 1969) (ruling that a tavern-restaurant is likely a
“place of public accommodation” under a civil rights statute); United States by Clark v. Fraley,
282 F. Supp. 948, 952, 954 (M.D.N.C. 1968) (holding that a bar was covered under Title II
because it had the characteristics of a restaurant and held itself out as one); Fazzio Real Estate
Co. v. Adams, 396 F.2d 146, 149, 150 (5th Cir. 1968) (holding that although bars, per se, are
not covered by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, they may be covered where beer is served in
conjunction with food).
198
Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 306 (1969).
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A. Sex Discrimination Laws and Gender-Based Pricing
Title II did not include a prohibition on sex discrimination, and there
are no agreed-upon reasons for why.199 Nevertheless, after the passage of
the Act, women’s rights activists wasted no time attacking the sex
discrimination that went relatively unabated for more than a century.
Bars, restaurants, nightclubs, and the assumptions that came with all three
were important targets. Many of these activists “reasoned from race,” to
use Serena Mayeri’s construction, and deployed race analogies in their
political and legal advocacy for sex equality.200 Faith Seidenberg was a
public interest leader who embodied this strategy. She served as an
attorney for the Congress of Racial Equality during the Civil Rights
Movement, sat on the Executive Board of the ACLU (where she founded
the Women’s Legal Defense Fund), and was a member of the National
Organization for Women—an interracial group that included activists
such as Pauli Murray, Betty Friedan, and Shirley Chisholm.201 In an
article that discussed one of NOW’s first major legal challenges—a
discrimination case involving a Syracuse hotel bar that refused to serve a
woman because she was not accompanied by a man—Seidenberg
presented Title II-like racial and religious analogies and stated, “If the
hotel put up a sign ‘No Jews Allowed’, or ‘No Negroes Allowed’ this
would be offensive to a great many people, but ‘No Women Allowed’
somehow seems all right to most.”202 In that case, the court refused to read

199

See Paulson, supra note 24, at 491 (citing Barbara Allen Babcock, Ann E. Freedman,
Eleanor Holmes Norton & Susan C. Ross, Sex Discrimination and the Law: Causes and
Remedies 1037 (1975)) (“One author explained that this omission was due to the low
consciousness level of sex bias, and because at the time the Act was passed, most of the
exclusions from public accommodations were based on race.”). Other speculative guesses
point to civil rights leaders’ privileging of race, the existing state-based frameworks that
focused on race, the uncertainty around whether the bill would pass, and fear about what
including sex might mean for its passage. See generally Janet Dewart Bell, Lighting the Fires
of Freedom: African American Women in the Civil Rights Movement (2018) (discussing the
role of Black women in civil rights activism and the interplay between sex and race
discrimination); Clay Risen, The Bill of the Century: The Epic Battle for the Civil Rights Act
(2014) (explicating issues with the bill that stoked worries and uncertainty about its passing).
200
Serena Mayeri, Reasoning from Race: Feminism, Law, and the Civil Rights Revolution
106–43 (2011).
201
Sepper & Dinner, supra note 24, at 101; Maryann Barakso, Governing NOW: Grassroots
Activism in the National Organization for Women 12, 45 (2004).
202
Faith A. Seidenberg, The Wave of the Future — NOW, 21 Cornell L. F. 2, 2 (1969); see
also Grossman, supra note 24, at 3 (“[N]o court would countenance a bar’s offering of ‘whites’
night’ as a legitimate means to entice white customers, nor would any court think that the
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sex into Title II and curtly stated that it would “not gratuitously do what
Congress has not seen fit to do.”203 But this was only one of a few
forthcoming challenges to discrimination in bars and restaurants.
A year later, Seidenberg and NOW commenced a successful § 1983
action against McSorley’s Old Ale House.204 This Manhattan-based Irish
saloon had a 115-year practice of only serving men. The court ruled that
the state’s annual license renewal scheme for a public accommodation
with an openly discriminatory practice constituted state action and held
that the policy of excluding women violated the Equal Protection
Clause.205 The court found no rational basis for distinguishing between
men and women as customers. It rejected the saloon’s argument that men
had preferences “for a haven to which they may retreat from the watchful
eye of wives or womanhood.”206 The court’s opinion also reflected courts’
growing recognition of sexism. It added, “Outdated images of bars as dens
of coarseness . . . and of women as peculiarly delicate and impressionable
creatures in need of protection from the rough and tumble of unvarnished
humanity will no longer justify sexual separatism.”207 Seidenberg v.
McSorleys’ Old Ale House provided a framework for future cases. Some
courts relied on the decision to find discrimination in similar restaurant
policies.208 Others cited Seidenberg when adjudicating cases involving
establishments that refused to serve women during lunch on business
days.209 The Supreme Court cited the decision when it invalidated a state
alcohol law premised on invidious gender discrimination.210 Seidenberg
was an early example of cases in the 1970s that affirmed women’s right
to equal enjoyment of bars—some of which existed outside of public
accommodations law and entailed decisions involving women’s
ownership and employment in these spaces.211 In short, Seidenberg
offering of ‘[B]lacks’ night’ on another day of the week would cure its discriminatory impact.
Yet courts have entertained both these possibilities for sex-specific discounts.”).
203
DeCrow v. Hotel Syracuse Corp., 288 F. Supp. 530, 532 (N.D.N.Y. 1968).
204
Seidenberg v. McSorleys’ Old Ale House, 317 F. Supp. 593, 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
205
Id. at 599.
206
Id. at 605.
207
Id. at 606 (footnote omitted).
208
Johnson v. Heinemann Candy Co., 402 F. Supp. 714, 718 (E.D. Wis. 1975); Women's
Liberation Union of Rhode Island v. Israel, 512 F.2d 106, 108–09 (1st Cir. 1975).
209
Bennett v. Dyer’s Chop House, 350 F. Supp. 153, 154–55 (N.D. Ohio 1972) (citing
Seidenberg, 317 F. Supp. at 603); see also Sepper & Dinner, supra note 24, at 105–14.
210
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 208 (1976) (citing Seidenberg, 317 F. Supp. 593).
211
White v. Fleming, 522 F.2d 730, 731, 733, 736–37 (7th Cir. 1975) (ruling that a city
ordinance that prohibited female employees from sitting with male patrons or standing behind
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helped unsettle assumptions about women’s unescorted presence in
public spaces and accommodations.
Changing legal, economic, and social conditions also helped facilitate
women’s independent attendance at bars, restaurants, and nightclubs.
Beginning with Pittsburgh and Colorado in 1969, and continuing through
the 1970s, states and municipalities codified prohibitions on sex
discrimination in public accommodations.212 This was a far cry from the
statutory amendment to Title II that feminist leaders desired, but created
a regulatory framework where one did not previously exist. Supreme
Court decisions that engaged questions of sexual freedom and bodily
autonomy also had implications for bars, restaurants, and nightclubs—all
of which historically served as important sites of courtship and romantic
mating.213 Women’s increased entry into the workforce was noteworthy
too.214 This form of participation in the market diminished the financial
dependency into which employment discrimination, confinement to the
domestic field, and courtship practices often conscripted women, and
shifted social norms. Though women have always worked,215 this new
economic freedom gelled neatly with the ideological independence that
a bar was unconstitutional); Daugherty v. Daley, 370 F. Supp. 338, 340–41 (N.D. Ill. 1974)
(striking down an Illinois statute that prohibited female employees from soliciting the
purchases of drinks and prohibited anyone from serving female employees drinks purchased
by male patrons); Sail’er Inn v. Kirby, 485 P.2d 529, 542–43 (Cal. 1971) (citing Seidenberg,
308 F. Supp. at 1260); Commonwealth, Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd. v. Burke, 481 S.W.2d
52, 54 (Ky. 1972); Paterson Tavern & Grill Owners Ass’n v. Borough of Hawthorne, 270 A.2d
628, 630–31 (N.J. 1970) (citing Seidenberg, 308 F. Supp. at 1260).
212
Sepper & Dinner, supra note 24, at 104; Lerman & Sanderson, supra note 24, at 264–65.
213
See Melissa Murray, Griswold’s Criminal Law, 47 Conn. L. Rev. 1045, 1072 (2015)
(noting that the 1965 decision Griswold v. Connecticut is “credited with helping to transform
society from one in which the state demanded compliance with majoritarian sexual norms to
one in which the state respected some degree of sexual autonomy”); see also Daphne Spain,
Constructive Feminism: Women’s Spaces and Women’s Rights in the American City 12–16
(2016) (describing the 1970s development of feminists’ “free spaces” such as bookstores,
clinics, and women’s centers, which reinforced feminists’ independence and selfdetermination); Susan Frelich Appleton, The Forgotten Family Law of Eisenstadt v. Baird, 28
Yale J.L. & Feminism 1, 12–16 (2016) (arguing that the 1972 case Eisenstadt v. Baird
challenged ideas about illegitimacy, family planning, and marriage).
214
Julia Kirk Blackwelder, Now Hiring: The Feminization of Work in the United States,
1900–1995, at 177–204 (1997) (describing women’s participation in the workforce in the
1970s).
215
Alice Kessler-Harris, Women Have Always Worked: A Concise History 1–16 (2d ed.
2018); Vicki L. Ruiz, From Out of the Shadows: Mexican Women in Twentieth-Century
America 72–98 (2008); Evelyn Nakano Glenn, Unequal Freedom: How Race and Gender
Shaped American Citizenship and Labor 1–3 (2002); Tera W. Hunter, To ’Joy My Freedom:
Southern Black Women’s Lives and Labors After the Civil War 44–73 (1998).
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the women’s movement augmented.216 Public accommodations owners
seized on this economic and ideological autonomy by suddenly
welcoming women in ways that would have seemed almost unfathomable
two decades earlier.
In the 1970s, bars, restaurants, and “discotheques” responded to
evolving sexual mores by using gender-based pricing schemes to induce
women into their establishments.217 Oftentimes referred to as “ladies’
night,” gender-based pricing typically manifests through reduced entry
costs for women or lower prices for items such as food or drinks.
Sometimes it takes shape through traditional marketing or through more
informal mechanisms, as indicated in the example offered in the
Introduction.218 The public accommodations volte-face here cannot be
understated.
Women went from being excluded or conditionally accepted when men
accompanied them to being independently welcomed (with inclusion
being subject to other social categories such as race or sexual orientation).
These schemes were generally about drumming up business. Sometimes
this business generation was motivated by an understanding that women
were traditionally excluded from these spaces. In other instances,
discounts were motivated by a recognition of women’s new purchasing
power. More often than not, these public accommodations’ economic
rationales were based on the heteronormative assumption that inducing
women into these establishments would lead to increased presence by
men, who would cross-subsidize the discounts.219
216
Sepper & Dinner, supra note 24, at 115 (2019) (noting that “[s]ex equality in public
accommodations required independence from attachment to men” and describing how women
who protested discrimination in these spaces “demanded legal recognition as individuals
without sexual attachment to a man as a physical companion or economic proxy”).
217
Reginald G. Smart, The Happy Hour Experiment in North America, 23 Contemp. Drug
Probs. 291, 292–93 (1996) (discussing how in the early 1970s, many bars, taverns, and
restaurants “initiated a variety of sales programs to attract more customers and increase
profits” and how some these included “[r]eductions in prices or free beverages for a particular
type of patron, usually for women” and concluding how “[s]uch reductions may possibly have
been based upon the assumption that many women would not go to bars without special
inducements”).
218
See sources cited supra notes 10–12 (highlighting the discretion placed with bouncers to
charge or not charge women cover to enter a club).
219
Julia Bauer, Despite Law, Bars Still Offer Women Free Booze, Herald, Mar. 8. 1974, at
4 (offering comments from a female patron who observed, “The men probably drink enough
to make up for the girls’ free drinks”); Robert Schwartzman, Ladies’ Night Unfair—He Says,
Fla. Today, Dec. 16, 1974, at 10C (male employee discussing the subsidization); David Green,
Chivalry Lost: All Dinners May Be Created Equal-Cafe Official, Ithaca J., Feb. 7, 1976, at 3.
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The emergence of this velvet rope discrimination was not lost on the
media or the general public. Views spanned the ideological gamut and
ranged from uncritical support to thoughtful skepticism. In 1971, one
Iowa bar patron objected to being charged 85 cents for a drink at a ladies’
night event when women were charged only 40 cents. He asked the
bartender about this price differential and the server exploded, “It’s for
BROADS! . . . You might get it if you had more hair.”220 Some voiced
concerns about the sex stereotyping that came with gender-based pricing.
One Missouri man complained, “It’s like the bars are pimping for men.
One bar owner actually said ladies’ night is a service to me. It centralizes
the ladies. I could see myself riding in on my stallion and cutting me a
nice little heifer out of the herd.”221 These reservations may have been
hollow or sincere recognitions of the legal arguments feminist activists
made in the 1960s and 1970s. They could have been pure weaponization
of anti-discrimination logics by a group of people who were not
considered the beneficiaries of public accommodations laws. A group of
women in Miami questioned the underlying bases and veracity of ladies’
night promotions. They highlighted the presumption of sexual
availability—particularly in bars and nightclubs—that was implicit in
these pricing arrangements. They noted how married women often felt
uncomfortable in these spaces, which defied the essence of the
promotions.222 Questioning what some believed was a faux admiration via
marketing, one woman queried, “Wouldn’t it be great if ‘ladies’ night’
really were ladies’ night?”223 Despite these varying views, the crucial
question was what would the legal actors responsible for implementing
and enforcing public accommodations laws think?
During the 1970s and 1980s, three approaches to the legal regulation
of gender-based pricing emerged. First, some states did nothing. These
jurisdictions either did not have prohibitions on sex discrimination in their
public accommodations statutes or had such laws but did not have cases
that worked their way to courts. These states left regulation to municipal
authorities or administrative agencies tasked with regulating

220

William T. Kong, ‘Ladies Night’ Illegal, Rights Unit Rules, Des Moines Trib., Feb. 18,
1971, at 1.
221
Elaine Viets, He Won’t Drink to Ladies Night, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Feb. 3, 1980, at
1–121 (emphasis added).
222
Nancy Webb Hatton, Ladies’ Night—No Hassle, Hustle, Mia. Herald, May 13, 1978, at
2D.
223
Id.

COPYRIGHT © 2021 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2021]

Velvet Rope Discrimination

727

discrimination. In these instances, agencies sometimes investigated
gender-based pricing. However, they would only issue weakly worded
pronouncements about the illegality of the practice while also admitting
their inability or disinterest in regulating it.224 The other two approaches,
which comprise the next two Subsections, involved judicial validation of
gender-based pricing and rejections of the practice. Although some of
these cases specifically involved bars, restaurants, and nightclubs, they all
had implications beyond these spaces.
1. Judicial Approval and Benevolent Sexism
One set of states was unbothered by gender-based pricing and found
the practice to be legally permissible. Michigan led things off. A little
more than a week after the Supreme Court of the United States issued its
own ruling on reverse discrimination,225 a Michigan court considered a
case involving a class of men who argued that a tennis club’s lower annual
membership fee for women violated the state’s public accommodations
statute. In Magid v. Oak Park Racquet Club Associates, the court glossed
over the statute’s requirement of “full and equal” access to public
accommodations and ruled that the different pricing was not technically
a “withholding, refusal or denial of accommodations” under the language
of the statute.226
1981 generated three more important decisions that upheld genderbased pricing. These cases evolved from the semantic and incomplete
readings of anti‑discrimination statutes to slow concessions to business
owners’ gender-based economic rationales. In one, the same Michigan
court upheld the decision in Magid. It accepted the defendant-racquet
224

Bar ‘Ladies Nights’ Illegal, Official Says, Star Trib. (Minn.), Dec. 9, 1972, at 5 (quoting
the Deputy Director of the Minneapolis Civil Rights Department claiming that the agency had
“many, many, many more important priorities” than to devote much time to ladies specials,
but would respond to discrimination as it is called to the agency’s attention); ‘Ladies Night’
Soon May Not Be a Familiar Cry in Idaho’s Bars, Times-News (Twin Falls), Jan. 28, 1980, at
14 (discussing how the Idaho Commission on Rights would use informal means to persuade
businesses to eliminate discriminatory practices and how the commission had failed to pursue
cases because of “limited staff and funds” and because the damages were lower than other
discriminatory activity brought to its attention).
225
Regents Univ. Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978) (holding that since the medical
school could not “carry its burden of proving that, but for the existence of its unlawful special
admissions program” the white applicant would not have been admitted, the applicant was
entitled to admission).
226
Magid v. Oak Park Racquet Club Assocs., 269 N.W.2d 661, 622, 663–64 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1978).
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club’s claim that the differential fee was justified by the “disparate costs
of providing separate locker room, separate toilet and other gender-related
facilities.”227
Illinois followed Michigan’s lead. The state had a dramshop statute
that required full and equal enjoyment of public accommodations that
served alcohol.228 The court concluded that the ladies’ night special in
dispute was not designed to discourage men from patronizing the
establishment, which would have denied them equal enjoyment.229
Instead, the court reasoned that since men paid the regular established
price there was no violation.230 The price for women, the court noted,
“[W]as a price reduced to a nominal sum and one obviously set for the
purpose of encouraging their patronage.”231 The court added:
[T]o prohibit the practice of on occasion offering drinks at reduced
prices to females would, by analogy, require holding it to prohibit a
similar offering to (1) persons of Irish descent on St. Patrick’s Day, (2)
persons in the military or naval service on Armed Forces Day, (3)
certain conventioneers when conventions are being held in the city, (4)
senior citizens, or (5) members of any other groups. Almost all
businesses, on occasion, offer reduced prices to some sort of group,
usually for the purpose of obtaining their business.232

Besides having an arguably narrow understanding of equal enjoyment,
the court employed a parade of horribles rhetoric common in disputes
about velvet rope discrimination that obscured the fact of legally
protected categories.233
Washington completed this trifecta of 1981 decisions green-lighting
gender-based pricing.234 When the Seattle Supersonics basketball team
offered a “ladies’ night” discount to women for Sunday basketball games,
one man attended the game with his wife and attempted to get two
discounted tickets (one for her and one for himself). He was denied and
sued. The court rejected the plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim and ruled
227

Tucich v. Dearborn Indoor Racquet Club, 309 N.W.2d 615, 617 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
Civil Rights in Licensed Premises; Distributor Sales to Non-Licensees, 235 Ill. Comp.
Stat. 5/6-17 (1990).
229
Dock Club v. Ill. Liquor Control Comm’n, 428 N.E.2d 735, 738 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).
230
Id.
231
Id.
232
Id.
233
Id.
234
MacLean v. First Nw. Indus. of Am., Inc., 635 P.2d 683, 686 (Wash. 1981).
228
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that he benefitted from the scheme by receiving an overall price discount
for his wife and himself. The court accepted the defendant’s argument
that “women do not manifest the same interest in basketball that men
do.”235 The Washington court used the rationale offered by its sister
tribunals in Michigan and Illinois: that there was no active
discouragement of men’s attendance, which made the gender-based
pricing permissible. The court found “no reason for judicial intervention
in ticket-pricing policies which are designed not to exclude anyone but to
encourage attendance.”236
Overall, these decisions produced advantages and drawbacks. The
Washington and Michigan courts made gestures toward an understanding
of women’s historical exclusion—in tennis and basketball—and ruled
that efforts to invite their participation in these areas were reasonable.237
They also identified what some imagined to be vexatious litigation
brought by plaintiffs eagerly seeking to use newly minted sex-based
discrimination laws for their benefit. At the same time, these decisions
embodied what some psychologists and gender scholars refer to as
benevolent sexism, which refers to “a set of interrelated attitudes toward
women that are sexist in terms of viewing women stereotypically and in
restricted roles but that are subjectively positive in feeling tone (for the
perceiver).”238 Although these decisions did not create the justifications
for gender-based pricing, they gave these explanations legal cover
moving forward.
Although the Washington and Michigan courts ruled in public
accommodations cases that did not involve bars, restaurants, or clubs,
235

Id. at 684.
Id. at 687.
237
See Dave Zirin, What’s My Name, Fool?: Sports and Resistance in the United States 12
(2005) (noting that Billie Jean King “became a giant protesting the exclusion and second-class
citizenship of female athletes”); Susan K. Cahn, Coming on Strong: Gender and Sexuality in
Twentieth-Century Women’s Sport 2–3 (1994) (describing the constraints that women athletes
and women’s sports have faced in modern American history).
238
Peter Glick & Susan T. Fiske, The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory: Differentiating Hostile
and Benevolent Sexism, 70 J. Personality & Soc. Psych. 491, 491 (1996); see also Katharine
T. Bartlett, Making Good on Good Intentions: The Critical Role of Motivation in Reducing
Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1893, 1917 (2009) (suggesting that
benevolent sexism satisfies “people’s need to think of themselves as egalitarian, while at the
same time helping them to rationalize or obscure their more negative or patronizing views”);
Matthew D. Hammond, Chris G. Sibley & Nickola C. Overall, The Allure of Sexism:
Psychological Entitlement Fosters Women’s Endorsement of Benevolent Sexism over Time,
5 Soc. Psych. & Personality Sci. 422, 423–24 (2013) (arguing that the benefits of benevolent
sexism lead women to endorse it).
236
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their analyses of gender-based financial inducements gained purchase in
these spaces. When considered with the Illinois court’s specific
consideration of bars, all of these decisions offered limited
understandings of who benefits from gender-based pricing and the
exclusionary implications of these schemes. As discussed in Part IV, these
decisions provided legal fodder for public accommodations seeking to
defend velvet rope discrimination.
2. Judicial Rejection and Stringency
Another set of cases struck down gender-based pricing with no
misgivings. These decisions took an anti-classification approach to
gender-based pricing. Anti-classification is a vision of equal protection
law that condemns government classifications based on legally protected
categories.239 It is often juxtaposed with the anti-subordination principle,
which suggests that it is wrong for the state to engage in practices that
enforce the subjugation of historically oppressed groups.240 Although
both are typically understood in the world of constitutional law, as many
scholars have highlighted, both have been transported to and applied in
statutory anti-discrimination law.241 Gender-based pricing decisions
involving anti-classification principles began in 1984 and built on each
other in consecutive years.
In the first case, the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board suspended a
bar’s license because it exempted two women from the $1 cover charge,
among other reasons.242 The trial court ruled that the board was “nitpicking” and ignored more substantial offenses; the court trivialized the
discrimination charges as akin to “stomping on a mouse in the kitchen
when there’s a tiger at the door.”243 The Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania—the court of last resort for these administrative claims—
reversed. It offered a strict anti-classification approach that would be
followed by other tribunals. It noted that the Pennsylvania legislature
239
See Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in
Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1470, 1534 (2004).
240
Id. at 1472–73.
241
See Murray supra note 25, at 294–96; Bradley A. Areheart, The Anticlassification Turn
in Employment Discrimination Law, 63 Ala. L. Rev. 955, 957–58 (2012); Jessica A. Clarke,
Protected Class Gatekeeping, 92 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 101, 141–42 (2017); Cary Franklin, The AntiStereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 83, 128
(2010).
242
Pa. Liquor Control Bd. v. Dobrinoff, 471 A.2d 941, 943–44 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984).
243
Id. at 943.
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“mandated that certain minor matters, as well as major breaches of law,
be treated as statutory violations” and ruled that “[a] court cannot reverse
Liquor Code charges by declaring the violations to be de minimis.”244 The
court also rejected defendant’s socioeconomic argument of “chivalry and
courtesy to the fair sex” as an explanation for its pricing scheme.245 It
indicated that when public accommodations make gender-based
determinations that have “no legitimate relevance in the circumstances,”
then the state’s anti-discrimination statute is violated.246 Fifteen years
after Pittsburgh passed the first piece of legislation banning sex
discrimination, a strict reading of gender-based pricing emerged.
The Supreme Court of California explicitly followed suit the next year
in Koire v. Metro Car Wash.247 The plaintiff was a man who was denied
the benefits of “Ladies Day” discounts to women at car washes and a
nightclub.248 With the help of an ACLU attorney who represented him in
a private capacity, the man sued under California’s anti-discrimination
statute and won.249 In ruling for the plaintiff, the court applied the
constitutional concept of sex as a “suspect classification” to antidiscrimination law and rejected the defendants’ attempts to analogize
gender-based pricing with age-based pricing that benefits seniors and
children.250 The court also rebuffed a host of other arguments made by the
defense that emphasized the business necessities of nightclubs,251 the
supposed social policy benefits of gender-based discounts,252 and the
244

Id.
Id.
246
Id.
247
707 P.2d 195 (Cal. 1985).
248
Id. at 195–96.
249
Steven Emmons & David Reyes, He Stood Up Like a Man—and Won, L.A. Times, Oct.
18, 1985, at 34.
250
Koire, 707 P.2d at 202.
251
Id. at 198 (“Most often, the nature of the business enterprise or the facilities provided has
been asserted as a basis for upholding a discriminatory practice only when there is a strong
public policy in favor of such treatment. . . . For example, it is permissible to exclude children
from bars or adult bookstores because it is illegal to serve alcoholic beverages or to distribute
‘harmful matter’ to minors.” (citations omitted)).
252
Id. at 199–200 (“However, the ‘social’ policy on which [the nightclub] relies—
encouraging men and women to socialize in a bar—is a far cry from the social policies which
have justified other exceptions to the [anti-discrimination statute]. For example, the
compelling societal interest in ensuring adequate housing for the elderly which justifies
differential treatment based on age cannot be compared to the goal of attracting young women
to a bar. . . . The need to promote the ‘social policy’ asserted by [the nightclub] is not
sufficiently compelling to warrant an exception to the [statute’s] prohibition on sex
discrimination by business establishments.”).
245
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economic rationality of these pricing arrangements.253 Although genderbased pricing was and continues to be considered “of minimal importance
or to be essentially harmless,” the court noted that “men and women
alike . . . are greatly offended by such discriminatory practices” and
stringently declared that the “legality of sex-based price discounts cannot
depend on the subjective value judgments about which types of sex-based
distinctions are important or harmful.”254 This strict interpretation of the
statute would become the most-cited case to reject gender-based pricing.
A year later, a Maryland appeals court came to a similar conclusion
when a restaurant offered 50% discounts to women on Thursdays.255 A
male patron filed a complaint with the Human Relations Commission of
Montgomery County after his “lady companion” received the discount
and he did not.256 The commission subsequently informed the owner that
the practice was violative of a local ordinance. He responded by
instituting a “Skirt and Gown” night that replicated the discount and
received media attention. The trial court found that the new policy was
facially neutral because it “did not burden men in any significant
manner.”257 In its reversal, the appellate court acknowledged the
“superficially humorous backdrop” but insisted that “the matter involves
an intrinsically substantive issue which, left unanswered, could serve to
encourage far more serious methods of discrimination.”258 It deferred to
the agency’s factual findings that the promotion was “discriminatory
subterfuge” and “merely an extension of Ladies’ Night.”259
Taken as a whole, these anti-classification cases had both productive
and problematic features. Positively, these decisions stemmed from the
growing tide of state courts simplistically concluding that gender-based
pricing was innocuous. These anti-classification cases identified how
253
Id. at 199 (“[T]his court [has] held that the fact that a business enterprise was
‘proceed[ing] from a motive of rational self-interest’ [does] not justify discrimination. . . . It
would be no less a violation of the Act for an entrepreneur to charge all homosexuals, or all
nonhomosexuals, reduced rates in his or her restaurant or hotel in order to encourage one
group's patronage and, thereby, increase profits. The same reasoning is applicable here, where
reduced rates were offered to women and not men.” (second alteration in original)).
254
Id. at 204.
255
Peppin v. Woodside Delicatessen, 506 A.2d 263, 267–68 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986).
256
Id. at 264.
257
Id. at 265.
258
Id. at 264–65.
259
Id.; see also Trends: Skirting the Law, Phila. Inquirer, Apr. 13, 1986, at 3A (reporting on
the case outcome and noting that some men showed up wearing skirts when the restaurant
initiated its “skirts and gowns” discount).
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such policies can harm both men and women. But these decisions were
not unimpeachable. By rejecting gender-based pricing in toto, all of these
decisions—which involved the public accommodations that are central to
this Article—provided fodder for a men’s rights movement eager to
“invert” animus, as Professor Murray describes it, and allowed male
plaintiffs to “deploy the force of state antidiscrimination laws.”260 This
inversion was just one part of the new legal landscape of sex
discrimination. Other judicial decisions, as discussed in the previous
Subsection, approved sex-based discounts but sanitized the sex
stereotypes that buoyed the practice, whereas some states did nothing.
Overall, the 1980s produced a gender jurisprudence in this corner of
public accommodations law that ranged from unconcerned to simplistic
to stringent.
B. Dress Codes
As the previous Part explained, the most immediate challenges to Title
II focused on whether bars and clubs were considered public
accommodations since they were not specifically identified in the statute.
After courts rebuffed these claims by holding that these establishments
implicated Commerce Clause issues within the statute’s ambit,261 public
accommodations proprietors would latch on to other parts of the statute
to avoid compliance. One strategy was for owners to simply argue that
they were private entities. This approach was as old as public
accommodations statutes themselves,262 but was repurposed after
statutory and court-mandated integration. On June 30, 1964, a group of
business owners who operated racially segregated restaurants banded
together to form the Northwest Louisiana Restaurant Club. They

260

Murray, supra note 25 at 293.
See supra note 197.
262
See, e.g., Everett v. Harron, 110 A.2d 383, 385 (Pa. 1955) (noting that the defendant
“frankly admit[ed] that a crude attempt to give the enterprise the character of a private club in
order to justify a selective admission of applicants was but a device to keep Negroes from the
swimming pool”); Commonwealth v. Moore, 32 Pa. D. & C. 630, 635 (1938) (rejecting the
argument that the defendant-hotel was a place of public accommodation “which [is] in [its]
nature ‘distinctly private’”); Gilmore v. Paris Inn, 51 P.2d 1103, 1103 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1935) (affirming judgment for defendant who argued café was a private club); Norman v. City
Island Beach Co., 126 Misc. 335, 336 (N.Y. App. Term 1926) (rejecting defendant’s assertion
that pool was private and not subject to state civil rights statute); Bowlin v. Lyon, 25 N.W.
766, 768 (Iowa 1885) (ruling that a skating rink that denied admission to Black person was
essentially a private business).
261
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developed this non-profit organization in an attempt to retain their
segregationist practices and benefit from Title II’s private club
exemption, which was passed two days later.263 In what would become a
familiar pattern,264 the organization engaged in a variety of strategies.
According to a federal court:
(a) They posted signs and decals, supplied to them by the Club, in
conspicuous places to indicate that their establishments were private
clubs open to members of the Northwest Louisiana Restaurant Club
only;
(b) They offered and issued membership cards as a matter of course to
any white customer without any requirements or conditions
whatsoever;
(c) They excluded Negroes from membership in the Club regardless of
their behavior or appearance;
(d) They served white customers without regard to whether they were
members of the Northwest Louisiana Restaurant Club;
(e) They denied equal service to Negroes on the ground that they were
not members of the Northwest Louisiana Restaurant Club;
(f) They denied equal service to Negroes on the basis of their race or
color.265

Though the federal district court found that the organization was a “sham”
and existed only to evade the law and exclude Black patrons,266 other
courts continued to deal with this issue in a whack-a-mole fashion. A few
years later, the Department of Justice brought another suit against a
restaurant-lounge that attempted to similarly “privatize.” In response to
integration and the white consumer resistance that came with it, Landry’s
263

United States v. Nw. La. Rest. Club, 256 F. Supp. 151, 152 (W.D. La. 1966); North
Louisiana Assn.—Restaurant Club Outlawed, Shreveport J., July 15, 1966, at 2C.
264
“Segregation academies,” which were private schools designed to avoid desegregation,
are a prominent example. See Anthony M. Champagne, The Segregation Academy and the
Law, 42 J. Negro Educ., 58, 58 (1973). See generally Mary Thornton, A Legacy of Legal
Segregation Returns to Haunt a Small Town, Wash. Post, Apr. 21, 1983, at A2 (“In community
after community, white officials during the 1960s transferred public property to private
organizations as integration loomed. Schools, swimming pools, athletic playing fields, even
school books, were given to private owners.”).
265
Nw. La. Rest. Club, 256 F. Supp. at 153.
266
Id.
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Fine Foods Restaurant rebranded itself as a private organization replete
with adopted bylaws to govern membership, membership cards, and fees;
its membership roster included 988 people who joined over a two-week
period—all of whom were white.267 The district court saw through the
transformation and found that the “club” violated Title II.268 The Supreme
Court addressed this insincere privatization trend in Daniel v. Paul, which
rejected a recreational facility’s use of the same practice.269 Nevertheless,
in other parts of the country, variants of the privatization argument
surfaced, among other strategies of exclusion.
Harkening back to courts’ evocations of and sympathies for
“respectable” Black pleasure seekers in early public accommodations
jurisprudence, lawyers, journalists, and other white-collar professionals
became the voices against velvet rope discrimination in the 1970s. This
was the case because, in addition to being subjected to it, they had the
resources, outlets, and symbolic capital to convey the existence of these
exclusionary strategies. In 1972, one Black lawyer noted how the terrain
was evolving from outright exclusion to racial balancing. “Racial
discrimination takes a different form in Pennsylvania than it did in the
Deep South,” he explained.270 “In Philadelphia, proprietors of white
nightclubs and restaurants are more interested in maintaining a quota
system, than in barring [B]lacks outright.”271 Club owners, he added,
“don’t mind a few [B]lacks patronizing their establishment, but they try
to discourage too many from coming in, fearing that [B]lacks in large
numbers will frighten white customers away.”272 A Black Boston Globe
journalist wrote, “Instead of blatantly telling [B]lacks they are not allowed
to enter, or posting signs saying ‘Whites Only,’ some singles clubs and
discotheques have devised more subtle means of maintaining this sick
practice.”273 He also saw behind the velvet rope:
Nowadays club owners, in attempts to limit the number of [B]lacks to
zero or a small number, require [B]lacks to show membership cards
when the club, in fact, has no such cards. Or they might tell [B]lacks

267

United States v. Jordan, 302 F. Supp. 370, 374, 377 (E.D. La. 1969).
Id. at 379–80.
269
395 U.S. 298, 298, 307–08 (1969).
270
Art Peters, LCB Card: A Way to Discriminate?, Phila. Inquirer, Sept. 6, 1972, at 31.
271
Id.
272
Id.
273
Robert A. Jordan, Cafe Bias Spotlight Spurs Progress, Bos. Globe, Oct. 21, 1976, at 31.
268
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that they do not meet the dress code, or that a “private party” is in
progress, or that a place is simply full.274

The Washington Post also detailed the discrimination faced by Black
professionals. In addition to including an unabashed admission by a
nightclub owner about racial preferences in these spaces, the outlet
provided stories about exclusion from a psychiatrist and an orthopedic
surgeon.275 The wife of the mayor was also subjected to velvet rope
discretion. “Rarely is denial of admission put in racial terms,” the story
explained. “Rather, the clubs start requiring membership cards or
inaugurate dress codes or invoke the city fire marshal’s crowd capacity
code.”276
Throughout the 1970s, state and local commissions, rather than the
Department of Justice, identified velvet rope discrimination and punished
it. Examples span across the country. Baltimore and Louisville bars
violated anti-discrimination laws by refusing to serve minorities, with the
defendant in the latter instance filing a lawsuit against the Kentucky
Human Rights Commission and claiming that he was denied due process
because the body was “composed substantially or entirely of avowed
integrationists and civil rights zealots.”277 Agencies in Phoenix and
Pittsburgh fined bar owners for overcharging Black patrons for beer.278 In
Dallas, the city’s consumer affairs department had a team of six
investigators between the ages of 24 and 33 who would visit different
nightclubs to ensure that they were not “using fake dress codes to keep
out minorities.”279 In the coastal town of Groton, the Connecticut
Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities found that a nightclub
274

Id.
Courtland Milloy, Some Doors Closed to Black Faces: Integration and ‘Chic’ in D.C.
Clubs, Wash. Post, May 31, 1979, at A1, A13 (quoting a nightclub owner as saying “clubs try
to restrict their [B]lack clientele to about 10 to 25 percent”).
276
Id. at A13.
277
Interracial Group Finds Discrimination by Tavern, Balt. Sun, Mar. 28, 1968, at C7; Suit
Attacks Discrimination Hearing, Courier-J., June 24, 1967, at 7.
278
Patrick Boyle, Human Relations Report Hails State’s ’67 Gains, Pitt. Press, July 25, 1968
(“Typical of illegal acts stopped by the commission in the area of public accommodations was
the case of a Negro charged 95 cents for a pitcher of beer in a Pennsylvania tavern while white
patrons paid only 75 cents.”); $25 Fine for a $1 Beer, Ariz. Rep., Jan. 17, 1968, at 55 (noting
how a tavern owner was sentenced to pay a $25 fine or spend eight days in a city jail for
conviction under the Phoenix public accommodations ordinance for charging a Black person
$1 for a 35-cent beer).
279
Cops Who Dance the Night Away, S.F. Exam’r, June 23, 1980, at B9; Dallas Revises
Law to Restrict Club Dress Codes, Tyler Courier-Times, Dec. 23, 1979, at 5.
275
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discriminated against minorities by claiming they lacked proper
identification or were not in compliance with the dress code; the owner
paid approximately $3,150 in damages.280 In Boston, one manager of a
club confessed that it was “standard practice for his club to limit the
number of [B]lacks admitted.”281 The Boston Licensing Board suspended
the license of a different nightclub for four days after the agency
concluded that the bar discriminated against Black and interracial couples
by asking for “membership cards” and denying entrance when they
allegedly “did not meet the dress code.”282 In addition to paying $150 in
restitution to each of the thirteen people denied entrance, the nightclub
agreed to hire a Black doorman.283
The 1980s brought more cases and settlements. The decade exposed
the robustness of velvet rope discrimination and its effect on women of
color and non-Black subjects. In a case where a Black woman
successfully alleged racial and gender discrimination at a nightclub, the
Alaska court described a nakedly racial and gendered pricing structure
that combined $1.00 per person admission fees with $2.50 drink ticket
purchases.284 Unescorted white women were excused from both the
admission and drink ticket fees. In addition to individual admission fees,
Black patrons were required to buy two tickets per person. White patrons,
with the exception of unescorted white women, were required to buy one
per person.285 The pricing structure looked like this:
1) White, unescorted females / no tickets: $0
2) Males ([B]lack or white) / two tickets: $6.00
3) White couples / two tickets: $7.00
4) Black female (alone) / two tickets: $6.00
5) Black couples / four tickets: $12.00286
280

Jack Kadden, Results Due in Month in Probe of Nightclub, Hartford Courant, June 9,
1978, at E24; Disco Faces Bias Hearing, Hartford Courant, Jan. 18, 1980, at 42.
281
ABCC Invites Discrimination Complaints, Bos. Globe, Sept. 23, 1976, at 67.
282
Walter V. Robinson, Back Bay Disco Accused of Barring Blacks, Bos. Globe, Sept. 22,
1976, at A1; Walter V. Robinson, Whimseys Closing 4 Days as Discrimination Penalty, Bos.
Globe, Jan. 5, 1977, at 3.
283
Viola Osgood, Black Doorman To Be Hired: Whimsey's Settles Bias Dispute, Bos.
Globe, June 11, 1977, at 3.
284
McDaniel v. Cory, 631 P.2d 82, 83 n.5 (Alaska 1981).
285
Id.
286
Id.
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An early expose in the Arizona Republic titled, “Sophisticated
Discrimination,” described how Mexican-Americans were barred from
some nightclubs in Phoenix whereas African Americans reported being
“turned away from a club because of their clothes, gone home and
changed and, after being admitted, [saw] white people wearing the
offending style.”287 In 1986, an Iowa nightclub owner was forced to
provide equal accommodations after patrons filed a claim with the Cedar
Rapids Civil Rights Commission alleging that the club had a $1 cover
charge for whites and a $6 cover charge for Blacks. The club allowed
Black customers to pay the $1 cover if they paid $100 for a membership
card. The manager claimed that they were “turning away both [B]lacks
and whites” but “[t]he ones that would bitch were the [B]lacks.”288 That
same year, seventy Black, Latino, and Middle Eastern people filed
complaints against Red Onion in southern California. They alleged that
they were rejected from Red Onion because they did not look like the
photographs in their driver’s licenses or because they failed to meet the
dress code.289 One employee claimed that bosses “instructed [workers] to
‘clean up the crowd’ when it became ‘too dark.’”290 The remedy? $500 to
each of the thirty-nine complainants and a $20,000 fund for people who
filed complaints with the state by a certain date.291 A multiracial coalition
protested at one of the chain’s establishments, with one holding a sign
saying “Something Smells at the Rotten” and another predicting, “[A]fter
the media attention dies down, these people are going to start
discriminating again.”292 He was right. A mere two years later, the Red
Onion coughed up a total of $390,000 to twenty-six people who claimed
they were denied admission into their nightclubs.293 Employees were
instructed to “use whatever excuse necessary to keep the racial balance
predominantly, if not exclusively, white” and “selective enforcement of
the dress code” served as a primary strategy.294 In 1988, the VIP cards of

287

Andrew Means, Sophisticated Discrimination, Ariz. Republic, Dec. 4, 1983, at H1.
Dave Gosch, Club Metro Now Offering Free Memberships to All, Gazette, Aug. 1, 1986,
at 5A.
289
Red Onion OKs Discrimination Settlement, Desert Sun, July 30, 1986, at 1; A. Dahleen
Glanton, Red Onion Agrees To Pay $390,000 in Racism Suit, L.A. Times, Sept. 3, 1988, at 3.
290
Glanton, supra note 289.
291
Red Onion OKs Discrimination Settlement, supra note 289, at 1.
292
Ray Perez & Heidi Evans, Red Onion Promises to Prevent Discrimination, L.A. Times,
May 16, 1986, at Part II.
293
Glanton, supra note 289.
294
Id.
288
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the post-Civil Rights movement were still in vogue, which led DOJ to
bring a successful action against a Kentucky nightclub.295 Doormen for
Glass Menagerie admitted that they were instructed to “hinder, delay or
prevent” the admission of Black club-goers, who “were perceived not to
spend as much money as white patrons, to not be ‘big tippers,’ and to
bother white female customers.”296
By the beginning of the 1990s, and thereafter, owners of bars,
restaurants, and clubs would use old strategies and develop new ones in
their efforts to exclude racial minorities. Some of these issues made it to
state and federal courts whereas others led to settlements with the
Department of Justice and local agencies. These include outright denials
of service,297 overcharging,298 requiring unnecessary or excessive
amounts of identification,299 conditioning entry on how the demographics
of the clientele evolved for the night,300 claiming there was a private
party,301 and of course dress codes.302 As discussed in the next Part,
295

United States v. Glass Menagerie, 702 F. Supp. 139, 140 (E.D. Ky. 1988).
Id.
297
Russo v. Corbin, No. C.A. 01A-07-001, 2002 WL 88948, at *2–*3 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan.
8, 2002) (finding substantial evidence unlawful denial of service at a restaurant to racial
minorities in violation of state law).
298
Consent Decree, United States v. Walker, No. 7:01-0008 (M.D. Ga. June 26, 2001)
(Dep’t of Just., Hous. & Civ. Enf’t Cases), https://www.justice.gov/crt/housing-and-civilenforcement-cases-documents-591 [https://perma.cc/D5JE-VS97] (resolving allegations of
racial overcharging in violation of Title II).
299
Consent Decree, United States v. Freeway Club (N.D. Ala. May 13, 2002) (Dep’t of
Just., Hous. & Civ. Enf’t Cases), https://www.justice.gov/crt/housing-and-civil-enforcementcases-documents-421 [https://perma.cc/B93H-S5FG] (resolving allegations that a nightclub
discriminated against Black patrons by demanding more forms of ID than from other patrons);
Consent Order, United States v. Black Wolf, Inc. (N.D. W.Va. Nov. 20, 2003) (Dep’t of Just.,
Hous. & Civ. Enf’t Cases), https://www.justice.gov/crt/housing-and-civil-enforcement-casesdocuments-303 [https://perma.cc/Q6VY-Y5TQ] (resolving allegations of racial
discrimination by bar-restaurant that required Black patrons to show a membership card before
being served while not requiring the same from others).
300
See source cited supra note 50 (resolving a nightclub’s admission policies turning away
certain patrons to achieve racial “balance”).
301
U.S. Dep’t of Just., News Release, West Virginia Nightclub Agrees Not To Turn Away
African American Patrons, Under Agreement with Justice Department (Jan. 27, 1998),
https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/1998/January/028.htm
[https://perma.cc/G2ZGGM47] (resolving claims that club denied entry to Black patrons by telling them there was a
private event).
302
Consent Decree, United States v. Candy II, No. 05-C-1358 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 1, 2007)
(Dep’t of Just., Hous. & Civ. Enf’t Cases), https://www.justice.gov/crt/housing-and-civilenforcement-cases-documents-75
[https://perma.cc/JK7M-JWPJ]
(decree
resolving
allegations that club discriminatorily applied dress code); Consent Order, United States v.
Badeen (D. Kan. Mar. 8, 2002) (Dep’t of Just., Hous. & Civ. Enf’t Cases),
296
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selective enforcement of dress codes became one of the more
administrable, publicized, and contested practices of them all. Although
other forms of velvet rope discrimination persisted (e.g., overcharging or
refusal to serve), dress codes became akin to the kinds of “second
generation” discrimination that Susan Sturm has described in the
employment context.303 These requirements came about during a moment
when remedies for civil rights legislation became hotly contested, the
enforcement vigor of the 1970s seemed to wane, and public
accommodations discrimination—at least outside of the disability
context—appeared to take a back seat. At the same time that this specific
form of racial exclusion operated, public accommodations began to
understand women as the kind of company they wanted to invite into their
doors. By the end of the 1980s, some public accommodations would rely
on the same strategies as their predecessors whereas others would develop
modified techniques of exclusion.
III. CONTEMPORARY VELVET ROPE DISCRIMINATION
The previous Parts have illustrated the heft of race and sex
discrimination in bars, restaurants, and nightclubs in American history.
This Part connects that history with the contemporary operation of velvet
rope discrimination. It discusses the resilience of some exclusionary
tactics as well as the modification and creation of new strategies. It
continues with two Sections that describe the defenses of dress codes and
gender-based discounts, respectively. Both Sections maintain that these
https://www.justice.gov/crt/housing-and-civil-enforcement-cases-documents-321
[https://perma.cc/RAH3-AD9D] (resolving allegations of club's discriminatory enforcement
of dress code against Blacks and Latinx persons); N.Y. State Off. Att’y Gen., A.G.
Schneiderman Announces Agreement with Midtown Nightclub Ensuring Equal Access for
All Patrons (June 27, 2013), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2013/ag-schneidermanannounces-agreement-midtown-nightclub-ensuring-equal-access-all
[https://perma.cc/MH89-JCEZ] (addressing $20,000 settlement to state and $500 of restitution
to each patron for club’s discriminatory use of dress codes, along with other methods of
exclusion); People v. Peter & John's Pump House, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 809, 809, 811, 814
(N.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that New York's allegation that a nightclub imposed a
discriminatory dress code gave the state parens patriae standing); Stephen Labaton, Denny’s
Restaurants To Pay $54 Million in Race Bias Suits, N.Y. Times, May 25, 1994, at A1
(describing the $54 million settlement involving Denny’s, which was accused of engaging in
racial segregation in their restaurants, discriminatorily requiring Black patrons pre-pay, rude
treatments toward them, and long waits for service).
303
Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach,
101 Colum. L. Rev. 458, 460–61 (2001).
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justifications are not only unpersuasive but violative of antidiscrimination norms. Both Sections also offer normative suggestions that
focus on the elimination of these practices. The final Section offers a few
remarks on enforcement.
Velvet rope discrimination is the use of legally-protected categories by
public accommodations in determinations of who is admitted and
provided service. The categories of interest in this Article are race and
sex, and the public accommodations it focuses on are bars, restaurants,
and nightclubs. But velvet rope discrimination is not necessarily restricted
to these specific accommodations. History and case law show that velvet
rope discrimination occurs at other sites such as swimming pools, movie
theaters, cafes, and amusement parks, to name a few.304 Nor is velvet rope
discrimination limited to race and sex but is also applicable to other
protected legal categories. Discrimination based on disability is a unique
space for thinking about these issues, particularly considering case law
and accounts of bias against this group in nightlife and restaurants.305
Therefore, this Article is a provisional account that invites more
investigation into the practice.
Velvet rope discrimination has synergies with other forms of
discrimination that scholars across the disciplinary spectrum have
304

See sources cited supra note 137 (demonstrating examples of discrimination at
swimming pools, movie theaters, cafes, and amusement parks).
305
Smith v. Bradley Pizza, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1020 (D. Minn. 2018) (finding
standing for a plaintiff with a disability in a claim of lack of access to restaurant arising from
architectural barriers); Whitaker v. Firman, No. 2:12-cv-224, 2013 WL 4498979, at *2, *6,
*9, *11 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 20, 2013) (rejecting, on standing grounds, a Title III claim brought by
a plaintiff who suffered from a rare joint disease that made it difficult to stand, and alleged
that the defendant-nightclub did not allow her to sit on a stool on the dancefloor or sit in the
VIP area); Wilson v. Superclub Ibiza, LLC, 931 F. Supp. 2d 61, 62–63 (D.D.C. 2013)
(evaluating the admissibility of evidence brought by a patron who alleged a nightclub operator
denied her entry in violation of the ADA); Sharp v. Capitol City Brewing Co., LLC, 680
F. Supp. 2d 51, 58–61 (D.D.C. 2010) (rejecting various claims brought by a restaurant patron
alleging violations of Title III of the ADA); MacDougal v. Catalyst Nightclub, 58 F. Supp. 2d
1101, 1102, 1103 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (deciding attorney’s fees for plaintiffs who brought two
lawsuits against defendant nightclub for failure to provide access to disabled patrons and food
service in violation of the ADA); Pinnock v. Int’l House of Pancakes Franchisee, 844 F. Supp.
574, 578 (S.D. Cal. 1993); see also Beth Winegarner, How Some Local Nightclubs Fail Their
Disabled
Patrons,
S.F.
Weekly
(Oct.
22,
2018,
6:53
AM),
https://www.sfweekly.com/music/how-some-local-nightclubs-fail-their-disabled-patrons/
[https://perma.cc/45VB-JLHR]; David Perry, Restaurants Haven’t Lived Up to the Promise of
the Americans with Disabilities Act, Eater (May 31, 2017, 9:28 AM),
https://www.eater.com/2017/5/31/15701042/american-disabilities-act-restaurantscompliance [https://perma.cc/3QP8-GTPU].
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helpfully catalogued. While some forms of velvet rope discrimination—
such as a long wait for service at a restaurant or bar—may seem race or
gender-neutral, other versions of velvet rope discrimination, specifically
“ladies’ night,” are quite overt. These explicit forms of discrimination
underline Jessica Clarke’s warning that the focus on implicit bias may
legitimate forms of explicit bias and leave the “homeland of equality
law—norms against overt discrimination—undefended.”306
Velvet rope discrimination also parallels Angela Onwuachi-Willig’s
discussion of “volunteer discrimination.”307 The idea here is that members
of a protected group may accede to or “volunteer” into discriminatory
policies.308 Women might reasonably prefer ladies’ night because it is an
economic benefit. Racial minorities might prefer dress codes because it
allows them to perform middle-class identity and prevents them from
being stereotyped as part of the riff-raff that public accommodations
owners often seek to exclude. One Black writer espoused this view when
he complained:
There used to be a time in this country when people — especially
[B]lack folks — took a lot more pride in their appearance and that of
their children. . . . Anyone who has taken a commercial flight seated
next to a man in a ‘wife-beater’ undershirt or sat in a pew as a woman
in hot pants made a late entry into a packed church knows what I'm
talking about.309

But as Onwuachi-Willig demonstrates, acceptance of such policies does
not negate the realities of race and gender discrimination; instead, it
highlights how women and racial minorities may have to perform identity
in ways that are socially palatable, comply with institutional norms, and
accept status hierarchies.310
Kenji Yoshino similarly discusses the phenomena of “covering,”
which entails identity-based pressures to conform that can submerge
identities that are protected by anti-discrimination law.311 “AsianAmericans are told to avoid seeming ‘fresh off the boat’; . . . Jews are told
not to be ‘too Jewish’; Muslims, especially after 9/11, are told to drop
306

Jessica A. Clarke, Explicit Bias, 113 Nw. U. L. Rev. 505, 510 (2018).
Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 49, at 1895 (2007).
308
Id.
309
DeWayne Wickham, Commentary, Dress Codes Restore Pride in Appearance, Ithaca J.,
July 6, 2004, at 7A.
310
Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 49, at 1898–99.
311
Kenji Yoshino, Covering: The Hidden Assault on Our Civil Rights, at ix, 23–24 (2006).
307
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their veils and their Arabic; the disabled are told to hide the paraphernalia
they use to manage their disabilities.”312 Onwuachi-Willig and Yoshino
are not alone. Other scholars have described how areas of social life that
are regulated by anti-discrimination law, such as the workplace,
sometimes demand performances of identity that may be natural for some
and coercive for others.313 Velvet rope discrimination finds synergy with
these works by centering public accommodations—which receive less
attention in anti-discrimination scholarship on race and sex—and
demonstrates how legally protected categories are not only imposed on
patrons but can be performed in their quests for admission into these sites.
Law and economics scholars have also had helpful insights into
discrimination. In housing law, Lior Strahilevitz has detailed how
developers evade fair housing laws by creating amenities that discourage
undesired populations from purchasing homes.314 An example might be
the creation of a religious temple in the middle of the development and
the requirement that all homeowners share the expenses of the temple’s
upkeep. This requirement would function as an exclusionary good for
people who are not of that faith and likely discourage them from homeownership in the development.315 In their discussion of employment law,
Jonah Gelbach, Jonathan Klick, and Lesley Wexler have developed the
concept of “passive discrimination” to describe how employer policies
and benefits packages sort people in and out of jobs in ways that impact
legally protected groups.316 An example might be employers who seek to
screen out female employees by exploiting men’s propensity for risktaking through benefits packages. Here the employer would make
employee compensation contingent on meeting variable performance
goals, such as paying on a commission basis or through profit-sharing

312

Id. at 21.
See sources cited supra notes 55, 59 (describing various situations in which identity
performance takes place in the workplace and other social situations); see also Gowri
Ramachandran, Intersectionality as “Catch 22”: Why Identity Performance Demands Are
Neither Harmless Nor Reasonable, 69 Alb. L. Rev. 299, 300 (2006).
314
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in Residential Communities, 92 Va. L.
Rev. 437, 477–78 (2006).
315
Id. (describing amenities strategies of Ave Maria Township, which was described as
“America’s first gated Catholic community”).
316
Gelbach, Klick & Wexler, supra note 49, at 818.
313
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arrangements (which has been explained as a reason for women’s
underrepresentation in the field of mutual fund investment).317
In the contexts of gender-based pricing and dress codes, exclusionary
practices could be animated by discriminatory intent or inspired by what
makes sense economically. Gender-based pricing unabashedly advertises
to women that they are generally welcome. For men, the message is also
welcoming but can be conditional on being in the company with women
(a sharp role reversal from decades ago). How one presents their race, sex,
and sexual orientation can either enhance or mitigate the nature of these
invitations and signals. We might think of dress codes as serving a similar
kind of signaling or sorting function that might be good faith or might be
pernicious. Dress codes can communicate exclusivity and status (i.e.,
luxury), sheer exclusion (discrimination), or some combination of both.
Beyond actual dress codes, allegations of discrimination surrounding
them may also function as a signal. Such controversies communicate to
potential patrons that a public accommodation is determined to maintain
a certain demographic.318 Velvet rope discrimination contributes to these
conversations by highlighting additional, hard-to-detect methods that
regulated entities employ to evade anti-discrimination laws.
This discussion of velvet rope discrimination builds on and extends
some of these insights by moving out of the employment and housing
contexts—which have been the recent strongholds of anti-discrimination
law—and situates discrimination in public accommodations.319 What
does the broader nature of velvet rope discrimination entail? In addition
to the inclusion and exclusion of people based on race and sex, it can
involve, as explained in the preceding Parts, overcharging, poor service,
no service, ejection after admission, the use of formal and informal
317
Id. (citing Peggy D. Dwyer, James H. Gilkeson & John A. List, Gender Differences in
Revealed Risk Taking: Evidence from Mutual Fund Investors, 76 Econ. Letters 151, 156
(2002)).
318
David Martin, Kansas City Officials Had Plenty of Warning that the Cordish Co. Would
Impose
a
Discriminatory
Dress
Code,
Pitch
(July
3,
2008),
https://www.thepitchkc.com/kansas-city-officials-had-plenty-of-warning-that-the-cordishco-would-impose-a-discriminatory-dress-code/ [https://perma.cc/26N7-63LH] (describing
the decade-long accusations of racial discrimination against a real estate company that
maintains bars and restaurants and arguing that “what looks like bad publicity on the surface
might, in [the company’s] dark way of doing business, be an inexpensive means of letting
white suburbanites know that the Power & Light District is sensitive to their fears. Not a fan
of hip-hop style? Neither are we. So come on down and take a ride on our mechanical bull.”).
319
See sources cited supra notes 24–25 (outlining the literature on discrimination in public
accommodations).
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quotas, denials of entry based on the target’s companions, and objections
to the lack of company (i.e., women). It entails respondeat superior
questions that involve owners’ attempts to avoid liability for antidiscrimination violations by claiming that racist or sexist exclusion was
the product of a bad actor (i.e., the promoter of the event) as well as
bouncers’ attempts to deflect by claiming that they were doing their job.320
Velvet rope discrimination defies the white racist/Black victim dyad and
features racial minorities being excluded from facilities that are owned
and staffed by other racial minorities.321 It considers how color—the
under-thematized category that has been a longstanding feature of many
public accommodations statutes—is slightly different from race, and cues
a different set of inter and intra-racial considerations.322 It is not confined
to public accommodations that are ostensibly geared toward heterosexual

320

In one incident, a nightclub disavowed the comments of a promoter who it claimed did
not work for the company. In a captured text conversation with a Latinx patron who wanted
entry into the club with an entourage, the promoter told him, “‘If you [have] any of their
[Instagram] or pics send cuz they’re strict [at] the door.’ He then added: ‘Gotta be 8/10 no
hood [B]lack or fat.’” Mona Holmes, Hollywood Club Promoter Called Out for Racist, Sexist
Door Policies, Eater LA (May 3, 2018), https://la.eater.com/2018/5/3/17315890/hollywoodclub-promoter-discrimination-the-argyle [https://perma.cc/7FDW-N285].
321
Marlon Bishop, East Village Bar Accused of Racist Door Policy, WNYC (Jan. 31, 2011),
https://www.wnyc.org/story/112317-east-village-bar-accused-racist-door-policy/
[https://perma.cc/4V58-D95E] (describing a complaint leveled by a Black woman who was
denied entry into a nightclub by a Black security guard while white women were allowed
entry, to which the guard replied, “This is what the owner wants. Do you think I like denying
my own people?”); Caroline M. McKay, Boston Club Will Pay Discrimination Fine, Harv.
Crimson (May 13, 2011), https://www.thecrimson.com/ article/2011/5/13/club-black-againstcure/ [https://perma.cc/N52T-2FLW] (discussing how a Boston club was forced to pay
approximately $28,000 after it discriminated against Black Harvard and Yale graduate
students and alumni, Sherif Hashem, the head of security, a person of color, told them there
was a concern about “weed smoking brothers from the other side of Massachusetts Avenue
who will want to come in if they see beautiful [B]lack women in line, and it will be a problem
if we try to turn them away”). This is not new. See Juan Williams, The Discriminating Club,
Wash. Post, Nov. 9, 1979, at A21 (describing a Black club in Washington D.C. that tried to
“create a discriminating mix”).
322
Tanya Katerí Hernandez, Multiracials and Civil Rights: Mixed-Race Stories of
Discrimination 67–74 (2018) (describing the paucity of legally recognized claims involving
multiracial discrimination in public accommodations); Kimberly Jade Norwood, “If You Is
White, You’s Alright. . . .” Stories About Colorism in America, 14 Wash. U. Global Stud. L.
Rev. 585, 605 (2015) (discussing light-skin parties and “battle of the complexions” contests
in Black nightclubs across America); Desiree Cooper, Still, Blacks Struggle to Accept Selves,
Detroit Free Press, Nov 1. 2007, at 1 (discussing a Detroit promoter’s plan to have a “Light
Skin Libra Birthday Bash,” which was intended to let “light skin” Black women into a
downtown club for free).
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customers, as LGBTQ bars have struggled with their own uses of legally
protected categories.323
Velvet rope discrimination is inventive. The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit, for instance, recognized the existence of “rabbit
schemes.”324 In this discriminatory tactic, a nightclub employee would
instruct an individual (the “rabbit”) to instigate fights with Black patrons
in an attempt to have them removed.325 The security guard would remove
both fighters from the club and allow the rabbit re-entry and compensate
them with free drinks.326 The rabbit scheme is the only strategy that the
court recognized despite the appellant raising a host of other claims.327

323

The Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations, the local agency responsible for
regulating anti-discrimination in the city, found that businesses in Philadelphia’s
Gayborhood—a geographical area consisting of bars and nightclubs for the LGBTQ
community—“create preferable environments for white, cisgender male patrons” and
discriminate against women, racial minorities, and transgender individuals. This
discrimination included “ad hoc, inconsistent, and arbitrary treatment of customers related to
dress codes, ID policies, bar service, and treatment by staff [that] create[d] a climate of
‘unwelcomeness,’ exclusivity, and hostility” toward these groups. One lesbian commented,
“[M]y partner and I, and our friends, have experienced feeling invisible in bars . . . and have
watched on multiple occasions men who came up to the bar after us, get served before us.”
Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations, Inform, Monitor, Enforce: Addressing Racism
and Discrimination in Philadelphia’s LGBTQ Community 8, 10 (2017); see also Patrick
Saunders, Atlanta Gay Bar Blake’s Taking Heat over Dress Code Sign, Georgia Voice (July
10, 2015, 11:36 AM), https://thegavoice.com/news/georgia/atlanta-gay-bar-blakes-takingheat-over-dress-code-sign/ [https://perma.cc/AF5B-EPYG]; Naomi Waxman, Boystown Bar
Called Racist for Banning Rap, Eater Chicago (May 30, 2019, 2:55 PM),
https://chicago.eater.com/2019/5/30/18645763/progress-bar-boystown-gay-rap-ban-leakedemail-social-media [https://perma.cc/4F97-2JC4].
324
Combs v. Cordish Companies, 862 F.3d 671, 681 (8th Cir. 2017).
325
Id.
326
Id. at 682.
327
Others include:
Questioning African American patrons at the entrances to clubs and/or the district in
general for the purpose of eliciting “annoyance” or some other response to be identified
as “aggression,” all for the purpose of creating a rule violation which would serve as a
basis for turning the individual away from the club or district or having him ejected
from same;
Ignoring/failing to serve African Americans at tables, bars and other areas, all for the
purpose of giving them an “unwelcome” message;
Keeping a head count on numbers of African Americans present in any one club or area
of the District, so that when the “target” or limit number is reached, additional African
Americans will be turned away or caused to leave by virtue of a change in the music
genre or some other strategy;
Telling African Americans who call to reserve tables in a club that the reservations
are all sold out for a particular night, when in fact same is not true;
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While this Article focuses exclusively on dress codes and gender-based
pricing, it is clear that there are various other tactics used to exclude, eject,
and discourage particular groups from using public accommodations that
warrant more scholarly and legal attention.
A. Rejecting Dress Codes
What is the nature of these dress codes and the defenses of them?
Noteworthy recent cases involving alleged discrimination by way of dress
codes lead to reasonable inferences that owners craft these policies to
specifically exclude racial minorities. Notable bans have prohibited plain
white t-shirts,328 high-top sneakers,329 doo-rags,330 work or construction
boots,331 excessive jewelry,332 and baggy clothing (“tuck-ins not
permitted”).333 Some bans have focused on specific brands of sneakers

Telling African Americans who have arrived at a club for their already-booked
reservation that there is nothing on the books in their names, or that the computer must
have messed up, or tables are double-booked and everyone else has already arrived.
Original Class Action Complaint at 2–3, Combs v. Lounge KC, L.L.C., No. 4:14-cv-00227,
2014 WL 939699 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 10, 2014).
328
Erin Donnelly, Is this Restaurant's Ban on Stilettos, Low-Hanging Pants, and Plain White
T-Shirts Racist?, Yahoo! (May 17, 2018), https://www.yahoo.com/lifestyle/restaurants-banstilettos-low-hanging-pants-plain-white-t-shirts-racist-155438657.html
[https://perma.cc/RWZ8-X9BF].
329
Deepa Lakshmin, 11 Times Hulk Hogan Broke His Own Restaurant’s Dress Code, MTV
(Sept.
25,
2014),
www.mtv.com/news/1942900/hulk-hogan-broke-dress-code/
[https://perma.cc/YRL8-AN4C].
330
Id.; Stephen Romano, Long Island Bar Turns Away Man for Wearing Turban, Port
Jefferson, NY Patch (May 16, 2019), https://patch.com/new-york/portjefferson/long-islandbar-turns-away-man-wearing-turban [https://perma.cc/KMD7-XM2P].
331
Emily Heil, Critics Say a New Baltimore Crab House is Targeting Minorities with Its
Strict Dress Code, Wash. Post (Sept. 17, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/food/wp/2019/09/17/critics-say-a-new-baltimore-crab-house-is-targeting-minoritieswith-its-strict-dress-code/ [https://perma.cc/QY6B-TJTX].
332
Aimee Green, Black Man Told He Couldn’t Enter Portland Bar Because of His Jewelry;
Real Reason Was Racism, Lawsuit Says, Oregonian (Aug. 21, 2019),
https://www.oregonlive.com/news/2019/08/black-man-told-he-couldnt-enter-portland-barbecause-of-his-jewelry-real-reason-was-racism-lawsuit-says.html
[https://perma.cc/4B53AC62]; Theresa Braine, New Jersey Restaurant Nixes Uber-Specific Dress Code Sign After
Being Accused of Racism, N.Y. Daily News (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.nydailynews.com/news/ny-news-ashford-jersey-city-restaurant-dress-code-racist-20190115-story.html
[https://perma.cc/637U-B9DQ].
333
Gene Demby, Dress Codes Are Open to Interpretation — And a Lot of Contention, NPR
(July 10, 2014), https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2014/07/10/330422908/dresscodes-are-open-to-interpretation-and-a-lot-of-contention [https://perma.cc/64SZ-MR5G].

COPYRIGHT © 2021 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

748

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 107:683

(e.g., Michael Jordan’s brand).334 Other codes are vaguely worded. Such
ambiguity has led to claims that dress codes are too susceptible to
discretionary bias because they prohibit gang colors,335 “excessive[ly]
matching” clothes,336 “inappropriate attire,”337 and “improperly fitting
clothes.”338 There is a strong case that these practices are racially
discriminatory under Title II. Unlike Title VII, Title II does not have a
“business necessity” defense that allows public accommodation owners
to make arguments that invoke legally protected categories.339 It is also
important to note that the Department of Justice has exacted a surprising
number of settlements with nightclubs and found racial discrimination
under Title II on this precise issue.340 Legal scholars, sociologists, and

334

Jelisa Castrodale, Pizzeria Accused of Racism over Ridiculously Restrictive Dress Code,
Vice (June 3, 2017), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/vbgm53/pizzeria-accused-ofracism-over-ridiculously-restrictive-dress-code [https://perma.cc/GXM6-CS7Z]; River North
Bar Releases Lengthy Dress Code, CBS Chi. (May 30, 2017), https://chicago.cbslocal.com/2017/05/30/dress-code-bottled-blonde/ [https://perma.cc/M8JG-7PG5].
335
Hope Schreiber, Sacramento Bar Under Fire for New Dress Code Which Critics Call a
Modern-Day ‘WHITES ONLY’ Sign, Yahoo! (Sept. 4, 2019), https://www.yahoo.com/lifestyle/sacramento-bar-under-fire-for-new-dress-code-which-critics-call-a-modern-daywhites-only-sign-165735079.html [https://perma.cc/G4N7-WGFK].
336
Alex Zielinski, Discriminatory Club Policies Are Pushing African Americans Out of
Portland’s Nightlife, Portland Mercury (July 4, 2019), https://www.portlandmercury.com/news/2019/07/04/26745491/discriminatory-club-policies-are-pushing-african-americansout-of-portlands-nightlife [https://perma.cc/ZK9Q-2ZDH].
337
See Heil, supra note 331 (discussing Baltimore restaurant’s ban on “inappropriate
attire”).
338
Jerod MacDonald-Evoy, Bar with Eyes on Tempe Accused of Racial Discrimination at
Texas Location, Ariz. Republic (May 4, 2018), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/tempe/2018/05/04/bar-coming-tempe-accused-using-dress-code-discriminatetexas/546368002/ [https://perma.cc/BYR4-QJBR].
339
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)-(B).
340
See Settlement Agreement, United States v. Ayman Jarrah, supra note 17, at 1–3
(resolving allegations of a bar’s discriminatory use of a cover charge to limit the number of
minorities admitted); Consent Decree, United States v. Candy II, supra note 302, at 1
(resolving allegations that club discriminatorily applied dress code); Consent Order, United
States v. Badeen, supra note 302, at 1 (resolving allegations of club’s discriminatory
enforcement of dress code against Blacks and Latinx persons); see also Williams v. Thant Co.,
No. 02-1214, 2004 WL 1397554, at *1 (D. Or. June 22, 2004) (denying defendant’s motion
for summary judgment arising out of plaintiffs’ allegation that nightclub selectively enforced
dress code against them because of their race); Consent Decree at 2, United States v. Routh
Guys,
L.L.C.,
No.
3:15-cv-02191
(N.D.
Tex.
June
30,
2015),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2015/07/06/–kungfusettle.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C4YH-7XP2] (settling with bar and restaurant that denied African American
and American patrons because of discriminatory enforcement of dress code).
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journalists have also recognized that these prohibited items are
overwhelmingly donned specifically by racial minorities.341
Although men of color attract much of the attention in the discourse on
discriminatory dress codes, overly vague dress codes that prohibit
“inappropriate attire” allow bouncers to deploy rules to exclude women
of color and sexual minorities in ways that also run afoul of various antidiscrimination norms.342 For example, hair requirements fell within a
341
See May, supra note 18, at 51–53 (discussing how dress codes in nightclubs often
prohibit the type of dress typically worn by African Americans); see also, May & Chaplin,
supra note 23, at 60 (noting how, in hip-hop culture, “[A]thletic jerseys, baggy jeans, oversized
plain white T-shirts, sweat-bands, do-rags (polyester head wraps), ‘wife beaters,’ (‘tank tops’)
and thick gold chains are worn as a means of representing one’s identification with that culture.
These clothing styles are typically adopted by young, [B]lack males in urban areas”); Tricia
Rose, “Fear of a Black Planet”: Rap Music and Black Cultural Politics in the 1990s, 60 J.
Negro Educ. 276, 277 (1991) (“Black teenage males sporting sneakers and other Hip Hop gear
are perceived as criminal equivalents.”); Marc Gunther, Faith and Fortune: How
Compassionate Capitalism Is Transforming American Business 149 (2004) (noting the
popularity of Timberland boots in the African American community); Russell K. Robinson,
Uncovering Covering, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1809, 1825 (2007) (describing the association of
doo-rags with “ghetto culture” and its association with African American men); Pancho
McFarland & Leslie Baker Kimmons, Style, in 3 Encyclopedia of Race, Ethnicity, and Society
1125 (Richard T. Schaefer, ed., 2008) (describing how 1990s hip-hop style entailed hooded
sweatshirts and Timberlands whereas the turn of the twenty-first century popularized large
platinum chains, diamond studs, and doo-rags); D. Wendy Greene, Title VII: What’s Hair
(And Other Race-Based Characteristics) Got to Do with It?, 79 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1355, 1383–
94 (2008) (noting how doo-rags are “indicative of Blackness in the lay community”); Brian
Josephs, Who Criminalized the Durag? GQ (Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.gq.com/story/whocriminalized-the-durag [https://perma.cc/D3DM-2ZAL] (discussing the relationship between
doo-rags and Blackness, the NFL’s and NBA’s respective bans in 2001 and 2005, and
suggesting that the stigma of this article of clothing is tied to the criminalization of Black
expression); Emily Chertoff, The Racial Divide on . . . Sneakers, Atlantic (Aug. 20, 2012),
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/08/the-racial-divide-on-sneakers/261256/
[https://perma.cc/LBA9-WV4C] (“Jordans and Chucks come from the same originary
sneaker, a canvas plimsoll from the mid-19th century. . . . How did the first become associated
with [B]lack street culture and the second with white-dominated hipsterism?”).
342
See Robert Wilonsky, Yet Again, Allegations Arise that in Some Uptown Bars, ‘Dress
Code’ Means No Minorities, Dallas Morning News (June 29, 2017),
https://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/commentary/2017/06/29/yet-again-allegations-arisethat-in-some-uptown-bars-dress-code-means-no-minorities/ [https://perma.cc/B47Z-K5MT]
(discussing incident where Black women were denied entry into bar for being out of dress
code); Morgan Gstalter, Man Wearing Makeup Denied Entry to Texas Nightclub, The Hill
(May 12, 2018), https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/387438-man-wearingmakeup-denied-entry-to-texas-nightclub [https://perma.cc/557L-55A2] (detailing incident
wherein man wearing makeup was denied entry to Texas nightclub); Hollywood Club
Accused of Discrimination After Promoter Allegedly Instructs: ‘No Hood Black or Fat’, Fox
L.A.
(May,
2,
2018),
https://www.foxla.com/news/hollywood-club-accused-ofdiscrimination-after-promoter-allegedly-instructs-no-hood-black-or-fat
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Virginia nightclub’s dress code policy.343 Kokoamos Island Bar & Grill
refused entry to people with dreadlocks, and after a Black woman and
Black man were separately refused entry, the Department of Justice filed
a lawsuit against the club that resulted in a consent decree.344 Bobby
Rodriguez, a 21-year-old Texan who identified as male, was denied entry
into a nightclub because he wore false lashes and makeup in violation of
the dress code.345 Rodriguez was told “men need to dress like men.”346
The nightclub responded to the ensuing media controversy by insisting
that the “standard dress code . . . states everyone must dress [in] gender
appropriate [clothing] to the gender stated on their state-issued driver’s
license.”347 The same thing happened to Ben Rios less than a year later
when he attempted to enter a nightclub for a friend’s birthday party
wearing stiletto heel shoes. 348 The doorman scolded, “You’re a man,
you’re not supposed to be wearing women’s clothing or makeup,” and
refused to grant him entry.349 Although dress codes invoke concerns about
race, they also have intersectional consequences and implicate state laws
banning discrimination based on sex and sexual orientation.
Assuming that these kinds of dress codes were not inspired by racial or
sexual considerations, the common defenses of dress codes are public
accommodations owners’ desire to create a comfortable ambiance (i.e., a
“classy environment”) and compelling concerns about safety.350 In these
regards, dress code policies are imprecise tactics. To the extent that these
policies are animated by race-neutral concerns about attracting
[https://perma.cc/7HCC-F8RX] (describing Hollywood club accused of denying entry to
anyone described as “hood [B]lack”).
343
Complaint at 3, United States v. Davis, No. 2:07cv430 (E.D. Va. Sep. 20, 2007),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2010/12/15/kokocomp.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4MKL-63CK].
344
Consent Decree at 1–2, United States v. Davis, No. 2:07cv430 (E.D. Va. Mar. 10, 2008);
Duane Bourne, Kokoamos Owner To Apologize for Barring Entry to Two Who Sued,
Virginian-Pilot (Mar. 12, 2008), https://www.pilotonline.com/news/article_1b7467ce-39f551ff-af29-47aefa87e36c.html [https://perma.cc/FGP2-6WSM].
345
See Gstalter, supra note 342.
346
Id.
347
Id.
348
Elise Solé, ‘You're a Man in Women’s Clothing’: 22-Year-Old Says He Was Dress
Coded for Wearing Makeup and High Heels, Yahoo! (Mar. 27, 2019),
https://finance.yahoo.com/news/nightclub-denies-banning-gay-customer-wearing-stilettoheels-makeup-000454296.html [https://perma.cc/2D3B-YC3W].
349
Id.
350
See May, supra note 18, at 57–58 (discussing how owners of nightclubs often justify
dress codes as a means of “maintaining a specific kind of atmosphere and clientele”).
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professionals or people who might be considered “classy,” such
prohibitions exclude minority professionals who do not conform to
typical ideas about what constitutes appropriate dress. Moreover, it is
unclear that dress codes can perform the kinds of security-enhancing
functions that people think they offer. For example, policies against
“excessive matching” that seek to keep out gang members due to concerns
about violence are underinclusive because they rest on outdated ideas
about gang fashion and ignore the fact that gang members could simply
conform to the dress code to ensure entry and still be socially
disruptive.351
If one accepts this Article’s account about dress codes, a possible
normative position—a strong one—would be legislating against the use
of dress codes. Here I suggest that, unless dress codes are implemented
for specific health or safety purposes (e.g., a requirement that people are
clothed, prohibitions on bookbags), they should be prohibited in public
accommodations. Dress codes are simply too ripe for abuse. Though they
are sometimes about taste and cultural capital, dress codes often smuggle
discrimination through sartorial requirements. A limited ban on dress
codes may sound fanciful or like regulatory overkill, but Kansas City
passed an ordinance that comes closest to this suggestion and serves as a
model.352
After confronting problems tied to velvet rope discrimination, Kansas
City passed an ordinance prohibiting the use of certain dress codes.353 The
ordinance stems from the conduct of the Cordish Company, a real estate
organization with a checkered history involving allegations of racial
discrimination.354 Cordish Co. develops large scale urban projects that
351
See Aimee Green, Lawsuit Claiming Portland Nightclubs Turned Away Black
Customers Ends in Settlement, Oregonian (June 19, 2019), https://www.oregonlive.com/news/2019/06/lawsuit-claiming-portland-nightclubs-turned-away-black-customers-ends-insettlement.html [https://perma.cc/VA9H-MYKU] (recounting incident involving Portland
nightclub that turned away Black patron for violating dress code that prohibited “excessive
matching”); see also Jennifer Daley, Bandana, in Ethnic Dress in the United States: A Cultural
Encyclopedia 17, 19 (Anette Lynch & Mitchell D. Strauss, eds., 2014) (discussing how gang
members often wear the same color bandana that corresponds with their gang’s colors as a
means of identification).
352
See Kan. City, Mo., Mun. Code §§ 38-113(b), 38-1(a)(26) (2020),
https://library.municode.com/mo/kansas_city/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=PTIICOO
R_CH38HURE [https://perma.cc/XX5G-V486] (making it an unlawful accommodation
practice to use a prohibited dress code to deny anyone accommodations).
353
Id.
354
See Andrea K. Walker, Dress Code Makeover at Cordish Venue in Ky., Balt. Sun (July
2, 2004), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-2004-07-02-0407020158-story.html
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include shopping centers, entertainment districts, residential complexes,
and gaming and lodging facilities.355 In downtown Louisville, Kentucky,
the company owns an entertainment district called 4th Street Live. Bars,
restaurants, and nightclubs comprise the district. Three to four nights a
week, the company would close off the district’s streets, and the area
would become a large, open-air bar.356 Cordish Co. instituted a dress code
that banned sports jerseys, sleeveless jerseys, backward worn ballcaps,
and sleeveless shirts on men, while prohibiting women from “dressing in
a way determined to be indecent.”357 For the next decade, this ban and
similar policies implemented by other entities in the district spawned
investigations, generated litigation, and drew the ire of the American Civil
Liberties Union of Kentucky.358 For our purposes, the point is that Kansas
City, Missouri was on notice about the allegations when it issued
approximately $300 million in bonds in 2006 to help the Cordish Co.
develop a similar entertainment venue—the Power and Light District—
which was essentially an urban renewal project.359 After various
allegations of unevenly enforced dress codes, the City Council took
matters into their own hands and passed an ordinance that prohibits

[https://perma.cc/U2JG-URNT] (describing a dress code implemented by Cordish Co. that the
ACLU and other local activists say unfairly discriminated against minorities and urban youth).
355
Id.
356
Joseph Gerth, Activists Call 4th Street Live Dress Code Discriminatory, Courier-J., June
26, 2004, at B1.
357
Id.
358
See Cary v. Cordish Co., 731 F. App'x 401, 402–03 (6th Cir. 2018) (lawsuit filed by
several African-American men who claim they were denied entry to Cordish-owned 4th Street
Live because of their race); Patrick T. Sullivan, Men Allege Race Discrimination at 4th Street
Live, Courier-Journal (June 4, 2014), https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news
/crime/2014/06/04/men-allege-race-discrimination-th-street-live/9977255/
[https://perma.cc/WCD7-GRP8] (detailing litigation against Cordish Co. related to
discriminatory accommodation practices); The Cordish Company Should Address Racial
Discrimination Claims Immediately, ACLU (Jan. 21, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/pressreleases/cordish-company-should-address-racial-discrimination-claimsimmediately?redirect=racial-justice/cordish-company-should-address-racial-discriminationclaims-immediately [https://perma.cc/38NL-FVHJ]; Amber Duke, Coalition Concerned
About Cordish Issues Points of Emphasis for Moving Community Forward, ACLU KY (Dec.
1, 2015), https://www.aclu-ky.org/en/news/coalition-concerned-about-cordish-issues-pointsemphasis-moving-community-forward [https://perma.cc/6VQT-W5E8].
359
Lynn Horsley, Despite Large Power & Light District Crowds, Taxpayers Are Still on the
Hook, K.C. Star (Feb. 7, 2015), https://www.kansascity.com/news/politicsgovernment/article9530081.html [https://perma.cc/3V63-926E].
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taxpayer-subsidized developments from arbitrarily using dress codes.360
The ordinance has three key features. One part of the ordinance describes
the covered entities and categories; in this regard, it looks similar to other
anti-discrimination legislation and specifies protected legal categories.361
Another portion of the ordinance, which is perhaps its defining feature,
denominates the kinds of dress codes that cannot be implemented; it
prohibits banning people based on jewelry, color of clothes, and the length
of a specific article of clothing, amongst other specifications.362 A final
piece of the ordinance allows public accommodations to affirmatively
require certain items of clothing.363 The Kansas City ordinance is far from
360
Sylvia Maria Gross, Nightlife Area’s Dress Code Seen as Discriminatory, NPR (June 25,
2009), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=105890577 [https://perma.cc/RTZ4-RWHL].
361
Kan. City, Mo., Mun. Code § 38-113(a) (2020), https://library.municode.com–
/mo/kansas_city/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=PTIICOOR_CH38HURE_ARTIIIDIPR
[https://perma.cc/2ZW8-W9K4].
362
Kan. City, Mo., Mun. Code § 38-1(a)(26) (2020), https://library.municode.com/–
mo/kansas_city/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=PTIICOOR_CH38HURE_ARTIIIDIPR
[https://perma.cc/2ZW8-W9K4] reads:
Prohibited dress code means a set of rules governing, prohibiting or limiting access to
a place or business, or portion thereof, defined herein as a “public accommodation”
because of any of the following:
(a) The wearing of jewelry, the manner in which jewelry is worn or the
combination of items of jewelry worn,
(b) The wearing of a garment or headdress which is generally associated with
specific religions, national origins or ancestry,
(c) The length of the sleeve of a shirt or the leg of a pair of pants or shorts is too
long, except that nothing herein shall be construed to prohibit a dress code that
requires the wearing of a shirt,
(d) The style, cut or length of a hair style,
(e) The colors of the garments,
(f) In conjunction with a major Kansas City sporting event, the wearing of
athletic apparel which displays either a number, a professional or college team
name or the name of a player;
(g) The wearing of tee-shirts, except that nothing herein shall be construed to
prohibit a dress code that requires such tee-shirts to have sleeves, or to prohibit
a dress code that does not allow undershirts, undergarments, or tee-shirts of an
inappropriate length. Designer tee-shirts, which are fitted and neat, cannot be
banned.
363
Kan. City, Mo., Mun. Code § 38-113(b)(2) (2020), https://library.municode.com/mo/kansas_city/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=PTIICOOR_CH38HURE_ARTIIIDIPR
[https://perma.cc/2ZW8-W9K4] states it does not prohibit:
Any owner, agent, operator or employee of a business or facility within a
redevelopment area from affirmatively requiring the wearing of specified articles of
clothing, which may include collared shirts and ties, sports jackets, business suits,
business casual, formal clothing or smart casual clothing in keeping with the ambiance
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perfect. It does not capture the variety of ways dress codes are arbitrarily
enforced.364 Its enshrinement of affirmative dress requirements may not
obviate the problem of exclusion that racial and sexual minorities face
and may be subject to its own form of manipulation.365 Nevertheless, it is
an important step that does not exist in isolation.
In the past two years, there has been a proliferation of similar antidiscrimination laws in New York City, California, and New Jersey. These
laws, often referred to as CROWN Acts, prohibit discrimination based on
hairstyle.366 Although they have garnered attention because of their bans
in the employment contexts, the New Jersey and New York City laws also
apply to public accommodations. The Kansas City ordinance is part of a
larger legislative recognition of what feminist legal theorists and critical
race scholars have argued for decades: ideas about professionalism are
not always race- or gender-neutral and can shape how marginalized
groups experience work and public space.367 These laws, coupled with the
steady media attention on dress codes, suggest that statutory reform is not
far-fetched.

and quality of the particular business or facility and formal footwear, so long as the
requirements are enforced with regard to each and every patron, regardless of race,
religion, color, ancestry, national origin, sex, marital status, familial status, disability,
sexual orientation or gender identity.
364
See sources cited supra notes 328–38.
365
In fact, the history described in this paper suggests that some owners of public
accommodations will be determined to find ways to evade anti-discrimination law. Still, one
might argue that affirmative dress requirements impose a certain kind of uniformity that makes
compliance easier for patrons whereas the status quo—loosely worded prohibitions—allow
for more discretionary and arbitrary enforcement.
366
Mariel Padilla, New Jersey Is Third State To Ban Discrimination Based on Hair, N.Y.
Times (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/20/us/nj-hair-discrimination.html
[https://perma.cc/M6WE-E5UV]; Aris Folley, New York Bans Discrimination Against
Natural Hair, Hill (July 13, 2019), https://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/452959-newyork-bans-discrimination-against-natural-hair [https://perma.cc/4HNW-E4KP]; Phil Willon
& Alexa Díaz, California Becomes First State to Ban Discrimination Based on One’s Natural
Hair, L.A. Times (July 3, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-pol-ca-natural-hairdiscrimination-bill-20190703-story.html [https://perma.cc/664D-FM5B].
367
See Erynn Masi de Casanova, Buttoned Up: Clothing, Conformity, and White-Collar
Masculinity 144–46 (2015).
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B. Rejecting Gender-Based Pricing
The nature of gender-based pricing has remained consistent, and the
explanations for it typically revolve around profitability,368
establishments’ desire to attract women,369 a hope to increase patronage
more generally,370 and the promotion of chivalry.371 As a general matter,
state anti-discrimination laws also do not have business-necessity-like
provisions that would allow public accommodations owners to make
gender-inflected arguments. Courts have rejected business arguments that
use profit motives to justify discrimination.372 Such dismissals similarly
apply to gender-based pricing inspired by bringing in more women and
men.373 In addition to resting on heteronormative assumptions, chivalrybased defenses understand discrimination through the traditional and
narrow lens of “hostile sexism” but ignore the “benevolent” version of
sexism that legal scholars, feminists, and social scientists have long
described.374 This subtler sexism, they argue, is demeaning, can go
unrecognized by both men and women, and can encourage more serious
discrimination.375 As one gender theorist recently explained, benevolent

368

Chris Dixon, The “Ladies’ Night” Strategy, Bus. Insider (Oct. 16, 2010),
https://www.businessinsider.com/the-ladies-night-strategy-2011-1 [https://perma.cc/V8NMS8SQ].
369
See Koire v. Metro Car Wash, 707 P.2d 195, 199 (Cal. 1985) (recounting argument by
defendant that a “Ladies Night” promotion encouraged more women to attend the bar, thus
promoting more interaction between men and women); City of Clearwater v. Studebaker’s
Dance Club, 516 So. 2d 1106, 1108 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (same).
370
Novak v. Madison Motel Assocs., 525 N.W.2d 123, 124, 127 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994)
(rejecting the defendant-bar’s argument that its “ladies drink free” special was designed to
increase patronage by all groups and indicating that “intent is not relevant . . . promotions may
not involve price differentials or other differential treatment based on the categories covered
by the statute, whatever the intent”).
371
Commonwealth Liquor Control Bd. v. Dobrinoff, 471 A.2d 941, 943 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1984) (highlighting how the trial court identified “chivalry and courtesy to the fair sex” as a
purpose for some women’s exemption from a bar’s cover charge).
372
See, e.g., Easebe Enters., Inc. v. Rice, 190 Cal. Rptr. 678, 681 (Ct. App. 1983) (“An
entrepreneur’s discriminatory practice based upon ostensible rational economic self-interest
still violates public policy.”); Koire, 707 P.2d at 199 (rejecting the defendants’ arguments that
gender-based discounts were permissible because they were profitable).
373
Ladd v. Iowa W. Racing Ass’n, 438 N.W.2d 600, 602 (Iowa 1989) (rejecting the
defendant’s claim that its ladies’ night promotion was animated by a desire to “stimulate
business”).
374
See sources cited supra note 238 and infra note 376 and accompanying text (describing
“benevolent sexism” and its documentation in the literature).
375
Hoff, supra note 24, at 141.
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sexism “undermines women’s resistance to male dominance” and is
“disarming because it is technically favorable.”376
This is not to say that women who reap the benefits of gender-based
pricing in these contexts are duped or devoid of agency. More likely than
not, women enter these public accommodations with the precise
understanding that the sites are fraught with assumptions about sex and
sexuality.377 Moreover, many women can enjoy these public spaces
outside the male gaze and opt out of the sexual pursuit and rituals that
these public accommodations engender.378 Tammy Anderson, a social
science expert in this field, offers instructive insights. She describes how
contemporary popular culture is replete with messaging the promotes
“going out at night” as a form of “sexual courtship,” but notes that there
are places that deviate from this theme and focus on non-sexual priorities
such as “music appreciation, dancing, [and] socializing with friends.”379
Still, there are broader costs that come with gender-based pricing,
particularly in bars and nightclubs.380 Some social scientists have slowly
unearthed these costs.381 However, legal scholars have been less attentive
to these costs, due in part to a lack of legal scrutiny of these public
accommodations.
If one accepted the motives for gender-based pricing, the costs are not
negligible. First, such policies condition entrance on gender performances
that may be consonant with how a woman understands her gendered
identity but also demand a version of femininity that is caricatured and
contrived.382 This presents the problem of sex stereotyping that antidiscrimination law and constitutional law have tried to regulate. Second,
gender-based pricing in bars and nightclubs intensifies the sexual
376

Kristin J. Anderson, Modern Misogyny: Anti-Feminism in a Post-Feminist Era 108
(2015).
377
Cf. Tammy L. Anderson, Better to Complicate, Rather than Homogenize, Urban
Nightlife: A Response to Grazian, 24 Soc. F. 918, 923 (2009).
378
Id.
379
Id.
380
Id. (“I have seen the harassment of women and their risk for sexual assault increase where
clubbing ethos and norms center on hooking up or being on the pull. Women are regularly
exploited when clubs use sexual props and gimmicks to sell alcohol or provide
entertainment.”).
381
See Anderson, supra note 377, at 923; David Grazian, Urban Nightlife, Social Capital,
and the Public Life of Cities, 24 Socio. F. 908, 913 (2009).
382
Grazian, supra note 381, at 913 (“[Y]oung female nightlife patrons are similarly expected
to perform hegemonic femininity by adhering to constraining gender norms that include
wearing snug designer jeans, low-cut blouses, and stiletto heels.”).
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violence that some social scientists show is pronounced in these spaces
and occurs with regularity.383 Such violence includes rape and attempted
rape as well as other forms of unwanted sexual contact that receive less
attention such as stalking, verbal harassment, touching, and groping.384
One criminologist puts it plainly: “[D]rink specials and discounts
intending to attract women to bars and other such nightlife venues also
function to encourage heavy drinking and subsequently increase the risks
for interpersonal victimization.”385 To be sure, gender-based pricing is not
the cause of sexual violence, and public accommodations are not the only
sites; such behavior appears in public space, education, and at work.386
But unlike the preceding settings, where social conventions, formal
guidelines, and official workplace norms somewhat “censure sexually
suggestive talk and behavior,” bars and nightclubs are seen as “direct
sexual marketplaces” where such behavior is appropriate.387 One
qualitative empirical study specifies the problems with gender-based
pricing and warrants extended quotation:
The novelty of “ladies night” was not only designed to attract females
to certain venues, but also to lure males . . . to the venue so that they
would spend more money. This was accomplished by creating an
atmosphere centered on sex and the fetishization of females through the
strategic use of alcohol. Males were lured to these venues, believing
that intoxicated females would be easy marks. . . . [A]lcohol norms play
an important role in shaping environments that became . . . conducive
to sexual assault of females. . . . In commercial venues, this sense of
levity was exaggerated to the point that physical and sexual assault were
regarded as a normal, if unfortunate, aspect of nightlife. In this respect,
victimization incidents were trivialized by club management, viewed

383
Philip R. Kavanaugh, The Continuum of Sexual Violence: Women’s Accounts of
Victimization in Urban Nightlife, 8 Feminist Criminology 20, 22 (2013) (canvassing the
research in this area).
384
Id. at 21.
385
Id. at 22.
386
See generally Laura Beth Nielsen, License to Harass: Law, Hierarchy, and Offensive
Public Speech (2004) (cataloguing misogynistic, harassing speech in public spaces); Peggy
Reeves Sanday, Fraternity Gang Rape: Sex, Brotherhood, and Privilege on Campus (2d ed.
2007) (discussing sexual assault at college fraternity parties); Catharine A. MacKinnon,
Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Sex Discrimination (1979) (theorizing
sexual harassment as sex discrimination and arguing that it is prohibited by Title VII).
387
David Grazian, On the Make: The Hustle of Urban Nightlife 263 n.1 (2008).
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merely as an expected hazard to be negotiated en route to maximizing
alcohol sales and profit.388

Relatedly, gender-based pricing shapes the behavior of men who
patronize these public accommodations—some of whom initiate sexual
violence. One of the rationales that defenders of gender-based pricing
offer is the desire to bring more men into these spaces by attracting
women. Again, a chorus of scholars has shown that men move through
the world with a general sense of entitlement. They perceive themselves
as having entitlement in the home, at work, in school, in public space, in
the digital world, and to women’s bodies.389 There is no reason to believe
that this entitlement to women’s bodies dissipates for men upon arrival
into these public accommodations. As the above-excerpted language
suggests, gender-based pricing likely augments this sense of entitlement,
at least in bars and nightclubs. In these spaces, which are specifically
structured as sexual390—from the pricing to the personnel391—men may
assume that women’s reduced costs constitute barter for their own
regularly-priced payments and infer entitlement to women’s bodies.392
Gender-based pricing is certainly not the genesis of such assumptions, but
it compounds the problem.
Courts’ negative treatment of gender-based pricing, along with the
above-mentioned costs of such schemes, suggests that there are legal
arguments in favor of its elimination. Normatively, this kind of
388
Philip R. Kavanaugh & Tammy L. Anderson, Managing Physical and Sexual Assault
Risk in Urban Nightlife: Individual- and Environmental-level Influences, 30 Deviant Behav.
680, 706 (2009).
389
See sources cited supra note 386 (discussing men’s verbal and physical abuse of women
on the street, in the university, and in the workplace).
390
Jennifer S. Hirsch & Shamus Khan, Sexual Citizens: A Landmark Study of Sex, Power,
and Assault on Campus 81 (2020) (“The mystery here is not the persistence of drunk sex
among students; rather, it is the persistent exoticization, among adults, of students’
recreational drinking and sex, especially considering their own well-accepted practice of
drinking to have sex.”).
391
Grazian, supra note 381, at 913 (“Nightclubs, restaurants, and cocktail lounges rely on
the physical attractiveness and sexual magnetism of female service staff and the promise of
eroticized interaction to recruit customers. Female workers in nightlife settings are often
expected to ‘do gender’ by attempting an exaggerated performance of sexualized femininity
that includes wearing tight and revealing clothing, and handling obnoxious and suggestive
comments from groups of male customers with flirty come-ons and gracious humor.”)
(citations omitted).
392
For a different take on how bars and nightclubs shape romantic marketplaces and inform
stereotypes about gay men and lesbians, see Russell K. Robinson, Structural Dimensions of
Romantic Preferences, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 2787, 2800–02 (2008).
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prohibition would rest on an anti-subordination approach that focuses on
the sex stereotyping that comes with the practice. Unlike the case of dress
code regulation, here, statutory reform is unnecessary because most states
already prohibit discrimination based on sex in public accommodations.
The anti-subordination approach would take shape through courts. There
is a new wave of disputes brought by men’s rights activists challenging
ladies’ night discounts, as well as a host of other gender-inspired
initiatives that are outside the scope of this Article but rely on public
accommodations law and anti-discrimination logics.393 These men’s
rights groups have challenged Mothers’ Day events, technology
conferences for women, networking functions, and breast cancer
awareness events.394 The path here is twofold.
First, courts need to invalidate gender-based pricing in bars,
restaurants, and nightclubs. Rather than relying on the anti-classification
approaches taken by previous courts and posited by men’s rights activists,
decisions rest on anti-subordination principles. Courts and readers might
feel uneasy supporting outcomes desired by someone like men’s rights
activist and ladies’ night challenger Steve Horner, who once claimed that
“[t]he real reason I’m doing this is to emulate Rosa Parks. And freedom
fighters like her.”395 But the uncomfortable reality is that the identity of a
person challenging a status hierarchy-enforcing practice should matter
less than the illegitimate practice itself. As Jessica Clarke observes, it may
seem like a member of a dominant group is not entitled to claim victim
status, but such group formalism impedes subordination agendas.396
393

See Murray, supra note 25, at 288–92.
Id; Matt Pearce, That Time Donald Trump Got Sued by a California Men’s Rights
Activist, L.A. Times (Nov. 1. 2016), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-trump-mensrights-20161027-story.html [https://perma.cc/U6GW-M52A] (discussing a lawsuit brought
by a men’s right activist against Trump National Golf Club for a promotion it offered in
recognition of breast cancer awareness month).
395
David Harsanyi, Man’s Goal: Lights Out on Ladies Night, Denver Post (Sept. 18, 2006,
5:07 PM), https://www.denverpost.com/2006/09/18/mans-goal-lights-out-on-ladies-night/
[https://perma.cc/RE23-HSHA].
396
Jessica A. Clarke, Protected Class Gatekeeping, 92 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 101, 105 (2017). As
Suzanne Goldberg put it in a recent controversy involving a women’s workspace in New York
City, “Anti-discrimination laws don’t only protect groups that have experienced histories of
discrimination . . . . These laws protect everyone from discrimination based on specified
aspects of their identity.” Karen Matthews, Can a Club for Women Legally Exclude Men?
NYC Launches Probe, AP News (Mar. 29, 2018), https://apnews.com/article/90b8bbab98a24a15a44aef9814210c2c [https://perma.cc/CH2T-59PS] (internal quotation
marks omitted). In this same controversy, Katherine Franke added, “We can’t say it’s illegal
for the men to keep women out of their clubs and say it’s legal for the women to keep the men
394
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Equality principles should be the organizing principle for considering
claims of discrimination and not the victim’s status. Gender-based pricing
quintessentially reinforces sexism and sex stereotypes.
Second, in cases involving this form of velvet rope discrimination,
courts need to specify anti-subordination principles. To be sure, the
application and specification of the anti-subordination ideal is not
straightforward and can vary depending on the social practice in dispute.
As Jack Balkin and Reva Siegel observe, “[T]here are a host of
contestable value judgments entailed in determining what dignitary
distinctions or distributive arrangements are unjust, and how the legal
system should integrate the pursuit of antisubordination commitments
with other social goals.”397 When examining the legal permissibility of a
practice under public accommodations laws, courts’ analysis of genderbased pricing might look different than their evaluation of Mother’s Day
functions. The analysis probably should be different. Such functions,
along with the women’s-only networking events, and breast cancer
awareness events that have come under legal scrutiny, deserve their own
intellectual treatment beyond the scope of this project. But what can be
said briefly is that these initiatives are not premised on the maintenance
of status hierarchies but on a recognition of the unique harms, histories,
and exclusion that women have faced. As the preceding Parts of this
Article have shown, gender-based pricing has typically been animated by
more problematic concerns, and to the extent that such cases make their
way to courts, anti-subordination principles call for the invalidation of
this practice.
C. Enforcement
This Article does not argue for a form of public accommodations
primacy. Instead, it seeks to reposition the issue in the civil rights race
and gender agenda. Nevertheless, there is still the outstanding question:
out of their clubs.” See Maura Barrett & Jo Ling Kent, Despite Success, Women’s Work
Sanctuaries May Break the Law, NBC News (May 21, 2018, 10:12 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/business/business-news/despite-success-women-s-worksanctuaries-may-break-law-n875551 [https://perma.cc/GW8Q-F6W2].
397
Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition:
Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. Miami L. Rev. 9, 14–15 (2003) (“[T]he
question whether a practice violates an antisubordination principle depends heavily on factual
and historical contexts, and, in particular, on the laws and social mores that prevail in a given
society at a given moment in history . . . . Few would characterize the anticlassification
principle as similarly flexible.”).
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How aggressively should we care about and regulate public
accommodations? Such questions are impossible to answer in a one-sizefits-all fashion and are conditional on a host of issues, including the
existing regulation of public accommodations; resource allocation
questions amongst regulatory bodies and the civil rights bar; the
jurisdiction’s warmness to civil rights claims; and other place-specific
idiosyncrasies. Still, there are at least two general and tentative
considerations that might speak to the enforcement question which are
worth addressing in detail.
First, regulatory bodies might shore up their efforts in the regulation of
public accommodations discrimination. The 1970s and 1980s provide a
historical template for such enforcement. During those decades, agencies
suspended liquor licenses as deterrence signals, sent out testers to ensure
equal access, and obtained modest settlements with violators of public
accommodations laws.398 Today, agencies often treat public
accommodations discrimination as a low priority.399 But the tripartite
combination of regulatory underenforcement, low damages awards for
violations, and the well-documented municipal extraction of money from
poor Black and brown people suggests that states and cities might engage
in legislative and ordinance reform that better regulates the subtle ways
velvet rope discrimination operates. To the extent that municipalities are
mercenary about revenue generation—through policing,400 illegal tax

398
See discussion supra Section II.B; Cops Who Dance the Night Away, supra note 279, at
B9; Dallas Revises Law to Restrict Club Dress Codes, Tyler Courier-Times, Dec. 23, 1979,
at 5.
399
The most noteworthy exception to this point is the New York City Commission on
Human Rights, which has been recently active in this area, uniquely organized, and has “one
of the broadest and most protective anti-discrimination laws” at its disposal: the New York
City Human Rights Law. Gurjot Kaur & Dana Sussman, Unlocking the Power and Possibility
of Local Enforcement of Human and Civil Rights: Lessons Learned from the NYC
Commission on Human Rights, 51 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 582, 598 (2020). For a general
discussion on the role of these agencies, see Columbia Law Sch. Human Rights Inst.,
Columbia Law Sch. & Int’l Ass’n of Official Human Rights Agencies, State and Local Human
Rights Agencies: Recommendations for Advancing Opportunity and Equality Through an
International Human Rights Framework (2010).
400
Devon W. Carbado, Predatory Policing, 85 UMKC L. Rev. 545, 556–58 (2017)
(describing fines and citations as sources of revenue that use police officers as their front-line
agents).
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assessments,401 asset forfeiture,402 and court fees403—they might instead
consider the deep-pocketed, anti-discrimination-law-flouting nightlife
industry as a site for regulation that could augment their coffers.404
Second, law schools might develop administrative law school clinics—
which are rarities in legal education notwithstanding their potential social
justice and pedagogical value.405 Such clinics could focus on public
accommodations discrimination as well as the host of civil rights issues
that local government agencies regulate but go unaddressed in the
school’s clinical offerings (e.g., employment discrimination, disability
law, education law). These suggestions in the aggregate, or in isolation,
are not enough to resolve the problem of public accommodations law, but
they would be fruitful steps in mitigating a form of dignity degradation
that has been underattended to for too long.
CONCLUSION
Although public accommodations served as crucial battlegrounds for
the Civil Rights Movement and the Women’s Rights Movement, they are
overshadowed by other spheres of social life that these campaigns sought
to equalize: criminal procedure, housing, education, voting, and
employment. These fields maintain a certain kind of significance in civil
rights thinking. Many people reasonably understand these areas as more
material and urgent legal priorities for marginalized groups. These
domains have spawned book-length legal treatments, casebooks, and
corresponding law school courses in ways public accommodations law

401
Bernadette Atuahene & Christopher Berry, Taxed Out: Illegal Property Tax Assessments
and the Epidemic of Tax Foreclosures in Detroit, 9 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 847, 849, 851 (2019)
(providing empirical evidence of a systemic and unconstitutional pattern of over-assessment
of home values in Detroit, leading to inflated property taxes).
402
Adam Crepelle, Probable Cause to Plunder: Civil Asset Forfeiture and the Problems It
Creates, 7 Wake Forest J.L. & Pol’y 315, 315–16 (2017) (describing the poor incentive effects
of law enforcement revenue generation from civil asset forfeiture).
403
See generally Alexes Harris, A Pound of Flesh: Monetary Sanctions as Punishment for
the Poor (2016) (theorizing court sanctions as a form of social control of the poor).
404
See
Nightlife
Industry
Overview,
Am.
Nightlife
Ass’n,
https://www.nightlifeassociation.org/market-overview/ [https://perma.cc/9XPM-PFQ2] (last
visited Jan. 18, 2021) (noting that the larger nightlife industry, of which bars and nightclubs
are a part of, brings in in roughly $26 billion annually in revenue).
405
See Michael Hunter Schwarz & Jeremiah A. Ho, Curriculum Reforms at Washburn
University School of Law, in Reforming Legal Education: Law Schools at the Crossroads 41,
42–43 (David M. Moss & Debra Moss Curtis eds., 2012).
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has not.406 But public accommodations are important sites for inclusion
into society. The relative paucity of work in this area highlights the
limited vocabulary legal scholarship has for thinking about law,
recreation, and leisure. Regina Austin puts it best: it is difficult to imagine
a conception of good life that does not entail a fair measure of leisure—
much of which occurs in public accommodations.407
This Article focuses on a limited category of public accommodations
(bars, restaurants, and nightclubs) that some people may not frequent. Yet
the focus on a specific subset still highlights how these spaces, and public
accommodations more generally, have been and continue to be important
sites of meaning-making, group formation, and political mobilization.408
Whether it be nightlife, amusement parks, beaches, swimming pools,
movie theaters, or the like, public accommodations are important places
people visit for “the purpose of engaging in pleasurable, generally
nonwork-related or after-hours pursuits.”409 Such leisure pursuits are
important features of modern living.410 But as history has shown, public

406
For voting rights see Samuel Issacharoff, Pamela S. Karlan & Richard H. Pildes, The
Law of Democracy: Legal Structure of the Political Process (4th ed. 2012); James A. Gardner
& Guy-Uriel Charles, Election Law in the American Political System (2d ed. 2018). For
employment law and discrimination see Mark Rothstein & Lance Liebman, Employment Law
(6th ed. 2007). For education law see Michael J. Kaufman & Sherelyn R. Kaufman, Education
Law, Policy, and Practice: Cases and Materials (4th ed. 2018); Charles J. Russo, Reutter’s The
Law of Public Education (6th ed. 2006). Housing falls within property and/or land use law
and casebooks. See Stewart E. Sterk, Eduardo M. Peñalver & Sara C. Bronin, Land Use
Regulation (2d ed. 2016); Joseph William Singer, Bethany R. Berger, Nestor M. Davidson &
Eduardo Moisés Peñalver, Property Law: Rules, Policies, and Practices (6th ed. 2014). For
book-length treatments on housing and discrimination by legal scholars see Richard R. W.
Brooks & Carol M. Rose, Saving the Neighborhood: Racially Restrictive Covenants, Law,
and Social Norms (2013); Richard Rothstein, The Color of Law: A Forgotten History of How
Our Government Segregated America (2017). The criminal procedure story is well-told. See
Michael J. Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the Struggle for
Racial Equality (2004).
407
Austin, supra note 71, at 667.
408
Id. at 670.
409
Id. at 668. See generally John Wilson, Politics and Leisure (1988) (discussing how leisure
is treated by differently-structured political states); A Handbook of Leisure Studies (Chris
Rojek, Susan M. Shaw & A.J. Veal eds., 2006) (collecting a variety of essays on the origins,
nature, and analysis of leisure); Robert A. Stebbins, Serious Leisure, Society, May 2001, at 53
(comparing a light-hearted, simple, and unsatisfying “casual leisure” with a more substantial
“serious leisure” which requires time and effort to master and generates more lasting rewards);
Sociology of Leisure: A Reader (C. Critcher, P. Bramham & A. Tomlinson eds., 1995).
410
A Handbook of Leisure Studies, supra note 409, at 1–2.
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accommodations are not insulated from the vagaries of social identity.411
And while this Article has focused primarily on race and sex, there are a
host of other relevant categories that are important to consider in the
public accommodations context, as the enduring battle for disability rights
and the thorny questions around religious freedom and sexual orientation
teach us.412 This Article’s excavation of velvet rope discrimination
supplies a history, analyses, and tangible normative suggestions that
might bring us closer to the equality norms embodied in our antidiscrimination laws.

411

See sources cited supra note 137 (describing movements to desegregate American public
accommodations); Ricard Gil & Justin Marion, Residential Segregation, Discrimination, and
African-American Theater Entry During Jim Crow, 108 J. Urb. Econ. 18, 18–19 (2018).
412
See sources cited supra note 25 (noting recent scholarship on sexual orientation, religion,
and disability in the context of public accommodations law).

